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THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES: How THE 
ACADEMY DEALS WITH SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Anne Lawton' 
Sexual harassment is an instance of moral exclusion, whereby members 
of a relatively poweiful group conduct their lives in their own interest, 
sometimes at the expense of a relatively powerless group, in such a way 
that any harm is denied, diminished or justified .. .. To exploit this world 
view, one need not be poweiful, one simply needs to be a member of the 
powerful group. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite increased awareness of and public attention to sexual harassment 
over the past ten to fifteen years, the incidence of sexual harassment remains 
disturbingly high both in the workplace and on university campuses. Sexual 
harassment, in any setting, can have deleterious effects. But on college 
campuses, sexual harassment creates unique problems. Because colleges and 
universities serve as the gatekeepers to good jobs, financial security, and 
professional life, sexual harassment compromises the educational mission of 
higher education and reinforces existing patterns of job sex segregation. 
For more than a decade, many universities have responded to the problem 
t. Assistant Professor, Miami University. A.B., M.B.A., J.D., University of Michigan. 
This Article is based on my experience with the sexual harassment grievance procedure at Miami 
University in Oxford, Ohio. 
For their support and assistance, I wish to thank the following persons: Thomas, Dorothy, and Kathy 
Lawton, Alicia Chavez, Charlie Conn, Carla Corroto, Dan Herron, Deborah Herron, Debra Hughes, Anne 
Koehler, Moe Lage, Toni Lester, Rebecca Luzadis, Kimberly Mendenhall, Karen Miksch, Lynda Oswald, 
Sarah Poston, Joshua Schwarz, Kay Snavely, Michael Treglia, Lynette Unger, Lu-in Wang, Elaine Yakura, and 
the members of the Management Department at Miami University. 
This Article is critical of many university sexual harassment procedures. I do not, however, wish to 
attribute fault to individual university attorneys or equal employment opportunity personnel, many of whom 
were quite willing to provide information to me and answer questions that I had about policies and procedures. 
I would like to mention the following persons in particular: (I) Denise Andrews, University Counsel, 
University of Maryland at College Park; (2) Sandy Fagan, Assistant Director, Affirmative Action Office, and 
Jennifer Aviles, formerly the Senior Program Coordinator, Commission on the Status of Women, University of 
Arizona; (3) Kristen Gray, Hope College; (4) Annela Lopez and Joe A. Powell, Office of the Vice President for 
Business Affairs, University of Texas at Austin; (5) Carmen McKines, Title IX Compliance Officer, and 
Michael R Smith, Assistant ChancellorOLegal Affairs, University of California at Berkeley; (6) Robin Parker, 
General Counsel, Miami University; (7) Linda H. Millstone, Director, Equal Employment Opportunity Office, 
University of Texas at Austin; (8) Jennifer Modestou, Affirmative Action Data Manager, University of Iowa; 
(9) Steven Prevaux, Associate General Counsel, University of Florida; and (I 0) Julie Sweitzer, Acting Director, 
Office of Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action, University of Minnesota at Twin Cities. 
I. Sharon Toffey Shepela & Laurie L. Levesque, Poisoned Waters: Sexual Harassment and the College 
Climate, 38 SEX ROLES 589, 607 (1998) (citing Alan Vaux, Paradigmatic Assumptions in Sexual Harassment 
Research: Being Guided Without Being Misled, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 116, 132 (1993)). 
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of sexual harassment by drafting internal policies and grievance procedures. In 
their public policies, colleges and universities express outrage about sexual 
harassment, stating a firm commitment to eliminating it on campus. 2 Sexual 
harassment is decried as "reprehensible"3 and a violation of "the dignity of 
individuals.'>'~ Efforts to eliminate such harassment are depicted as "the decent, 
humane, [and] ethical thing to do.''5 Yet few women6 invoke these internal 
sexual harassment grievance procedures. The question is, why? The answer lies, 
in part, with the policies and procedures themselves. 
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 7 the Supreme Court made notice to the 
employer, and hence, procedures on sexual harassment, the focal point in most 
cases of employer liability for workplace harassment. Prior to the Court's 
decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 8 the same 
standards. of liability applied, whether the case involved liability for the 
harassment of employees .under Title Vll, or of students under Title IX.9 As a 
result, Meritor created incentives for educational institutions to develop sexual 
harassment policies. 10 Other than exhorting institutions to develop policies that 
2. See, e.g., THE UNIVERSITY OF ARizoNA, iNrERIM SEXUAL HARAsSMENT POLICY [hereinafter ARizoNA 
POLICY] (on file with author) ('The University of Arizona ... requires an environment free of sexual harassment 
as defined in this Sexual Harassment Policy .... ");UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY CAMPUS POLICY ON 
SEXUAL HARAsSMENT AND COMPLAINT REsoLunON PROCEDURES § I [hereinafter BERKELEY POLICY] (on file with 
author) ("[I]he University is strongly opposed to sexual harassment .... "); UNNERSITY OF MARYLAND AT 
COLLEGE PARK, UMCP POLICY AND PROCEDURES ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT§ A (1991) [hereinafter MARYLAND 
POLICY] (on file with author) ("UMCP is committed to maintaining a worlting and learning environment in which 
students, faculty, and staff can develop intellectually, professionally, personally, and socially .... The Campus 
prohibits sexual harassment"); UNIVERSITY OF MINNEsOTA, SEXUAL HARAsSMENT GUIDELINES§ I [hereinafter 
MINNESOTA GUIDELINES] (on file with author) ("Sexual harassment ... should be everyone's concern."); The Ohio 
State University, Human Resources Policy and Procedure Manual (1993) (visited July 9, 1998) 
<http://www.ohr.ohio-state.edu/policy/115pol.htm> [hereinafter OSU Policy] ("Sexual harassment is unlawful 
and impedes the realization of the University's mission of distioction in education, scholarship, and service."); 
University of Florida, Sexual Harassment: President's Message (visited July 16, 1998) 
<http://www.aa.ufl.edu/aalaffactlharass/message.htm> ("Sexual harassment at the University of Florida will not 
be tolernted and should not be ignored."); University of Iowa, Sexual Harassment and Consensual Relationships 
§4.1a(l) (visited April 21, 1999) <http://www.uiowa.edu/-Qur/opmanual/ii/04.htm> [hereinafter Iowa Policy] 
("Relationships involving sexual harassment or discrimination have no place within the University."). 
The policies on the Internet are current. See E-mail message from Gina Lee, Office Associate, Ohio State 
University-Human Resources, to Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami University (Apr. 22, 1999) (on file 
with author); Telephone conversation between Steven Prevaux, Associate Genernl Counsel, University of Florida, 
and Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami University (Apr. 21, 1999) [hereinafter Florida Conversation] 
(notes on file with author); E-mail message from Grainne Martin, Associate Director and Compliance Officer, 
University of Iowa, to Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami University (Apr. 22, 1999) (on file with author). 
Both Ohio State and Florida are making some revisions to their policies. Changes to the Florida policy will be 
posted on the University's sexual harassment web site. See Florida Conversation, supra. 
3. Iowa Policy, supra note 2, Div. I,§ 4.1a(l). 
4. OSU Policy, supra note 2. 
5. MINNESOTA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, §I. 
6. While men can be the victims of sexual harassment, the research shows that sexual harassment 
disproportionately affects women, both at work and at school. In addition, most harassers are male, not female. 
See infra Part I.A. & B. Hence, in this Article, when referring to the victim of harassment, I use "women," 
"woman," or "female." When referring to the accused or the sexual harasser, I use "men," "man," or "male." 
7. 477U.S.57(1986). 
8. 118 s. Ct. 1989 (1998). 
9. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or 
Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034-1, 12,039 n.l8 (1997) [hereinafter Sexual Harassment Guidance]. 
I 0. The Court's discussion in Merit or of employer liability sent a strong message that employers needed 
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do not require women to complain to the harasser, 11 the Court provided no 
guidelines for developing effective sexual harassment policies and procedures. 
Unfortunately, neither the lower federal courts nor the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") or Department of Education ("DOE") 
stepped in to fill the breach. 12 
As a result, the law created no incentives for schools to develop 
expeditious, effective, and simple procedures for resolving sexual harassment 
complaints because liability seldom attached for adopting long, complex, and 
burdensome procedures. Instead, because of the strong tradition of self-
governance within academic institutions, sexual harassment policies and 
procedures reflect the interests of those with the most power, i.e., tenured 
professors, rather than the results of research on what constitute effective 
mechanisms for sexual harassment reporting. What has resulted is a system in 
which lip service is paid to the eradication of sexual harassment, but scant 
attention is given to evaluating the efficacy of current policies and procedures or 
determining why so few women officially report harassment. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements· on 
institutional liability create few incentives for educational institutions to develop 
procedures that will fulfill the promise to eliminate sexual harassment on 
campus. In its two most recent Title Vll cases, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton13 
and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 14 the Court noted that "Title VII is designed 
to encourage the creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance 
mechanisms."15 But, once again, the Court provided almost no guidance to the 
lower federal courts about the parameters of an effective grievance procedure. 
And, in Gebser, the Court effectively insulated educational institutions from 
liability for student harassment under Title IX by requiring student victims to 
demonstrate that a school official with authority to remedy the harassment acted 
with deliberate indifference in handling the student's sexual harassment 
complaint. 16 For Title IX, then, the presence or absence of a grievance procedure 
appears to make little difference to a determination of liability. 
This Article argues that the law has failed to hold institutions of higher 
education accountable for developing sexual harassment procedures that 
simply do not work for the vast majority of women on campus. The absence 
to develop polices that "address sexual harassment in particular" in order to reduce their exposure to liability 
for sexual harassment. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. In interpreting Title IX, the Department of Education 
encouraged, but did not require, educational institutions to develop "polic[ies] and procedure[ s) specifically 
addressing sexual harassment .... "Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 9, at 12,038. This meant that 
schools needed a specific sexual harassment policy and procedure for employees, but not for students. 
II. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73. 
12. See Dana S. Connell, Effective Sexual Harassment Policies: Unexpected Lessons from Jacksonville 
Shipyards, 17 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 191, 191 (1991) ("Unfortunately, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) and courts have offered little guidance to employers regarding the elements of a 
competent sexual harassment policy. As a result, many employers have adopted policies that are, at best, 
ineffective."). 
13. 118 s. Ct. 2275 (1998). 
14. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998). 
15. !d. at 2270. 
16. 118 S. Ct. at 1999. 
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of any meaningful external check on procedure means that forces within the 
academy shape and define the procedures available for sexual harassment 
victims. Yet the tradition of self-governance coupled with the institution of 
tenure increase the potential within academia for creating procedures that 
disproportionately burden the victims of sexual harassment. These 
procedures, in tum, have created strong disincentives to report harassment. 
Part I of this Article summarizes the research on the incidence of sexual 
harassment both in the workplace and inside academic institutions. The research 
demonstrates that the incidence of sexual harassment has not declined over the 
past twenty years, despite the adoption of sexual harassment policies and 
procedures by corporations and academic institutions. Part II explores the 
discrepancy between the actual incidence of harassment and the reporting of 
harassment within institutions. The existing research has documented an 
underreporting problem in the workplace. Because few institutions of higher 
education make public their sexual harassment records, this Article summarizes 
the results of a public records request for sexual harassment complaints, policies, 
and procedures from ten large public universities. The documents provided 
demonstrate that underreporting is also a significant problem on college 
campuses. Part III of this Article explores the reasons for underreporting. The 
available research indicates that victims rarely report harassment, in large part 
due to concerns about the fairness and efficacy of internal reporting procedures. 
An examination of university sexual harassment policies and procedures reveals 
that most universities erect significant procedural barriers to reporting. 
In Part IV, this Article proposes several steps that universities may 
undertake in order to increase the likelihood that women will report harassment. 
Universities and the courts alike should examine the social science literature on 
sexual harassment and underreporting. The value of sexual harassment law is its 
influence on the everyday operations of an organization. If procedural barriers 
foster underreporting, then the courts need to provide legal incentives for 
institutions of higher education to dismantle these barriers. 
I. THE INCIDENCE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
The statistics on the incidence of sexual harassment in the workplace and 
within academic institutions tell a troubling story. While incidence rates vary, 
studies show that anywhere from one-third to one-half of all women report that 
they have been sexually harassed on the job. 17 The percentage of women 
17. See generally James E. Gruber, The Impact of Male Work Environments and Organizational Policies 
on Women's Experiences of Sexual Harassment, 12 GENDER & Soc'v 301,308 (1998)(43% of a large, random 
sample of Canadian women reported experiencing one of II forms of unwanted sexual attention, ranging from 
sexual jokes and remarks to touching to sexual assault, during the 12 months prior to the survey); James E. 
Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment: An Analysis of Sociocultural, 
Organizational, and Personal Resource Models, 67 Soc. Sci. Q. 814, 818 (1986) (over 36% of a sample of 150 
female blue-collar workers in an auto assembly plant reported sexually harassing behaviors at work); Kimberly 
T. Schneider et al., Job-Related and Psychological Effects of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Empirical 
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experiencing harassment on campus is similar. 18 Most troubling is that the 
incidence of sexual harassment has declined little, if at all, in almost twenty 
years, despite widespread public attention to the issue. 
A. The Workplace 
In 1980, the United States Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") 
conducted the first major survey of sexual harassment in the workplace. 19 The 
MSPB report found that within the prior two-year period, forty-two percent of 
the female employees and fifteen percent of the male employees20 had 
experienced some form of unwanted sexual attention, which the MSPB report 
labeled "sexual harassment. "21 
In 1987 and again in 1994, the MSPB conducted follow-up surveys to 
measure the incidence of sexual harassment in the federal workplace. 22 The 
Evidence From Two Organizations, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 401, 402 (1997) ("The prevalence of such 
harassment in the workplace is now acknowledged to be widespread, with some estimates suggesting that as 
many as one of every two women will experience a sexually harassing behavior at some point during their 
working lives.") (citations omitted); Brenda C. Coleman, A Third of Female Doctors Report Sex Harassment, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 23, 1998, at SA (almost 37% of female doctors reported having been sexually 
harassed). 
18. See generally Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment in 
Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. !52, 170 (1988) (31% of female students in large-
scale university study reported experiencing gender harassment); Christina Risley-Curtiss & Walter W. 
Hudson, Sexual Harassment of Social Work Students, 13 AFFILIA 190, 196-202 (1998) (48% of 189 female 
social work students reported "an occasional episode" of harassing behavior at school or in field placements); 
Linda J. Rubin & Sherry B. Borgers, Sexual Harassment in Universities During the 1980s, 23 SEX ROLES 397, 
405 ( 1990) ("When examining the incidence of sexual harassment in universities a pattern emergesDit exists as 
a common occurrence in our universities. While reported frequencies vary, it is suggested that 30% may be a 
reliable estimate.") (citations omitted); Shepela & Levesque, supra note I, at 592 ("The most extensive surveys 
of academic sexual harassment report incidence rates of 20% to 40% for gender harassment of women.") 
(citations omitted} (emphasis in original); Coleman, supra note 17, at A5 (31% of female medical students 
experience gender harassment and 20% experience sexual harassment in medical school). But see Eric L. Dey 
et al., Betrayed by the Academy: The Sexual Harassment of Women College Faculty, 67 J. HIGHER EDUC. 149, 
157 ( 1996) (15% of women faculty said they had been sexually harassed}. 
19. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT 
A PROBLEM? (1981) (hereinafter MSPB REPORT]. The Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") undertook 
the study of sexual harassment at the request of the Subcommittee on Investigations of the House of 
Representatives' Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. See id. at iii. The MSPB compiled its data from 
questionnaires mailed to 23,964 male and female federal government employees in 1980. It analyzed data from 
20,083 returned questionnaires. See id. at A-3, A-4. The MSPB survey asked employees whether they had 
experienced any of the following seven categories of unwanted sexual attention at work: (I) uninvited sexual 
teasing, jokes, remarks, or questions; (2) uninvited sexually suggestive looks or gestures; (3) uninvited pressure 
for dates; ( 4) uninvited and deliberate touching, leaning over, cornering, or pinching; ( 5) uninvited pressure for 
sexual favors; (6) uninvited letters, telephone calls, or materials of a sexual nature; or (7) actual or attempted 
rape or sexual assault. See id. at B-1, B-2. For a copy of the MSPB questionnaire, see id. at app.C. 
20. See id. at 33. 
21. In all three of its reports, the MSPB uses the term "sexual harassment," even though it acknowledges 
that certain behaviors in the survey, e.g., sexual jokes, if infrequent, might not satisfy the legal definition of 
sexual harassment. Nonetheless, the purpose of the survey, according to the MSPB, was to "not only ... 
avoid[] situations in which a court would find a violation of law, but also [to] prevent[ ] the creation of an 
unpleasant, unproductive work atmosphere." U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES 3 (1995) (hereinafter MSPB 
UPDATE II]. 
22. In its 1987 follow-up study, the MSPB mailed questionnaires to approximately 13,000 federal 
employees; 8523 responded0a response rate of about 66%. See U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: AN UPDATE 9 (1988) (hereinafter MSPB UPDATE]. The 
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results of the MSPB studies proved disturbing because they highlighted the 
persistence of harassing behaviors in the workplace, despite widespread 
education and training efforts. 
In 1994, 44 percent of women and 19 percent of men responding to our 
survey reported that they had experienced some form of unwanted sexual 
attention during the preceding 2 yearsDrates similar to 1987's 42 percent 
and 14 percent. The fact that the incidence of unwanted sexual attention 
has not decreased since the last Government-wide survey is naturally a 
cause for concern. Despite very widespread training and information 
efforts that have successfully raised workforce sensitivity to the issues 
surrounding sexual harassment, the persistence of this amount of 
unwanted sexual attention in the Federal workplace suggests that the 
Government's programs to eradicate the problem need some serious 
reexamination. 23 
The MSPB surveys proved valuable not only because they demonstrated 
the intractability of sexual harassment, but also because they revealed 
patterns of behavior in the workplace. In all three surveys, sexual teasing, 
jokes, questions, and remarks ranked as the most prevalent form of unwanted 
behavior, with anywhere from thirty-three to thirty-seven percent of the 
female respondents stating they had experienced this behavior at work during 
the two years prior to the MSPB survey.24 Subsequent surveys, conducted 
both in the workplace and within educational institutions, demonstrate that 
this form of behavior, by far, is the most prevalent. Nonetheless, a substantial 
number of women in the MSPB surveys reported having experienced 
deliberate touching, leaning, or cornering (between fifteen percent and 
twenty-four percent),25 pressure for dates (between thirteen percent and 
twenty-six percent),26 and pressure for sexual favors (between seven percent 
1987 survey repeated many of the questions from the 1980 study so that the MSPB could obtain data on trends 
related to particular behaviors. See id. In its latter study, the MSPB also requested information from the heads 
of the 22 largest federal agencies about efforts to curtail sexual harassment within their agencies. See id. 
In 1994, the MSPB mailed questionnaires to approximately 13,200 federal employees, chosen randomly 
from a computerized Central Personnel Date File. More than 61% of the employees (approximately 8052) 
completed the questionnaires. See MSPB UPDATE II, supra note 21, at 1-2. (The 1995 report states that the 
MSPB received more than 8,000 completed questionnaires, but does not provide the exact number of 
respondents. The 61% response rate provided in the report, however, means that 8052 employees responded to 
the mailed questionnaires.) In order to compare data across the 1980, 1987, and 1994 studies, the MSPB 
repeated many questions from the earlier surveys. See id. In addition, the MSPB added several questions to 
assess employee attitudes about workplace relationships. See id. For a copy of the survey, see id. at Appendix 
I. 
23. MSPB UPDATE II, supra note 21, at viii (bold in original). 
24. See MSPB REPORT, supra note 19, at 37, fig.3-3 (33% of female respondents in 1980); MSPB 
UPDATE, supra note 22, at 2-3 (35% of female respondents in 1987); and MSPB UPDATE II, supra note 21, at 
16, tbl.4 (37% of female respondents in 1994). 
25. The figures increased for this category of behavior between 1980 and 1994. Compare MSPB 
REPORT, supra note 19, at 37, fig.3-3 (15% in 1980) with MSPB UPDATE II, supra note 21, at 16, tbl.4 (24% in 
1994). 
26. There was a substantial drop in this category of harassment between 1980 and 1994. Compare MSPB 
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and nine percent).27 Perhaps most disturbing was the four-fold increase 
among women respondents for actual or attempted rape or assault, climbing 
from one percent in 1980 to four percent in 1994.28 
The MSPB surveys also detected certain traits that characterized victims 
of sexual harassment. Later studies confirm many of the MSPB findings. 
First, women are much more likely to experience sexual harassment than are 
men. For example, the 1994 study found that for every category of unwanted 
sexual behavior, two to three times more women than men identified having 
experienced that behavior on the job.29 
Second, age and marital status affected the risk of harassment among 
women. Younger women, i.e., those between the ages of twenty and forty-
four, and single or divorced women were more likely targets of sexual 
harassment. 30 In addition, women were more at risk for harassment if they 
held a nontraditional job, worked for a male boss, or worked in a 
"predominantly male environrnent."31 Finally, co-workers accounted for more 
than forty-one percent of the harassing behavior experienced by women on 
the job.32 
In its study of federal government employees at the National Institutes of 
Health ("NIH"}, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") found levels and 
patterns of harassment similar to those found in the MSPB surveys. 33 The 
GAO mailed questionnaires to a stratified random sample34 of 13,473 white-
REPORT, supra note 19, at 37, fig.3·3 (26% in 1980) with MSPB UPDATE II, supra note 21, at 16, tbl.4 (13% in 
1994). 
27. Compare MSPB REPORT, supra note 19, at 37, fig.3-3 (nine percent in 1980) with MSPB UPDATE II, 
supra note 21, at 16, tbl.4 (seven percent in 1994). 
28. Compare MSPB REPORT, supra note 19, at 37, fig.3-3 with MSPB UPDATE II, supra note 21, at 16, 
tbl.4. 
29. With the exception of sexual teasing, jokes, remarks, and questions, which 14% of the men 
identified, no more than nine percent of the male respondents said that they had experienced any of the seven 
other categories of unwanted sexual attention. (lbe MSPB added an eighth category[}stalking!lto its list of 
behaviors in 1994.) By comparison, between 10% and 37% of the women respondents said that they had 
experienced five of the eight categories of unwanted sexual behaviors listed on the MSPB questionnaire. See 
MSPB UPDATE II, supra note 21, app. 2. 
In the 1987 MSPB survey, women were three times as likely as men to have experienced six of the seven 
categories of unwanted sexual attention identified in the MSPB questionnaire. See id. 
30. See MSPB REPORT, supra note 19, at 42, tbl.4-l; MSPB UPDATE, supra note 22, at 20; MSPB 
UPDATE II, supra note 21, at 16-17. 
31. MSPB REPORT, supra note 19, at 42, tb1.4-l; MSPB UPDATE, supra note 22, at 20; MSPB UPDATE II, 
supranote2l,at 16-17. 
32. See MSPB UPDATE, supra note 22, at 20 (69% of women said a co-worker had harassed them, while 
29% indicated the harasser was a supervisor); MSPB UPDATE II, supra note 21, at 18-19 (77% of women 
reported their harasser was a co-worker). 
33. For an explanation of the General Accounting Office's ("GAO") survey methodology, see GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuB. NO. 95-192, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: Nlli's HANDLING OF ALLEGED 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SEX DISCRIMINATION MATTERS app. III (1995) [hereinafter Nlli REPORT]. 
34. "A stratified random sample is one obtained by separating the population elements into 
nonoverlapping groups, called strata, and then selecting a simple random sample from each stratum." RICHARD 
L. SCHEAFFER ET AL., ELEMENTARY SURVEY SAMPLING 97 (4th ed. 1990) (emphasis in original). For example, 
in a government organization, responses may vary based on location of office. Therefore, a stratified random 
sample would divide the entire population of workers for a particular agency and then randomly select 
participants for the survey from the samples at each office location. In order to obtain a simple random sample, 
take "a sample of size n ... drawn from a population of size N in such a way that every possible sample of size 
n has the same chance of being selected ... . "/d. at 56. 
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collar NIH employees. The surveys questioned employees about sex 
discrimination and sexual harassment. Of those employees responding, thirty-
two percent reported having experienced some form of unwanted, uninvited 
sexual attention during the prior year.35 Women reported harassing behavior 
at a higher rate than did men: thirty-eight percent of the women and twenty-
four percent of the men responded that they had experienced unwanted sexual 
attention at work in the prior year.36 This difference in experiencing 
harassment might account for the survey's finding that women (twenty-one 
percent of female respondents) were more likely than men (eight percent of 
male respondents) to view sexual harassment as a serious problem at the 
NIH.37 The GAO survey found that the most prevalent form of harassment 
consisted of gossip about sexual behavior, sexual teasing, jokes, and remarks, 
and negative sexual comments about certain groups, e.g., women, men, and 
homosexuals. 38 
B. Academic Institutions 
Large-scale studies, such as those by the MSPB or the NIH, of the 
incidence of sexual harassment on campus are more difficult to find. 
Congress has requested and obtained a comprehensive study of sexual 
harassment in the military academies.39 In 1993, the American Association of 
University Women ("AAUW") released the results of its survey of 1632 
public school students in grades eight through eleven, which found that 
eighty-one percent of students reported experiencing various harassing 
behaviors.40 The Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR"), 
which is responsible for enforcing Title IX, recognizes that sexual harassment 
affects "significant number[s] of students."41 And, more recently, the 
Supreme Court in Gebser noted that sexual harassment "is an all too common 
aspect of the educational experience. "42 
Of the 4110 employees to whom the GAO mailed surveys, 2642 employees returned surveys that the 
GAO could use--a 64% response rate. See NIH REPORT, supra note 33, at 45. 
35. See NIH REPORT, supra note 33, at 5. 
36. See id. at 7. 
37. See id. 
38. Seeid. 
39. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuB. No. 94-6, DOD SERVICE ACADEMIES: MORE ACTIONS 
NEEDED TO ELIMINATE SEXUAL HARAsSMENT 26 (I 994) [hereinafter DOD REPORT) (study of sexual harassment at 
the Military Academy, the Air Force Academy, and the Naval Academy found that 93-97 % of the women 
students had experienced at least one sexually harassing event during the 1991 academic year). A follow-up study 
found that 70-80% of female students at the Military Academy, the Air Force Academy, and the Naval Academy 
reported experiencing "at least I of the 10 forms of sexual harassment on a recurring basis." GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuB. NO. 95-58, DOD SERVICE ACADEMIES: UPDATE ON EXTENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 8 
(1995) [hereinafter DOD REPORT II). 
40. See THE AMERICAN AsSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, HOSTILE 
HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1993). The questionnaire 
given to students asked about specific behaviors, not whether they had experienced sexual harassment. 
41. Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 9, at 12,034. 
42. 118 S.Ct. 1989,2000 (1998). 
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Over the past twenty years, social science researchers also have 
produced a number of studies that attempt to measure the incidence of sexual 
harassment on college campuses.43 In the 1980s, Fitzgerald and her 
colleagues undertook a large sample study of sexual harassment at two large 
universities: one in the Midwest and the other located on the West Coast.44 
The researchers administered the Sexual Experiences Questionnaire 
("SEQ")45 to the following groups: (1) 1394 female and male undergraduate 
and graduate students at University 1; (2) 1205 female and male 
undergraduate and graduate students at University 2; and (3) 307 female 
faculty, staff, and administrators at University 1.46 Fitzgerald and her 
colleagues asked respondents to identify whether they had experienced more 
than twenty different types of unwanted sexual or sexist behavior, ranging 
from suggestive stories and crudely sexual remarks to threats of retaliation for 
failure to cooperate sexually.47 
Like the authors of the MSPB surveys, Fitzgerald and her colleagues found 
that sex proved to be a potent predictor of who experienced sexual harassment 
on campus. 
Another conclusion, based on the two university data sets, is that men (at 
least male students) are quite unlikely to be harassed ... [S]ome have 
suggested that [sexual harassment] may also be a problem for men. Our 
findings, like those of other investigators, suggest that this is unlikely to 
be so ... [I]n the present sample, harassing experiences other than Levell 
(gender harassment) were virtually nonexistent [for male students] ... 
While it is clear that sexual behavior in the classroom or workplace is 
inappropriate no matter the target, it is equally clear that this is 
overwhelmingly a barrier for women students and workers .... 48 
43. See supra note 18. 
44. See Fitzgerald et al., supra note 18. 
45. The Sexual Experiences Questionnaire ("SEQ") "represents particularly sound work in (the] domain 
[of sexual harassment research]." Richard D. Arvey & Marcie A. Cavanaugh, Using Surveys to Assess the 
Prevalence of Sexual Harassment: Some Methodological Problems, 51 J. Soc. ISSUES 39, 49 (1995). Unlike 
some sexual harassment questionnaires, the SEQ asks respondents about particular kinds of unwanted and 
uninvited sexual behavior before asking whether respondents have experienced sexual harassment. As a result, 
researchers can compare the behaviors identified by survey respondents against perceptions of harassing 
behavior. 
In addition, researchers have tested the SEQ cross-culturally--{)n women in both the United States and 
Brazil-and on both working women and female students. In 1995, Gelfand and her colleagues concluded that 
the "SEQ provides a psychometrically sound measurement strategy that can be used instead of the checklist 
methodology typically employed in most prevalence studies." Michele J. Gelfand et al., The Structure of Sexual 
Harassment: A Corifirmatory Analysis Across Cultures and Settings, 47 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 164, 174 
(1995). 
46. See Fitzgerald, et al., supra note 18, at 156, 165. The researchers referred to the two universities as 
University I and University 2. They did not identify which school was located in the Midwest and which was 
on the West Coast. 
47. For a complete list ofbehaviors, see Fitzgerald et al., supra note 18, at 160-61, 166-67, tbls.l & 2. 
48. !d. at 172-73 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
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The types of sexual behaviors reported by women on campus followed 
patterns found in the earlier MSPB surveys. Fitzgerald and her colleagues 
found that approximately one-third of the women had experienced gender 
harassment,49 while one in seven female respondents said that either a 
professor or co-worker had engaged in seductive behavior. 50 
[G]ender harassment and seductive behaviors are the most common 
situations experienced by women students and workers ... and they are 
experienced quite widely. On the average, slightly over 31% of women 
students and 34% of working women reported some form of gender 
harassment, while about 15% of the students and 17% of the employed 
women had experienced seductive sexual approaches from their 
professors or co-workers ... Such behaviors constitute what can be called 
condition ofwork (or education) harassment, and while not as widely 
recognized as the more dramatic quid pro quo behaviors discussed below, 
create an offensive and often intimidating environment in which women 
must work or study. 51 
A much lower percentage of women students, faculty, staff, and 
administrators reported experiencing sexual bribery,52 sexual coercion,53 or 
sexual imposition. 54 Nonetheless, the rates reported translate to substantial 
absolute numbers of women who experience these more severe forms of 
behavior. For example, between five percent and fourteen percent of the 
undergraduate and graduate women reported unwanted attempts to fondle or 
touch them. 55 Extrapolating to the larger university population, using the 
conservative five percent estimate, means that I 000 women students at these 
two academic institutions had experienced unwanted attempts to touch or 
fondle them.56 
49. The researchers defined "gender harassment" as "generalized sexist remarks and behaviors," such as 
telling offensive jokes, making seductive or crudely sexual remarks, leering and ogling, and making sexist 
remarks. /d. at 157, 160-61, 166-67, tbls.l & 2. 
50. Seductive behavior involved "inappropriate and offensive, but essentially sanction-free, sexual 
advances" and included unwanted discussion of sexual matters, requests for dates, and sexual propositions. /d. 
51. /d. at 170 (emphasis in original). 
52. The authors defined sexual bribery as the "solicitation of sexual activity or other sex-linked behavior 
by promise of rewards." /d. at 157. For example, if a professor offers a student an "A" in a course in exchange 
for sexual favors, this behavior constitutes sexual bribery. 
53. Sexual coercion involves the threat of punishment in order to obtain sexual favors. See id. An 
example of sexual coercion is when a male professor tells a female student that he will tum her in for cheating 
unless she "cooperates" with him sexually. 
54. Sexual imposition includes unwanted or forceful attempts to touch or fondle, and forceful attempts to 
obtain sex. See id. at 160-61, tbl.l. 
55. The incidence rate varied by university and by graduate versus undergraduate student status. At 
University 1, eight percent of the undergraduate and graduate women reported unwanted attempts to touch or 
fondle them. At University 2, five percent of the undergraduate women and 14% of the graduate women 
reported such incidents on the survey. See id. at 160-61, tbl.l. 
56. Each university enrolled approximately 20,000 students. See id. at 156. The study provides no 
breakdown of the student population by sex. Assuming, however, that women constitute approximately 50% of 
the population at each university, five percent of the 10,000 women students equals 500 women students at 
each university who reported unwanted touching or fondling. 
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In a more recent study involving university women, Schneider and her 
colleagues administered the SEQ to two samples of working women, one of 
which was a group of 115 faculty and 185 staff at a Midwestern university. 57 
Neither sample contained students. 
The SEQ, revised as a result of prior research, 58 asked participants 
whether they had experienced any of eighteen different behaviors, which 
described three types of sexual harassment: (1) gender harassment; (2) 
unwanted sexual attention; and (3) sexual coercion.59 If a woman reported 
having experienced any one of the eighteen items on the SEQ within the 
previous two-year period, she was then asked to describe the experience. If 
women identified more than one experience, the questionnaire prompted 
them to describe the incident that left the "greatest impression." 
Of the 300 university women completing the SEQ, 189 or sixty-three 
percent identified having experienced at least one of the eighteen behavior 
items on the SEQ within the prior two years. Descriptions of the harassing 
behaviors provided more information. Sixty-one percent of the women 
experiencing harassing behaviors said that the incident had occurred only 
once. 60 In measuring the impact of harassment, however, frequency is not the 
sole criterion. Even if experienced only one time, some behaviors, such as 
sexual assault, fondling, or threats for sexual non-cooperation, are severe 
enough to affect the work environment for women. As a result, it is not 
surprising that almost half of the women experiencing harassing behaviors 
(forty-eight percent) described the incident as "offensive or extremely 
offensive," while forty-four percent found the incident to be "upsetting or 
extremely upsetting."61 
IT. THE REPORTING PROBLEM 
Studies report that between one-third and one-half of women experience 
sexual harassment on the job. Similar rates of harassment hold true for 
women at institutions of higher learning. Yet magazine articles and editorials 
57. See Schneider et al., supra note 17, at 404. The other sample, not discussed here, was comprised of 447 
women who worked for a private-sector employer in the northwestern United States. For results of this sample, 
see id. at 406-07. 
58. As a result of their 1988 study, Fitzgerald and her colleagues discovered that these three categories--
gender harassment, unwanted sexual attention, and sexual coercion--more accurately described the range of 
harassing behaviors experienced by women than the original five categories of behavior used in the 1988 study. 
See Fitzgerald eta!., supra note 18, at 169. 
59. Gender harassment is "sexist behavior, crude comments or jokes of a sexual nature, and other 
behaviors that disparage the gender of the target or convey hostility toward women." Schneider et a!., supra 
note 17, at 404. Unwanted sexual attention collapses the categories of seductive behavior and sexual imposition 
used by Fitzgerald and her colleagues in their 1988 study. See Fitzgerald et al., supra note 18, at 169. 
"[U)nwanted touching, hugging, stroking, or repeated unwanted requests or pressure for dates" constitute 
unwanted sexual attention. Schneider et al., supra note 17, at 404. Finally, sexual coercion is the "implicit or 
explicit demand ... for sexual favors through the threat of negative job-related consequences or the promise of 
job-related rewards." /d. at 404. 
60. The percentages are based on the 189 women who said that they had experienced at least one of the 
18 items on the SEQ. See Schneider et a!., supra note 17, at 407. 
61. Schneider eta!., supra note 17, at 407. 
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query whether the law has gone too far in dealing with sexual harassment.62 
Newspapers assert, without citation, that "there is widespread 
acknowledgment among experts that things have got[ten] better."63 Yet the 
MSPB surveys demonstrate that the incidence of harassment in the workplace 
has not declined in almost twenty years, despite increased awareness of and 
publicity about the problem. Underreporting of sexual harassment 
partially accounts for this perception gap.64 While a significant percentage of 
women experience harassment, very few (as low as five percent in the MSPB 
surveys) officially report sexual harassment to those in authority.65 
Underreporting of harassment occurs both in the workplace and on campus. 
Women fail to report harassment for a number ofreasons.66 The end result is 
that underreporting creates the false impression that the real problem today 
lies in the abuses of the system rather than in the persistence of sexual 
harassment in the workplace and on campus. 
A. The Workplace 
In its surveys on workplace harassment, the MSPB found that most 
women use informal67 means of dealing with sexual harassment on the job. 
The most common response of victims is to ignore the harassing incident or 
to take no action whatsoever against the offender. 
[T]he most frequently occurring reaction to sexual harassment is inaction. 
The single most common response of employees who are targets of 
sexually harassing behaviors hasn't changed since the initial 
administration of MSPB's survey in 1980. That response has been, and 
continues to be, to ignore the behavior or do nothing. 68 
62. See, e.g., Robyn Blumner, A Chilling Course for Harassment Law, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 15, 1998, at 
13A; Maggie Gallagher, Feminists Inspired Rigid School Rules, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 10, 1996, at 
7B; Robert M. Vercruysse, Has the Law Gone Too Far?, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 5, 1998, at 5B; Philip Weiss, 
Don't Even Think About It (The Cupid Cops Are Watching), N.Y.TIMES MAG., May 3, 1998, at 43. 
63. Weiss, supra note 62, at 46. 
64. A backlash against feminism also accounts, in part, for the perception gap. See Marcia A. Gillespie, 
The Backlash Boogie, Ms., May/June 1998, at I; see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL 
OF GENDER INEQUALITY 96-107 (1997). It is indeed curious that the media focuses the glare of the "sexual 
harassment" spotlight on the anomalous, such as an incident in which two elementary school boys were 
suspended for kissing their female classmates. Concern for the "abuses" of the law of sexual harassment at 
times overwhelms concern for the failure of the law during the past 20 years to eliminate or even reduce the 
incidence of sexual harassment. 
65. See Laurie A. Rudman et al., Suffering in Silence: Procedural Justice Versus Gender Socialization 
Issues in University Sexual Harassment Grievance Procedures, 17 BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCH. 519, 520 
(1995). 
66. See infra Part JII.C.l-5. 
67. The MSPB defined informal action as a range of behaviors, from ignoring the incident to reporting it 
to a supervisor. See MSPB UPDATE, supra note 22, at 23-24. 
68. MSPB UPDATE II, supra note 21, at 29; see also MSPB UPDATE, supra note 22, at 24. 
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In the MSPB surveys, more than forty percent of women used other informal 
means of handling harassment, such as asking or telling the harasser to stop 
his behavior or avoiding the harasser at work.69 
Few women (between five percent and six percentf0 who experienced 
unwanted sexual attention at work reported taking formal action71 against the 
offender. Ignorance of available procedures did not account for the low 
formal reporting rate. At least three-quarters of all respondents knew about 
three of the four available channels for formal reporting and/or investigation 
of allegations of sexual harassment within their agency.72 Perhaps most 
startling was the finding "that victims were just as likely to change jobs as a 
result of sexual harassment as they were to take formal action. "73 
Similar patterns of reporting behavior surfaced in the NIH report. 
Approximately thirty-eight percent of female and twenty-four percent of male 
respondents reported some form of unwanted and uninvited sexual 
attention.74 Nonetheless, only four percent of the NIH employees who had 
experienced harassment took formal action, such as filing a sexual 
harassment complaint.75 The overwhelming majority of respondents either 
ignored the incident or did nothing (forty-five percent) or avoided the 
offender (forty percent).76 
B. Academic Institutions 
It is more difficult to obtain reporting rates for sexual harassment on 
college campuses. The EEOC has the power to "make such technical studies 
as are appropriate to effectuate the purposes and policies of [Title VII] and to 
make the results of such studies available to the public.'m But the EEOC has 
conducted no comprehensive studies of workplace sexual harassment, 
whether in the private sector or within academic institutions. Some 
researchers, such as Fitzgerald and her colleagues, have conducted large-scale 
studies of harassment within academic institutions, but many of these studies 
are limited to one or two universities. In addition, few universities make 
public the number of sexual harassment complaints filed by faculty, students, 
and staff. As a result, for those colleges that do release reporting statistics,78 
69. See, e.g., MSPB UPDATE, supra note 22, at 24. 
70. See MSPB UPDATE, supra note 22, at 27; MSPB UPDATE II, supra note 21, at 33. 
71. The MSPB defined formal action as filing a grievance about or requesting an investigation of the 
incident of harassment. See MSPB UPDATE, supra note 22, at 25. Based on this definition, the authors of the 
MSPB report estimate that fewer than five percent of women formally report sexual harassment. Many women 
considered speaking to their supervisor as formal action, even though this did not satisfy the MSPB's definition 
of formal action. See id. at 27. 
72. See MSPB UPDATE, supra note 22, at 25-26, fig.3-3; MSPB UPDATE II, supra note 21, at 33. 
73. MSPB UPDATE, supra note 22, at 27. 
74. See NIH REPoRT, supra note 33, at 7. 
75. See id. at 5. 
76. See id., app.II, at 28 (indicating that 1710 of 4292 respondents (40%) avoided the offender; 1951 of 
4292 respondents (45%) ignored the incident or did nothing). 
77. 42 U.S.C. 0 2000e-4(g)(5) (West 1998). 
78. Cornell University publishes annual and semi-annual sexual harassment reports, which are located at 
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"[i]t's difficult to know if [the reporting rate is] similar to other campuses 
because there aren't any comparable studies. •>79 
In order to obtain more data regarding reporting of sexual harassment on 
campus, I requested copies, pursuant to state public records laws, of sexual 
harassment complaints from ten large public universities.80 I requested copies 
of all formal and informal complaints of sexual harassment made during the 
past three academic years.81 
Many schools maintain separate formal and informal complaint 
mechanisms. Generally, an investigation, fact-finding, and the possibility of 
sanctions characterize formal procedures. Many schools require a written 
complaint to initiate formal sexual harassment proceedings. By comparison, 
there usually is no investigation, fact-finding, or sanctions involved in an 
informal sexual harassment procedure. A written complaint is not needed to 
initiate most informal proceedings. Thus, some universities do not have 
actual copies of informal complaints. In the event that the university did not 
have copies of informal complaints, I asked each university to provide the 
number of informal complaints made between August 1995 and June 1998. 
Finally, in order to avoid privacy problems, I explained in my records 
requests that it was acceptable if the university redacted the names of victims 
and those persons accused of sexual harassment. 
I requested sexual harassment records from the following universities: 
(1) Miami University in Oxford, Ohio ("Miami"); (2) State University of 
New York at Binghamton ("SUNY"); (3) the University of Arizona 
("Arizona"); (4) the University of California at Berkeley ("Berkeley"); (5) the 
University ofCo1orado at Boulder ("Colorado"); (6) the University of Florida 
<http://www.comell.edu/Admin/OEO.html>. The University of Iowa also has published sexual harassment 
reporting data in its student newspaper. See Sexual Harassment, DAILY IOWAN, Sept. 15, 1997. 
79. Cindy Tschampl, Harassment Survey Measures Success of Policy. IOWA DAILY, Apr. 17, 1996, at 1 
(quoting Iowa State President Martin Jischke upon release of Iowa State reporting statistics for the 1994-1995 
academic year). 
80. Because large universities account for approximately half of the total college population, I selected 
I 0 universities with student enrollments exceeding 15,000. See National Center for Education Statistics, Digest 
of Education Statistics, Postsecondary Education ~ 8 (last modified Feb. 12, 1998) 
<http://www.nces.ed.gov/pubs!digest97/d970003.html> [hereinafter Education Statistics] ("While 11% of the 
campuses enrolled 10,000 or more students, they accounted for 50% of total college enrollment.") (citation 
omitted). The University of Florida ("Florida"), the University of Minnesota ("Minnesota"), and the University 
of Texas ("Texas") are among the top 10 largest universities, based on student enrollment. See CHRON. OF 
HIGHER EDUC., ALMANAC ISSUE 17 (1998) [hereinafter ALMANAC) (based on U.S. Department of Education 
figures for the fall of 1996). Another five of the 10 universities-the University of Arizona ("Arizona"), the 
University of California at Berkeley ("Berkeley"), the University of Colorado at Boulder ("Colorado"), the 
University of Iowa ("Iowa"), and the University of Maryland at College Park ("Maryland")-are among the 50 
largest in the United States, based on student enrollment. See id. Only Miami University ("Miami") and the 
State University of New York at Binghamton ("SUNY'') do not figure in the top 50. See id. I selected Miami 
based on my personal experience with Miami's internal sexual harassment grievance procedures. 
I further narrowed my sample by selecting only public universities. I did so because I intended to request 
records pursuant to state public records laws. As units of state government, public universities are within the 
purview of public records laws. Finally, I wanted my sample to include universities from different geographical 
regions. Therefore, I chose universities from the Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, South, Southwest and West in 
order to have a more representative sampling oflarge public universities. 
81. I requested complaints for the period from August I, 1995 through early June of 1998. Copies of 
public records requests are on file with the author. 
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at Gainesville ("Florida"); (7) the University of Iowa {"Iowa"); (8) the 
University of Maryland at College Park ("Maryland"); (9) the University of 
Minnesota at Twin Cities ("Minnesota"); and ( 1 0) the University of Texas at 
Austin ("Texas") [hereinafter "public records schools"). Table I summarizes 
the universities' responses to my public records request. 
Only two of the ten public records schools (Miami and Texas) provided 
actual copies of sexual harassment complaints. Miami only disclosed copies 
of formal sexual harassment complaints; the university does not maintain 
records of informal complaints. 
Four universities (Berkeley, Florida, Maryland, and SUNY) provided 
neither copies of complaints nor annual summaries of the number of sexual 
harassment complaints filed on campus. The remaining four schools 
(Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, and Minnesota) did not produce copies of 
complaints, but did provide the number of sexual harassment complaints filed 
per year. Cumulative statistics of the number of complaints filed provides 
some information about reporting rates. But raw numbers tell us nothing 
about the time needed to complete an investigation or the sanctions imposed 
for various transgressions. As a result, critical information necessary to 
evaluate the effectiveness of grievance procedures is missing. 
1. Available Information 
Because few large-scale studies of sexual harassment on college and 
university campuses exist, it is more difficult to document the underreporting 
problem on campus. In 1994, the GAO released its initial report of sexual 
harassment at the three military academies charged with educating and 
training air force, naval, and army cadets. The report found a very high 
incidence of sexual harassment but a very low level of formal reporting of 
harassment. During the 1991 academic year, between ninety-three and ninety-
seven percent of female cadets reported experiencing harassment, with 
anywhere from fifty to seventy-six percent reporting harassing behavior on a 
"recurring basis."82 During this same academic year, only 3.7% of cadets 
(twenty-six complaints) reported incidents of sexual harassment.83 
Of course, studies of underreporting at academic military institutions 
may not accurately reflect the level of reporting of sexual harassment at 
civilian colleges and universities. Unfortunately, neither the EEOC nor the 
DOE has conducted a comprehensive study of the prevalence and reporting of 
sexual harassment on college campuses. Nonetheless, social science research 
strongly suggests that both the incidence of sexual harassment and the low 
82. See id. A follow-up report for the 1993-1994 academic year showed the following percentages of 
female cadets who reported recurring harassment: (I) Naval Academy: 70%; (2) Military Academy: 80%; and (3) 
Air Force Academy. 78%. See OOD REPORT II, supra note 39, at 8-11. 
83. There were 1415 female cadets at the three academies during the 1991 academic year. Using the 
Naval Academy's conservative 50% incidence rate for recurring harassment, 708 female cadets reported 
experiencing recurring incidents of harassing behavior. Yet only 3.7% filed complaints (26 complaints/70S 
female cadets). See id. at 20, 26. 
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level of reporting are similar in both the workplace and in academic 
settings.84 And the data provided by some of the public records' schools 
supports the conclusions of social science researchers that underreporting of 
harassment is not a phenomenon limited to the workplace. It also is a serious 
problem at institutions ofhigher learning. 
Only six universities-Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Miami, Minnesota, and 
Texas-provided either copies of sexual harassment complaints or numerical 
breakdowns of harassment complaints. All six of these institutions had 
reported levels of harassment that fell significantly below the incidence of 
harassment reported by social science researchers.85 No college or university 
in this survey of large public universities had an official reporting rate 
greater than one percent. Moreover, data constraints result in an 
exaggeration, for each school, of its official reporting rate.86 Table II provides 
official reporting rates for the institutions that released either complaints or 
reporting statistics. 
Data from Arizona demonstrates that even the exaggerated official 
reporting statistics significantly understate the actual incidence of sexual 
harassment on campus. During the past three academic years, at best only 
0.6% of female students annually reported harassment at Arizona.87 Yet this 
figure is nowhere close to the incidence of harassment reported by students at 
Arizona, according to a report completed by Arizona's Commission on the 
Status ofWomen ("Commission").88 The survey of faculty, staff, and students 
84. See generally Rudman eta!., supra note 65, at 519-20 (detailing high incidence coupled with low 
reporting of sexual harassment on campus). 
85. Fitzgerald and her colleagues found that approximately one-third of female students reported 
incidents of gender harassment, while 15% reported seductive sexual approaches from professors. Among 
undergraduate women, between five eight percent reported unwanted attempts to fondle or touch them. See 
supra Part I.B. 
86. Dividing the average number of complaints reported by each university for the past three academic 
years by the number of full-time female graduate and undergraduate students produces the reporting rate. The 
calculations do not include complaints by faculty, staff, part-time, or male students, so they overstate the 
official rate of reporting. Because most of the universities did not provide copies of actual complaints, I could 
not determine whether students, faculty, or staff made the complaints. I erred on the side of the universities and 
provided figures based on the assumption that all complaints involved only one subset (female students) of 
each campus' population. 
87. The 0.6% reporting rate is based on 57 formal and 222 informal complaints over a three-year period 
or an average of 93 complaints per academic year. See Table II. But Arizona does not keep records indicating 
the nature of informal contacts. See E-mail message from Sandy Fagan, Assistant Director, Affirmative Action 
Office, University of Arizona, to Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami University (Aug. 25, 1998) 
[hereinafter Arizona Letter] (on file with author). Thus, these 222 informal contacts include contacts about 
other employment discrimination issues, such as race, disability, and sexual orientation discrimination. 
It is highly unlikely that all 222 informal complaints involve complaints of sexual harassment. For 
example, during the 1997-1998 academic year, there were 24 formal complaints of discriminatory behavior at 
Arizona, but only 10 (or 42%) involved sexual harassment. See Communication from Sandy Fagan, Assistant 
Director, Affirmative Action Office, University of Arizona (July 15, 1998) (on file with author). If the 
percentage of sexual harassment complaints out of all discrimination complaints (42%) holds constant for 
formal and informal contacts, then only 93 of the 222 informal contacts at Arizona involve sexual harassment. 
This almost halves Arizona's official reporting rate, from 0.6% to 0.34%. (Using the 42% assumption, there 
were 150 formal complaints and informal contacts about sexual harassment during the past three academic 
years: 57 formal complaints and 93 informal contacts. Thus, on average, there were 50 sexual harassment 
complaints per year over this time period. This means that only 0.34% of full-time female students reported 
sexual harassment per year: 50 complaints out of 14,911 female students.) 
88. See UNIVERSITY OF ARizONA, COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REsULTS OF CAMPUS 
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asked both male and female respondents about their experiences with sex 
discrimination and sexual harassment. The survey asked about particular 
kinds of harassing behavior, e.g., sexual advances, touching, and seductive 
remarks about appearance. 
Of the 1223 students who completed the survey, thirteen percent 
reported that faculty members had made seductive remarks about the 
student's appearance, body, or sexual activity on more than one occasion.89 
Seven percent of students reported experiencing unwanted sexual attention 
from a faculty member a "few times or more."9° Finally, four percent of 
students reported that faculty members had made sexual advances to them a 
"few times or more."91 
The Commission's report also covered harassment of faculty and staff. 
The Commission found that thirty percent of the 1227 female respondents 
said that they had experienced sexually insulting comments or "put-downs" 
from men. 92 Eighteen percent of the women respondents reported that a man 
had touched them in a sexual way at work. 93 Two percent of the female 
respondents said that they had left a job at Arizona because of sexual 
harassment. 94 
The Commission's report demonstrates that the level of harassment at 
Arizona is much higher than the number of incidents reported through 
University channels. This is not to suggest that Arizona has a more serious 
underreporting problem than do other universities.95 The difference is that 
most universities do not conduct climate surveys so there is no mechanism 
for comparing the incidence of harassment with official reporting rates. The 
social science research on the incidence of sexual harassment on campus 
when compared with the reporting rates of public records' schools 
demonstrates that the underreporting phenomenon at Arizona is not an 
anomaly. 
The problem with underreporting is that it creates the false impression 
that sexual harassment is a rare event on campus. Men, who often are not the 
CLIMATE STUDIES ON UA EMPLOYEES AND UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS FALL 1993- SPRING 1994 [hereinafter 
ARIZONA CLIMATE SURVEY] (on file with author). The comparison is not exact because the Commission survey 
did not include graduate students; it included both male and female undergraduates. 
The Commission currently is compiling the results of a more recent survey, which has not yet been 
released. See E-mail message from Jennifer Aviles, formerly the Senior Program Coordinator, Commission on 
the Status of Women, University of Arizona, to Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami University (Sept. 18, 
1998) (on file with author). 
89. See ARIZONA CLIMATE SURVEY, supra note 88, at 16. The authors of the survey compiled the results 
according to frequency of harassing behavior. For a copy of the student survey, see id. at app.D. 
90. ld. at 16. 
91. !d. 
92. See id. at 5. For a copy of the survey completed by female employees, see id. at app.A. 
93. See id. 
94. Seeid. 
95. An unpublished study reveals a similar underreporting problem at Minnesota. Almost half of a 
sample of 1300 women surveyed at the University of Minnesota reported having experienced sexual 
harassment, but only two percent of these students filed formal complaints of sexual harassment. See C.C. 
Cochran et a!., Predictors of Responses to Unwanted Sexual Attention (unpublished manuscript, cited in 
Rudman eta!., supra note 65, at 520). 
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recipients of unwanted sexual attention, view those formal complaints that 
women actually do make as aberrations, rather than as part of a systemic 
pattern of harassment. 
[D]isturbing numbers of female cadets reported to the Superintendent that 
instances of sexual assault, improper fondling, and sexual harassment and 
discrimination had occurred to them while at the Academy. Only a tiny 
fraction of these instances had ever been reported. Perhaps for that 
reason, male cadets tended to be far less aware of the extent of such 
problems than the female cadets were .... [S]omething that was relatively 
common knowledge among female cadets was far less well known by the 
males.96 
Underreporting can create two cultures within a university: those who 
experience and witness harassment and those who do not.97 Bridging the gap 
requires universities both to make public their records on harassment and to 
evaluate why their official reporting rates significantly understate the actual 
incidence of harassment on campus. 
2. What Colleges and Universities Won't Tell Us 
Nondisclosure of sexual harassment complaints at public universities 
appears to be the rule, not the exception. But nondisclosure creates problems. 
First, it is difficult for the public to measure the effectiveness of university 
grievance procedures if they have no information with which to compare 
official reporting rates with the incidence of harassment on campus. Second, 
how can universities themselves evaluate the efficacy of their internal 
grievance procedures if they maintain no records or annual numerical 
summaries of sexual harassment complaints? The reluctance with which 
colleges and universities provide information, even pursuant to state public 
records requests, about sexual harassment complaints makes it difficult to 
study the incidence and reporting of harassment on campus. The end result is 
a reporting system that insulates educational institutions from public scrutiny. 
a. Failure to Keep Records 
Of the ten public records' schools, five do not keep records that, at a 
minimum, permit the universities to assess easily the effectiveness of their 
internal sexual harassment reporting procedures. Three universities-Florida, 
96. DOD REPORT, supra note 39, at 25 (citing AIR FORCE ACADEMY, AD HOC COMMISSION ON REsPECT 
AND DIGNITY ( 1993)). 
97. See generally Charles L. Hulin eta!., Organizational Influences on Sexual Harassment, in 5 SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT IN lliE WORKPLACE: PERSPECTIVES, FRONTIERS, AND REsPONSE STRATEGIES 127, 147 (Margaret 
S. Stockdale ed., 1996) (stating that women view their organizations as more tolerant of harassing behavior 
than do men, raising the question of whether "two work group climates" exist within an organization). 
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Berkeley, and Maryland-maintain neither formal nor informal records in a 
manner that allows the universities to track easily the numbers of sexual 
harassment complaints received. Two other universities-Miami98 and 
S~9-maintain no records of informal complaints of sexual harassment. 
Florida's sexual harassment procedure is decentralized, with most 
complaints starting at the departmental level. 100 Thus, records that are 
maintained are kept within each of the twenty-six departments of the 
university. Berkeley has "neither a central index to, nor any way of 
reasonably retrieving or identifying, [formal] grievances of an [sic] alleged 
sexual harassment."101 As for informal complaints of sexual harassment, 
Berkeley does not "maintain a statistical breakdown of complaints on the 
basis of their nature and resolution."102 Maryland does not maintain complaint 
records by subject matter, so the university cannot "identify which files ... 
contain sexual harassment complaints as opposed to other matters."103 
Maryland also does not keep track of "the number of sexual harassment 
complaints, either formal or informal."104 
Universities are not required to keep records of sexual harassment 
complaints. Public records laws require disclosure of existing records; they 
do not compel institutions to maintain certain records. In addition, the EEOC 
"has not adopted any requirement, generally applicable to employers, that 
records be made or kept."105 The EEOC does require institutions of higher 
education to maintain records necessary to complete the EE0-6, 106 but the 
information required does not include sexual harassment complaint 
documentation. 
The failure to keep records sends a clear message about a university's 
priorities. There is no reason not to keep records other than to protect the 
institution from outside scrutiny and legal liability. The public cannot obtain 
98. See Memorandum from Robin L. Parker, General Counsel, Miami University, to Anne Lawton, 
Assistant Professor, Miami University I (Oct. 28, 1997) [hereinafter Miami Letter I] (on file with author) (no 
copies of informal complaints because a written complaint not needed to invoke informal complaint 
procedure); Memorandum from Robin L. Parker, General Counsel, Miami University, to Anne Lawton, 
Assistant Professor, Miami University 1 (Sept. 3, 1998) [hereinafter Miami Letter II] (on file with author) 
(indicating that tabulations of annual numbers of informal complaints currently do not exist). 
99. See Letter from Katharine F. Ellis, Director of Media Relations, Binghamton University, to Anne 
Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami University 2, mf 5-6 (July 14, 1998) [hereinafter SUNY Letter] (on file 
with author) ("The University does not maintain copies of informal complaints of sexual harassment, and I am 
informed that the number of informal complaints has not been tracked in any formal manner."). 
100. See Telephone Conversation between Steven Prevaux, Associate General Counsel, University of 
Florida, and Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami University (July 16, 1998) [hereinafter Florida 
Conversation 2] (notes on file with author); see also University of Florida. University Procedures For Handling 
Sexual Harassment Complaints (visited July 16, 1998) <http://www.aa.ufl.edu/aa/affactlharass/ 
procedures.htm>. 
101. Letter from Michael R. Smith, Assistant Chancellor-Legal Affairs, University of California, 
Berkeley, to Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami University I (July I, 1998) [hereinafter Berkeley Letter] 
(on file with author). 
102. Jd. at 2. 
103. Letter from Denise A. Andrews, University Counsel, University of Maryland, to Anne Lawton, 
Assistant Professor, Miami University 1 (Sept. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Maryland Letter] (on file with author). 
104. Jd. 
105. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.12 (1998). 
106. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.48 (1998). 
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copies of records that do not exist. "[T]he Freedom of Information Law 
provides for access to existing records, but does not require an agency to 
create a record in response to a request." 107 And, if the public cannot obtain 
university records on harassment, then it cannot evaluate a university's 
internal procedures for handling harassment. 
A university also protects itself from legal liability by not keeping 
records. This is especially important in cases of repeat offenders. While many 
educational institutions have both formal and informal mechanisms for 
bringing sexual harassment complaints, women more often invoke informal 
complaint mechanisms. 108 Suppose during each academic year from 1990 
until 1997, Professor W harasses a different female student. Each year, the 
harassed student complains, using the university's informal grievance 
procedure. And, each year, Professor W escapes with no punishment. The 
university does not impose sanctions because no fact-finding occurred, which 
is typical in informal proceedings. 109 The university "knows" that Professor 
107. SUNY Letter, supra note 99, at 2, ~5-6. 
108. For example, from January I through June 30, 1997, the Office of Equal Opportunity at Cornell 
University heard 12 employment-related complaints of sexual harassment. All 12 were handled informally, 
without an investigation. See Cornell University, Office of Equal Opportunity, Spring 1997 Semi-Annual Sexual 
Harassment Report and Consolidated Report for the 1996-97 Fiscal Year with Five-Year Comparative Data §§ 
LA-C (visited Aug. 13, 1998) <http://www.cornell.edu/Admin/OEOsp97.html> [hereinafter Cornell Report] 
(on file with author). 
For the period from July I, 1997 through June 30, 1998, Arizona had 24 formal discrimination 
complaints, 10 of which involved sexual harassment. See Communication from Sandy Fagan, Assistant 
Director, Affirmative Action Office, University of Arizona, to Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami 
University (July 15, 1998) (on file with author). Arizona does not keep records by issue, e.g., race versus sex 
discrimination, for informal complaints. But, if the percentage of formal complaints involving sexual 
harassment (10/24 x 100 = 42%) is applied to informal complaints, then there were 49 informal complaints 
(42% x 116 informal complaints) from July I, 1997 through June 30, 1998. See id. Thus, at Arizona there were 
almost five times as many informal as formal complaints of sexual harassment; see also MSPB UPDATE, supra 
note 22, at 27 (stating that five percent of women used formal complaint procedures); MSPB UPDATE II, supra 
note 21, at 33 (stating that while 78% of respondents knew of formal grievance procedures, only six percent of 
victims actually used those procedures for sexual harassment complaints). The research on the efficacy of 
formal complaint mechanisms suggests that women may choose informal resolution mechanisms over formal 
complaint procedures because the latter are more burdensome and involve greater risk. See, e.g., Louise F. 
Fitzgerald et a!., Why Didn't She Just Report Him? The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women's 
Responses to Sexual Harassment. 51 J. Soc. ISSUES 117, 122-23 (1995); MatthewS. Hesson-Mcinnis & Louise 
F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: A Preliminary Test of an Integrative Model. 27 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 
877, 895-96 (1997); Denise H. Lach & Patricia A. Gwartney-Gibbs, Sociological Perspectives on Sexual 
Harassment and Workplace Dispute Resolution, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHA V. I 02, II 0-12 ( 1993). 
109. See, e.g., MIAMI UNIVERSITY POLICY INFORMATION MANUAL §§ 3.6.1-J, 3.6.P. (1997) [hereinafter 
MUPIM] (on file with author) (informal resolution involves no investigation and does not trigger university 
disciplinary proceedings); UNIVERSITY OF ARizONA, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OFFICE DISCRIMINATION 
COMPLAINT PROCEDURES 3 [hereinafter ARizONA COMPLAINT PROCEDURES] (under revision) (on file with 
author) (stating that university generally will not conduct full investigation until complainant tries other means 
of resolution, e.g., mediation); UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS, POLICY MEMO. NO. 
4.110 [hereinafter TEXAS STUDENT PoLICY] (will not investigate unless the complainant files a written 
complaint); Cornell University, Sexual Harassment Policy, Policy 6.4 (visited July 9, 1998) 
<http://www.univco.cornell.edu/policy/sh.html> [hereinafter Cornell Policy]; Letter from Mary A. DeSouza, 
Assistant Director of Office of Equal Opportunity, Cornell University, to Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, 
Miami University I, 'If 3 (Aug. 7, 1998) [hereinafter Cornell Letter] (on file with author) (mediation process, 
which Cornell encourages complainants to use prior to invoking the investigation process, involves no fact-
finding); University of Colorado at Boulder, Sexual Harassment Policy and Procedures§ III.B (Oct. 19, 1998) 
<http://www.Colorado.edu/FacultyStaff/harassmentpolicy.html> [hereinafter Colorado Policy] (stating that 
informal complaints involve "no written allegations" and "resolution is achieved without a formal 
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W is a repeat offender, yet has no institutional memory of Professor W's 
actions. In 1998, a female student decides to file a formal complaint against 
Professor W, or hires an attorney to bring suit. The university will have no 
records showing that it had failed to sanction Professor W, even though he 
had repeatedly harassed other female students for the past seven academic 
years. 
Finally, if a university does not maintain records or statistical 
compilations of complaints, then how can it monitor the efficacy of its 
internal grievance procedures? Without records, the university cannot 
examine how it processes sexual harassment complaints. It cannot calculate 
the average time required to investigate a complaint, or the average sanction 
imposed. In addition, the university cannot determine its own internal 
reporting rate, in order to compare it to social science research on the 
incidence of sexual harassment. Without this information, universities are 
woefully ill-equipped to evaluate and revise existing policies and procedures 
in order to improve internal reporting rates of sexual harassment. 
b. Failure to Disclose Existing Records 
Many colleges and universities that do maintain records refuse to 
disclose them. Five of the ten public records schools-Iowa, Berkeley, 
SUNY, Arizona, and Colorado-refused to disclose some or all of the sexual 
harassment records that they maintain. The reasons for nondisclosure fall into 
two broad categories: (1) confidentiality concerns, and (2) exemptions for 
personnel records. 
Three universities-Iowa, Berkeley, and SUNY-refused to provide 
copies of some or all of their harassment records based on confidentiality or 
privacy concerns. Iowa refused to provide copies of either its formal or 
informal sexual harassment complaints, citing university policy on 
confidentiality. "Pursuant to University policy, the requested complaint files 
are confidential and not subject to disclosure." 110 However, Iowa did provide 
an annual compilation of sexual harassment reports dating back to the 1990-
1991 academic year. 111 
Berkeley and SUNY refused to produce certain harassment records, also 
citing confidentiality or privacy concerns. Although Berkeley apparently 
maintains records of informal complaints of sexual harassment, it refused to 
investigation"). 
The policies from Cornell and Colorado on the Web are current. See Cornell Letter, supra, 'If I; E-mail 
message from Gretchen Long, Office of Sexual Harassment Policy, University of Colorado at Boulder, to Anne 
Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami University (Apr. 21, 1999) [hereinafter Colorado Letter] (on file with 
author). Colorado is revising its sexual harassment policy. A draft of the revised policy, which has not yet been 
adopted, can be found at <http://www.cu.edu/draft>. See Colorado Letter, supra. 
110. Letter from Jennifer Modestou, Affirmative Action Data Manager, University of Iowa, to Anne 
Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami University I, 'll'lf3, 4 (July 14, 1998) [hereinafter Iowa Letter] (on file with 
author). 
Ill. See UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, OFFICE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACfiON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS ON 
CAMPUS 1990/91-1996/97 [hereinafter IOWA DATA] (copy on file with author). 
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disclose those records, claiming that the "documents are maintained as 
strictly confidential; and ... it would be unreasonably burdensome to redact 
each of those complaint files." 112 SUNY, on the other hand, maintains no 
informal records of sexual harassment. 113 It does keep formal records, but 
declined to provide them, claiming that doing so, even in redacted form, 
"would result in an unwarranted invasion ofpersonal privacy."114 
Arizona and Colorado also refused to produce copies of sexual 
harassment complaints, but based their decision on exemptions for personnel 
records. Arizona argued that "the information contained in an [Affirmative 
Action Office] complaint [is] personnel information since the allegations, if 
proven, can lead to disciplinary action against an employee."115 Colorado also 
declined to provide copies of either informal or formal complaints, claiming 
that "this information is part of personnel files that are not allowable under 
the [Colorado Open Records Act]."116 Although both Arizona and Colorado 
denied my request for copies of actual complaints, both universities provided 
numerical summaries of complaints filed. While Arizona provided the 
number of sexual harassment complaints filed during the past three academic 
years, Colorado provided figures only for the eighteen-month period from 
December 1, 1995 through May 31, 1997.117 
Although public records laws do not require blanket disclosure of all 
records maintained by public institutions, the policy underlying public 
records laws is one favoring disclosure over nondisclosure. 118 Viewed in this 
light, the reasons offered by the public universities that denied access to their 
sexual harassment records are suspect. 
First, some institutions fail to understand the difference between a state 
law exemption and their institution's policy preferences regarding disclosure. 
Both Iowa and Berkeley declined my public records request, based on their 
respective institutions ' policy on confidentiality; neither cited a valid state 
law exemption in refusing to disclose records. A university cannot trump 
state public records laws by promising confidentiality and then using that 
justification to deny access to records that public law makes available. 
112. Berkeley Letter, supra note 101, at 2. 
113. See SUNY Letter, supra note 99, at 2, m! S-6. 
114. !d. at I, 'lf4. 
115. Arizona Letter, supra note 87. 
116. Colorado Letter, supra note 109. 
117. See UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER, REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY § I, at I 
[hereinafter COLORADO REPORT I] (on file with author); UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, UNIVERSITY REPORT ON 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 1997 §§I-II, at 1-2 [hereinafter COLORADO REPORT II] (on file with author); Letter from 
Shari J. Robertson, Co-Chair, University of Colorado at Boulder's Sexual Harassment Policy, to Anne Lawton, 
Assistant Professor, Miami University (Oct. 6, 1998) (on file with author). 
118. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-201 (1997) (with certain enumerated exceptions, it is "the 
public policy of[Colorado] that all public records shall be open for inspection .... "); Carlson v. Pima County, 
687 P.2d 1242,1246 (Ariz. 1984) ("statutory policy favoring disclosure"); Zubeck v. El Paso County 
Retirement Plan, 961 P.2d 597,600 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) ("The general purpose of the [Open Records Act] is 
to assure that, by providing access to public records, the wotkings of government are not unduly shielded from 
the public eye.") (citation omitted); Gould v. New York City Police Dep't, 675 N.E.2d 808, 811 (N.Y. !996) 
("All government records are thus presumptively open for public inspection and copying unless they fall within 
one of the enumerated exemptions of Public Officers Law § 87(2). "). 
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Second, other universities paint with an extremely broad brush in 
denying access to sexual harassment records. SUNY claimed that disclosure 
of sexual harassment records would constitute "an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy."119 This is a legitimate exemption under New York's 
Freedom of Information Law ("FOIL"); however, the courts in New York 
have held that exemptions under FOIL are to be narrowly construed. 120 
Overly broad interpretations of terms such as "privacy" contravene FOIL's 
presumption of disclosure. 121 
In addition, FOIL provides that, with certain statutory exceptions, 
"disclosure shall not be construed to constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy ... when identifying details are deleted."122 None of the 
statutory exceptions apply to disclosure of sexual harassment records, and my 
request for records specifically stated that SUNY could redact the names of 
both the complainant and the accused. SUNY's reliance on the personal 
privacy exemption effectively insulates the institution from releasing copies 
of any public records involving discipline. Apparently, SUNY seeks to evade 
disclosure by asserting that redacting the names of complainants and those 
accused would still make these persons "easily identifiable" by an academic 
in another state. 123 
Arizona and Colorado, like SUNY, also denied disclosure, relying on an 
exemption for personnel records. Arizona's public records law, however, 
contains no such exemption. The law does provide an exemption from 
disclosure for certain identifying information, e.g., home address and phone 
number, of peace officers. 124 But even this exemption does not protect all 
information about peace officers from public disclosure, and university 
professors are not peace officers. 
Apparently, Arizona relies on a policy statement by its Board of 
Regents, which provides, in pertinent part, that "[p ]ersonnel records and 
information are confidential and their disclosure ... would be contrary to the 
best interests of the state. "125 Because sexual harassment complaints can lead 
to disciplinary action, university counsel at Arizona considers such records to 
be personnel information exempt from disclosure under state law. 126 But in 
Carlson v. Pima County, 127 the Arizona Supreme Court confronted this exact 
dilemma of balancing the right of confidentiality against the right of access to 
public documents. "[A] practical alternative to the complete denial of access 
119. SUNY Letter, supra note 99, at I,~ 4. 
120. See Gould, 675 N.E.2d at 811 ("To ensure maximum access to government documents, the 
'exemptions are to be narrowly construed, with the burden resting on the agency to demonstrate that the 
requested material indeed qualifies for exemption."') (citations omitted). 
121. See, e.g., id. ("blanket exemptions for particular types of documents are inimical to FOIL's policy 
of open government") (citation omitted). 
122. N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW§ 89(2)(c )(i) (Consol. 1998). 
123. SUNY Letter, supra note 99, at I~ 4. 
124. See ARiz. REv. STAT.§ 39-123(A) (1997). 
125. Arizona Letter, supra note 87 (citing Arizona Board of Regents Policy 6-912). 
126. See id. 
127. 141 Ariz. 487 (1984). 
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would be deleting specific personal identifying information, such as 
names."128 Arizona rejected this alternative; instead, it completely denied 
access to all sexual harassment records. The problem with Arizona's 
interpretation of state law is that it effectively insulates all disciplinary 
records from public review. It is unclear how doing so is in the best interests 
of the state. 
Colorado's Open Records Act, unlike Arizona's law, does contain an 
exemption for personnel files. 129 In response to an amendment to the Open 
Records Act in 1985, which made the Act applicable to the Regents of the 
University of Colorado, Boulder issued an Administrative Policy Statement 
("APS") noting that under Colorado law "personnel files are not open to the 
general public."130 The APS provides for the inclusion of disciplinary records 
in personnel files. 131 Performance ratings are also included in personnel files, 
according to Colorado's APS, yet Colorado law expressly exempts 
performance ratings from the personnel files exemption. 132 Thus, placing a 
record in a personnel file does not automatically insulate it from disclosure 
under the Colorado Open Records Act. 133 
In fact, the definition of "personnel files" coupled with state policy 
regarding disclosure of public records strongly suggests that Colorado law 
does not exempt sexual harassment records from disclosure as personnel 
records. Performance ratings are excluded from the definition of "personnel 
records." Yet an evaluation of performance normally includes disciplinary 
actions. In addition, Colorado state law favors disclosure of public records. 
The Colorado courts have narrowly construed exemptions to the Open 
Records Act. 134 Colorado's interpretation of the personnel files exemption 
creates a vast exemption for all disciplinary actions against state employees. 
Such a broad interpretation seems to contravene the legislature's decision to 
exempt performance ratings from the statutory definition of personnel files. 
III. WHY THE DISCREPANCY? 
The law shapes the outer limits beyond which universities dare not tread 
for fear of legal liability in sexual harassment cases. At a minimum, 
institutions of higher education know that they must have a grievance 
128. /d. at 491. 
129. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204(3)(a)(II)(A)(l997). 
130. University of Colorado, Treatment of Personnel Files for Purposes of the Colorado Open Records 
Act 'II 4 (1989) (visited July 21, 1998) <http://www.cusys.edu/--policies!Personnellopenrecords.html> 
[hereinafter Colorado Policy Statement]. 
131. See id. at § I.A. I. 
132. See CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 24-72-202(4.5) (1997) ('"Personnel files' does not include ... performance 
ratings .... "). 
133. The Colorado Policy Statement recognizes that certain items, although categorized as personnel 
records for purposes of university policy, do not satisfy the personnel records exemption under state law. See 
Colorado Policy Statement, supra note 130, § I. 
134. See, e.g., Zubek v. El Paso County Retirement Plan, 961 P.2d 597 (Colo. 1998) 
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procedure available for sexual harassment complaints. 135 But legal liability 
has rarely attached in cases involving inefficient, ineffective, or inadequate 
complaint procedures. 136 By broadly defining the boundaries of permissible 
action, however, the courts, the EEOC, and the DOE have given universities 
little guidance and great discretion in determining what constitutes an 
effective sexual harassment policy and procedure. 
The result is that the debate over sexual harassment law plays itself out 
in the development of sexual harassment policies and procedures. In the 
absence of concrete guidelines and legal constraints on procedure, 
universities develop policies, procedures, and strategies based on their 
organization's culture. This, in tum, means that organizational culture and 
dominant beliefs about sexual harassment, not research on effective 
procedures, shape and define the relief afforded within academic institutions 
to victims of sexual harassment. 
A. Sexual Harassment in Colleges and Universities: The Legal Framework 
Educational institutions are governed both by Title VII, 137 which covers 
employees, and Title IX, 138 which applies to students. In its recent decision in 
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 139 the Supreme Court 
effectively insulated educational institutions from liability for sexual 
harassment of their students. The Court, in a five-to-four decision, held that a 
student victim of harassment cannot hold her school liable for a teacher's 
sexual harassment unless a school official with "authority to institute 
corrective measures ... has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, 
the teacher's misconduct."140 In its two recent Title VII decisions in 
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth 141 and Faragher v. City of Baco Raton, 142 the 
Court adhered to a much different standard of liability for sexual harassment 
in the workplace. It is unclear, however, whether the lower federal courts will 
interpret E/lerth and Faragher in such a manner as to restrict employer 
discretion in shaping sexual harassment policies, procedures, and strategies. 
135. Until Gebser, the DOE held that schools needed a grievance procedure, but not one specifically 
tailored to sexual harassment complaints. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 9, at 12,038. Meritor, 
of course, exhorted employers to develop specific policies and procedures for sexual harassment complaints. 
136. See Connell, supra note 12, at 192-94 for cases in which courts have found employers liable for 
having ineffective policies. The problem is that many of these cases involved firms that had sexual harassment 
polices, but no complaint procedures. Given the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor. a finding of liability 
under such circumstances is not unlikely. Unfortunately, few courts have gone beyond the limited advice given 
in Meritor to determine whether employer procedures actually encourage women to come forward with sexual 
harassment complaints. 
137. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). 
138. The Education Amendments of 1972, Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1990). See Emmalena K. 
Quesada, Innocent Kiss or Potential Legal Nightmare: Peer Sexual Harassment and the Standard for School 
Liability Under Title IX, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1014, 1021-23 (1998) for the legislative history of Title IX's 
enactment. 
139. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998). 
140. !d. at 1993. 
141. 118 s. Ct. 2257 (1998). 
142. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). 
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1. Title VII and Sexual Harassment of Employees on Campus 
Title VII proscribes employers143 from discriminating on the basis of sex 
"with respect to [] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment .... " 144 The phrase "sexual harassment" appears nowhere in the 
language of Title VII. In fact, the word "sex" was added apparently in a last-
ditch effort to defeat passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964}45 As a result, 
virtually no legislative history exists to aid in interpreting Congress' intent 
with regard to the scope of Title VII's protection against sex discrimination. 
Nonetheless, beginning in the 1970s, courts began to interpret Title 
VII's prohibition against sex discrimination as encompassing sexual 
harassment in the workplace. In 1976, in Williams v. Saxbe} 46 the federal 
district court for the District of Columbia became the first U.S. court to 
recognize sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination cognizable under 
Title VII. 147 In Williams, the court held that the "retaliatory actions of a male 
supervisor, taken because a female employee declined his sexual advances, 
constitutes sex discrimination within the definitional parameters of Title 
VI1."148 Four years later, the EEOC issued guidelines that recognized sexual 
harassment as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII. 149 
The EEOC guidelines recognize two categories of sexual harassment: 
(1) quid pro quo; and (2) hostile environment. Quid pro quo literally means 
"something for something."150 In the context of sexual harassment law, quid 
pro quo means that an employee's submission to sexual conduct either is 
made a condition of employment or is used in making employment decisions 
about the employee. 151 Hostile environment cases, on the other hand, involve 
sexual conduct that "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering 
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment."152 
Although far more common, hostile environment cases posed a greater 
problem for the courts in the early development of sexual harassment law :S3 
Even today, it is far easier to label quid pro quo cases as sexual harassment, 
no doubt because of the explicit sexual nature of the behavior and the odious 
conduct involved. Yet studies of sexual harassment indicate that far more 
143. Title VII defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any 
agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994) (emphasis added). 
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). 
145. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813,816-17 (1991). 
146. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 
(D.C. Cir. 1978). 
147. See Estrich, supra note 145, at 821 n.22. 
148. 413 F. Supp. at 657. 
149. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980) ("Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of 
Title VII."). 
150. BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY 1248 (6th ed. 1990). 
151. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1l(a)(l), (2)(1980). 
152. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1980). 
153. See Estrich, supra note 145, at 822-23. 
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women experience hostile environment harassment in the form of sexist 
remarks and behaviors, than quid pro quo harassment. 154 The pervasiveness of 
hostile environment harassment no doubt made it more threatening for the 
early courts to recognize. To do so meant calling into question structural and 
systemic inequalities in educational institutions and the workplace. 155 This 
reluctance on the part of early courts to recognize harassment based on a 
hostile environment set the stage for the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor 
in 1986. 
a. Meritor 
The Meritor case began when Mechelle Vinson, previously an assistant 
manager at Meritor Savings Bank ("Bank"), filed suit against the Bank and 
Sidney Taylor, a Bank vice president and manager of the branch at which 
Vinson had worked. 156 The Bank terminated Vinson for taking excessive sick 
leave. 157 Vinson claimed, however, that Taylor had constantly harassed her 
during her four-year tenure at the Bank in violation of Title VII. 158 
As expected, the testimony at trial was conflicting. Vinson testified that she 
had acquiesced in Taylor's repeated demands for sexual relations out of fear of 
losing her job.159 She also testified that Taylor had fondled her in front of other 
employees and raped her on more than one occasion. 160 Taylor denied all of 
Vinson's allegations. He claimed that Vinson fabricated her story in retaliation 
for a work-related dispute. 161 
The district court ruled in favor of the Bank and Taylor, finding no sexual 
harassment or sex discrimination. 162 The court interpreted Title VII to restrict 
recovery to cases of quid pro quo sexual harassment. It acknowledged that Title 
VII unquestionably covers cases of "sexual harassment of female employees in 
which they are asked or required to submit to sexual demands as a condition to 
obtain employment or to maintain employment or to obtain promotions .... "163 
But the court found that Taylor had not required Vinson to grant him "sexual 
favors as a condition of either her employment or in order to obtain 
promotion." 164 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
reversed. The Court of Appeals held that victims of sexual harassment could 
154. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
155. See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 145, at 822 ("To prohibit [sexual harassment] in all cases, rather than 
in only the most egregious, presented a fundamental challenge to the way business is conducted in America."). 
This is not to suggest that federal courts have now successfully risen to the challenge. 
156. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59-60 (1986). 
157. See id. at 60. 
158. See id. 
159. Seeid. 
160. See id. 
161. Seeid. at61. 
162. See id. 
163. Vinson v. Taylor, 1980 WL 100, at *8 (D.D.C. 1980). 
164. Jd. at *7. 
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pursue two theories in order to demonstrate harassment: ( 1) quid pro quo; or (2) 
hostile environment.165 Consequently, the court remanded the case to the district 
court for consideration ofVinson's case under a hostile environment theory. 166 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' 
reversal of the district court's decision and remanded the case back to the district 
court for further proceedings.167 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court 
agreed with the D.C. Court of Appeals, holding that Title VII provides a remedy 
for a claim of sexual harassment based on hostile environment. 
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for 
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at 
the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a 
requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return 
for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as 
demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.168 
By recognizing a cause of action for sexual harassment based on hostile 
environment, the Supreme Court provided women with a powerful weapon in 
the fight for equal treatment in the workplace. At the same time, however, the 
Court's failure to carefully delineate the rules of employer liability for 
harassment and the requirement that the employer have knowledge and notice of 
the harassment weakened women's ability to effectively challenge sexual 
harassment. 
The three opinions in the Meritor line of cases reflect three different 
positions on employer liability. Meritor involved harassment by a supervisor and 
thus raised the issue of whether liability could attach to an employer by virtue of 
notice to a supervisor, an agent for the employer. The Supreme Court ultimately 
dodged the issue, instead making vague statements about the applicability of 
agency law and leaving much confusion in the wake of its decision. 169 
The question of employer liability was first addressed, in dicta, at the 
district court level. The district court ruled against Vinson on her claim of sexual 
harassment and thus had no reason to discuss the Bank's vicarious liability for 
Taylor's conduct. Nonetheless, the district court, in dicta, found that liability 
could not attach absent knowledge of the harassment by the employer. 170 The 
court noted that the Bank's employee manual provided a grievance procedure, 
which Vinson never used. 171 In addition, Vinson had not filed a complaint with 
165. See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 144-45 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
166. See id. at 152. 
167. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,73 (1986). 
168. /d. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,902 (lith Cir. 1982)). 
169. See Michael Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Principles: A Second 
Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson. 44 VAND. L. REv. 1229, 1230 (1991) (footnote omitted) ("As 
subsequent observers noted, the Court's recourse to agency law added considerable confusion to the employer 
liability issue."). 
170. SeeVinson,l980WL 100,at7. 
171. See id. at 8. 
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the EEOC prior to initiating litigation. 172 The district court held that ![Taylor had 
engaged in sexual harassment, notice to Taylor, a member of the Bank's 
management team, did not constitute notice to the Bank.173 The court further 
stated that the Bank could not be held liable for Taylor's actions without notice. 
Unlike the district court, which required knowledge by the employer for 
liability, the Court of Appeals held that Title VII imposed liability upon 
employers for sexual harassment by supervisory personnel, even absent 
knowledge by the employer itself. Title VII's definition of employer includes 
agents. Therefore, notice to the agent constitutes notice to the employer itself 
because the agent falls within the statutory definition of employer. The Court of 
Appeals concluded that if Taylor had engaged in sexual harassment, notice to 
Taylor, a member of the Bank's management team, did constitute notice to the 
Bank.t74 
The Supreme Court held to a middle position on the question of employer 
liability. The Court rejected the Court of Appeals' strict liability rule, explaining 
that employers are not "always automatically liable for sexual harassment by 
their supervisors."175 The Court, however, also rejected the district court's 
liability rule, concluding that employers may be liable for sexual harassment in 
some circumstances even without notice from the victim. 176 
There are problems with the Supreme Court's discussion of employer 
liability in Meritor. Even though the Court noted that the "debate over the 
appropriate standard for employer liability [had] a rather abstract quality about it 
given the state of the record,"177 it nonetheless decided to speak on the issue. 
Instead of creating clear-cut rules ofliability, however, the Court "decline[ d] ... 
to issue a definitive rule on employer liability .... "178 The majority made several 
statements that have shed little light and caused much confusion on the issue of 
an employer's liability for sexual harassment by its employees. In fact, Justice 
Marshall wrote a separate concurring opinion, in which Justices Brennan, 
Blackmun, and Stevens joined, because the majority had "[left] open the 
circumstances in which an employer is responsible under Title VII"179 for sexual 
harassment in the workplace. 
Moreover, in an otherwise vague discussion of employer liability, the Court 
provided employers with only two pieces of concrete advice, using the facts of 
Meritor as an example. The Court exhorted employers to develop specific 
policies prohibiting sexual harassment. The Bank had an anti-discrimination 
policy that did not specifically address sexual harassment, and the Court 
explained that the Bank's general policy did not alert employees that the Bank 
172. See id. at 7. 
173. Seeid. 
174. See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
175. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,72 (1986). 
176. Seeid. 
177. /d. 
178. /d. 
179. /d. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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had an interest in addressing sexual harassment. 180 Next, the Court noted that an 
employer could not require an employee complaining of sexual harassment to 
file her grievance with the person committing the harassment: sexual harassment 
procedures should provide alternative methods for filing grievances. 181 The 
Bank's grievance process required Vinson to first complain to her supervisor, 
who was the person allegedly harassing her. 182 
The Court ended its discussion of employer liability by noting that the 
Bank's "contention that [Vinson's] failure [to use the Bank's grievance 
procedure] should insulate it from liability might be substantially stronger if its 
procedures were better calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come 
forward." 183 The message was clear: develop sexual harassment policies and 
procedures. 
Meritor 's legacy has been one of confusion. 184 For more than a decade, the 
lower courts grappled with the vague statements about employer liability drafted 
in Meritor. Not until twelve years later in Ellerth and Faragher did the Court 
elaborate on its earlier statement in Meritor that "courts [should] look to agency 
principles for guidance"185 in determining an employer's liability for sexual 
harassment based on a hostile work environment. 186 
b. Ellerth and Faragher 
In its most recent Term, the Supreme Court decided two Title Vll cases-
Ellerth and Faragher-involving the liability of employers for sexual 
harassment on the job. The Court enunciated and applied the same standard of 
liability in both cases, expanding on Meritor 's vague exhortation to apply 
agency law principles in determining employer liability for sexual harassment. 
In doing so, however, the Court created a standard of liability that differed 
significantly from that crafted by the Court in cases of sexual harassment of 
students.187 
180. See id. at 72-73. 
181. See id. at 73. 
182. See id. 
183. Id. at 73 (emphasis added). 
184. Nonetheless, certain patterns emerged in the lower courts' decisions following Meritor and prior to 
the Court's recent decisions in Ellerth and Faragher. See Phillips, supra note 169. First, courts have held 
employers strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment by their supervisory personnel regardless of notice or 
knowledge. Second, in cases of hostile environment sexual harassment, most courts have shielded employers 
from liability for harassment by supervisory personnel if the employee failed to use an internal grievance 
procedure that satisfied the rudimentary requirements established in Meritor. Finally, courts have not imposed 
liability for harassment by fellow employees unless the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
harassment. 
185. 477 U.S. at 72. 
186. The Supreme Court heard three other sexual harassment cases during this 12-year period. See 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (same sex harassment violates Title VII's 
prohibition against sex discrimination); Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (a Title VII plaintiff 
whose case was on appeal when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 may not avail herself of the 
monetary damages remedy created by the 1991 Act); Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (psychological 
injury to the victim is not a required element of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim). 
187. See infra Part III.A.3, 4. 
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E/lerth and Faragher, decided by the Court on the same day, involved 
lawsuits by two women, neither of whom complained to upper management 
about sexual harassment on the job prior to filing suit against their respective 
employers. 188 Kimberly Ellerth worked in sales for Burlington Industries in 
Chicago. 189 She alleged that during her year of employment with Burlington, 
Ted Slowik, her supervisor, engaged in a pattern of sexually harassing 
behavior. 190 Slowik, described as a mid-level manager, hired and promoted 
people, subject to his supervisor's approval. 191 During her employment at 
Burlington, Slowik interviewed Ellerth for a promotion, which she received.192 
Ellerth knew that Burlington had a sexual harassment policy, yet lodged no 
complaint with her immediate supervisor, who reported to Slowik. 193 
For five years, while going to college, Beth Ann Faragher worked part-time 
as a lifeguard for the City of Boca Raton, Florida ("City").194 She reported to Bill 
Terry, David Silverman, and Robert Gordon, her immediate supervisors.195 
Terry and Silverman repeatedly made crude comments and sexist remarks to 
Faragher and other female lifeguards.196 On many occasions, Terry touched the 
female lifeguards without their permission, including putting his hands on 
Faragher's buttocks. 197 Both Terry and Silverman sexually propositioned women 
lifeguards, including a woman interviewing for a job with the City.198 
The City developed a sexual harassment policy in 1986, which it revised in 
1990. 199 The trial court found, however, that due to the City's failure to properly 
disseminate the policy, many of the lifeguards, including Faragher's three 
immediate supervisors, had no knowledge of the policy.200 Several of the female 
lifeguards, including Faragher, discussed Terry's and Silverman's conduct with 
Gordon, their other supervisor, but Gordon did not report the behavior to anyone 
in higher management with the City.201 At trial, Faragher explained that she 
discussed Terry's and Silverman's behavior with Gordon because she respected 
his opinion, not because she considered the discussions a formal complaint of 
sexual harassment to a supervisor. 202 Approximately two months before 
188. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2262-63; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2281. 
189. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2262. 
190. See id. at 2262. For example, during her interview for a job promotion, Slowik told Ellerth that "she 
was not 'loose enough"' and proceeded to lean over and rub her knee. /d. (citation omitted). Slowik also 
remarked that Ellerth's job would be easier if she wore short skirts. See id. He commented on her breasts, and 
on one occasion when Ellerth called Slowik regarding a customer, Slowik informed her that he did not have 
time to talk unless she described her clothing to him. See id. 
191. See id. 
192. See id. 
193. See id. at 2262-63. 
194. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275,2280 (1998). 
195. See id. 
196. See id. at 2281. 
197. Seeid. 
198. Seeid. 
199. See id. at 2280. 
200. See id. at 2280-81. 
201. See id. at 2281. 
202. Seeid. 
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Faragher quit her job with the City, another female lifeguard did complain to the 
City's Personnel Director about Terry's and Silverman's conduct.203 The City 
investigated and reprimanded both Terry and Silverman.204 The City offered 
Terry and Silverman the option of choosing between suspension without pay 
and forfeiture of their annual leave as a sanction.205 
In two seven-to-two decisions,206 the Supreme Court first addressed the 
lower courts' confusion about the standard of employer liability in quid pro quo 
versus hostile environment cases. Prior to Ellerth and Faragher, lower federal 
courts had held employers vicariously liable for quid pro quo harassment by 
their supervisory personnel, regardless of notice or knowledge?07 In cases of 
hostile environment sexual harassment, however, most, but not all, courts had 
shielded employers from liability for hostile environment harassment by 
supervisory personnel if the employee failed to use an internal grievance 
procedure. 208 In hostile environment cases, an employer was liable if it knew or 
should have known of the harassing conduct. 
In Ellerth, the Court held that employer liability does not tum on whether 
the plaintiff's case involves quid pro quo or hostile environment harassment.209 
"[T]he terms are relevant when there is a threshold question whether a plaintiff 
can prove discrimination in violation of Title VII.'mo But, employer liability 
depends not on these labels, but on whether the supervisor of a harassed 
employee "takes a tangible employment action against [that employee]."211 The 
Court defined a "tangible employment action" as "a significant change in 
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change 
in benefits."212 In most cases, a "tangible employment action" involves "direct 
economic harm" to the employee.213 
Having defined a tangible employment action, the Court then proceeded to 
discuss the standard of employer liability when a Title VII plaintiff can and 
cannot prove that the employer took such action. In cases involving tangible 
203. See id. 
204. Seeid. 
205. Seeid. 
206. Justice Thomas dissented in both cases. Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas in dissent. See 
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2271 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 
2294 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
207. See supra note 184. 
208. See id. 
209. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2264-65. 
210. /d. at 2265. 
211. /d. at 2269. The Court based its analysis on§ 219(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, 
which provides, in pertinent part, that an employer is not liable for his employees' torts committed "outside the 
scope of their employment, unless: ... [the employee] ... was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence 
of the agency relation." ld. at 2267 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d)). The Court 
concluded that the mere existence of the employment relationship did not suffice to establish vicarious liability. 
Rather, a Title VII plaintiff had to demonstrate a negative tangible employment action taken by a supervisor in 
order to establish vicarious liability on the part of the employer. See id. at 2268. 
212. /d. at 2268. 
213. /d. at2269. 
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negative employment actions, employers are vicariously liable.214 For example, 
if a supervisor fires an employee who refuses to engage in sex with him, the 
employer is vicariously liable for the harassment, even if the employee did not 
use the employer's internal grievance procedure.215 But, an employer generally 
is not vicariously liable for sexual harassment by fellow employees because 
peers do not have the authority to fire or demote other employees. 
In cases in which a Title VII plaintiff cannot demonstrate a negative 
tangible employment action, e.g., peer harassment, she still may recover 
damages against her employer. But, in these cases, the employer may assert an 
affirmative defense. In order to prevail on the liability question, the employer 
must prove two elements by a preponderance of the evidence. 216 First, the 
employer must show that it "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any sexually harassing behavior."217 Second, it must prove that the 
employee "unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise."218 If the 
employer fails to prove either element of the affirmative defense, then the Title 
VII plaintiff prevails on the issue ofliability.219 
2. Liability of Educational Institutions for Employee Harassment 
After Ellerth and Faragher 
Although some hailed Ellerth and Faragher as victories for employees/20 it 
is unclear what impact the decisions will have on the vast majority of women 
who experience harassment on the job. Most women never report sexual 
harassment, let alone bring suit in federal court against their employer. Thus, it is 
important to examine the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Ellerth and 
Faragher in terms of the incentives they create for employers to reduce the 
incidence of harassment in the workplace, not simply in terms of the impact 
these decisions have on the litigation process.221 
214. See id. at 2270; Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275,2292-93 (1998). 
215. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270 (an emp1oyermay not invoke the affirmative defense, which requires 
the employee to take advantage of reasonable corrective or preventive measures, in cases involving tangible 
employment actions). 
216. See id. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293. 
217. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293. 
218. /d. 
219. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2274 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Moreover, employers will be liable 
notwithstanding the affirmative defense, even though they acted reasonably, so long as the plaintiff in question 
fulfilled her duty of reasonable care to avoid harm.") (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
220. See. e.g., Dominic Bencivenga, Looking for Guidance: High Court Rulings Leave Key Terms 
Undefined. N.Y. L.J., July 2, 1998, at 5 (stating that Ellerth and Faragher decisions "clearly support 
employees"); Marcia Coyle, Sex Harassment Redefined, NAT'L L.J., July 6, 1998, at AI ("In a trio of decisions 
this term, the U.S. Supreme Court crafted a new chapter in sexual harassment law, one likely to ease the way 
for alleged victims to hold employers liable for employee supervisors' acts .... "). 
221. This Article is concerned primarily with the adequacy of internal grievance policies and procedures; 
thus, I note only in passing two important contributions to sexual harassment litigation brought about by the 
Court's decisions in Ellerth and Faragher. 
In Ellerth and Faragher, the Supreme Court made certain aspects of sexual harassment litigation more 
difficult for employers. First, the affirmative defense developed by the Court seems to require a fact-intensive 
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A focus on the incentives for prevention is consistent with Title VII's 
purpose. Although Title VII does provide redress for those persons who suffer 
from employment discrimination, "its 'primary objective', like that of any statute 
meant to influence primary conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid 
harm."222 The question that remains is whether the Court's decisions in Ellerth 
and Faragher will alter the day-to-day conduct of employers in preventing and 
remedying harassment in the workplace. The answer to this question is less than 
clear for several reasons. 
First, have Faragher and Ellerth imposed on employers a duty to 
prevent harassment that goes beyond the employer's obligation to develop 
and disseminate sexual harassment policies and procedures? In Meritor, the 
Court focused exclusively on procedures for reporting of harassment. Meritor 
did not require employers to adopt sexual harassment training or prevention 
programs. Neither did the EEOC or the DOE.223 And the courts have not held 
schools liable for failing to develop sexual harassment prevention programs. 
The Court's most recent decisions in Faragher and Ellerth mention both 
prevention and remedial efforts as part of the employer's affirmative defense 
to liability in sexual harassment cases. Yet the Court seems to equate 
procedures with prevention. 
An employer may, for example, have provided a proven, effective 
mechanism for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual harassment, 
available to the employee without undue risk or expense. If the plaintiff 
unreasonably failed to avail herself of the employer's preventive or 
remedial apparatus, she should not recover damages that could have 
been avoided if she had done so.224 
This excerpt from Faragher suggests that a proven, effective complaint 
procedure satisfies the employer's burden of both prevention and 
inquiry regarding the reasonableness of both the employer's and the employee's conduct. In addition, the Court 
provides little guidance on what it means for employers to "exerciseD reasonable care" and what constitutes an 
unreasonable failure by an employee to use an employer's grievance procedure. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270. 
Justice Thomas argues, in dissent, that the Court's "Delphic pronouncements" concerning the employer's 
affirmative defense "remainO a mystery" for lower federal courts "ruling on motions for summary judgment-
the critical question for employers now subject to the vicarious liability rule." !d. at 2274 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). As a result, lower courts will have to determine, on a case-by-<:ase basis, what constitutes 
reasonable behavior on the part of employers and employees. This, in turn, will make it more difficult for 
employers to prevail on motions for summary judgrnent. 
Second, the affirmative defense requires an employer to prove that it acted reasonably in correcting 
harassment and that the plaintiff employee acted unreasonably in avoiding harm caused by the harassment. If 
the employer fails to satisfY either element, then liability for damages attaches. As a result, "employers will be 
liable ... even though they acted reasonably, so long as the plaintiff in question fulfilled her duty of reasonable 
care to avoid harm." !d. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court places the burden of 
liability on employers in cases in which both the employer and the employee exercise reasonable care. 
222. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292 (citation omitted). 
223. The DOE noted that training of administrators, teachers, staff, and students can help students to 
identifY harassment and how to respond to it. But the DOE did not require such training. See Sexual 
Harassment Guidance, supra note 9, at 12,044. 
224. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292 (emphasis added). 
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remediation. Coupled with the absence of any discussion of prevention in the 
Court's opinions in both Faragher and Ellerth, it is possible that lower 
federal courts will equate sexual harassment complaint procedures with 
prevention programs. 
This interpretation reinforces existing incentives that allow institutions 
of higher education to focus on passive strategies, such as complaint 
reporting, to reduce and eliminate sexual harassment. Policies and procedures 
are necessary; they can affect and modify behavior.225 But the persistence of 
harassment on campus, notwithstanding almost two decades of anti-
harassment policies in many institutions of higher education, strongly 
suggests that policies and procedures alone do not work. 
Second, how will the lower federal courts interpret key language in El/erth 
and Faragher regarding the employer's affirmative defense to liability in sexual 
harassment cases? What constitutes a "proven, effective" procedure? Suppose 
the lower federal courts decide that a procedure is proven and effective if a 
complaint stops harassing behavior. Most women never report sexual 
harassment. The research suggests that underreporting is directly related to 
serious shortcomings in grievance policies and procedures.226 If an employer's 
policy is proven and effective, even if only one percent of employees officially 
report harassment while twenty to thirty percent experience it on the job, 
employers have little incentive to change their existing policies. 
Moreover, under what circumstances can a woman avoid a costly or risky 
internal grievance procedure? The Court makes clear that the expense or risk 
must be "undue", so a woman cannot bypass an internal grievance procedure 
simply because it involves some risk or expense. But the Court gives no 
guidance on what constitutes an "undue risk or expense." Will the lower courts 
take into account variations in ability to absorb expense and risk? For example, a 
single mother with three children who has few marketable skills may be unable 
to absorb any risk or expense while a single professional woman with no 
children may hire an attorney to assist her during the firm's internal grievance 
procedure. If the courts take these differences into consideration, however, it 
means that in each case, the affirmative defense will involve a very fact-specific 
inquiry. Thus, no woman can afford to bypass an internal procedure; she may 
end up incorrectly assessing a court's later determination of what constitutes an 
undue risk or expense. 
Finally, as a practical matter, how will women even know that they must 
use their employers' grievance procedures? Most women subjected to sexual 
harassment are not attorneys. The Court requires employers to develop a proven, 
effective sexual harassment procedure that is not unduly risky or expensive. It 
does not require employers to provide employees with legal advice about 
pursuing claims against the employer. As a result, women may bypass the 
225. See Gruber, supra note 17, at 316-17. 
226. See infra Part III.C.l-5. 
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internal grievance procedure for several reasons. They may think that the 
procedure is ineffective, yet a court may later determine that this is not the case. 
They may quit their job, as Kimberly Ellerth did, and then file for sexual 
harassment. Once a woman terminates her employment, she may no longer avail 
herself of her ex-employer's grievance procedure. They may miss the internal 
filing deadline, which is a problem in some academic institutions with extremely 
short statutes of limitation, e.g., sixty to ninety days.227 The Supreme Court's 
standard requires ordinary working women to know the "ins" and "outs" of 
sexual harassment law, without having access to an attorney. After all, most 
women would use an internal grievance procedure in order to avoid filing a 
lawsuit or filing with the EEOC, both of which would require them to consult 
with attorneys. 
The problem is that the Court in Ellerth and Faragher left important 
interpretive questions to the lower courts to resolve, on a case-by-case basis. 
Thus, even though employers have the burden of proving that an employee 
unreasonably failed to use a proven, effective procedure that is not unduly risky 
or expensive, lower federal courts may interpret this language in such a fashion 
as to effect little change in current employment practices. While Ellerth and 
Faragher raise the issue of effective procedures, they fail to enunciate workable 
rules for employers in constructing effective procedures. As a result, only time 
will tell, as the lower courts elaborate on the Court's opinions in Ellerth and 
Faragher, whether these decisions effectively maintain the status quo or effect a 
major change in employers' incentives for eliminating sexual harassment in the 
workplace. 
3. Title IX and Sexual Harassment of Students 
With certain limited exceptions,228 Title IX prohibits educational 
institutions229 that receive federal financial assistance230 from discriminating 
on the basis of sex in the provision of educational programs and activities. 
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
227. See e.g., ARIZONA CoMPLAINT PROCEDURES, supra note 109, at 2 (employees must file a complaint 
of harassment within 60 days of the incident); UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, BERKELEY CAMPUS 
STUDENT GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE§§ liLA, IV.A, at 4-5 (1998) [hereinafter BERKELEY STUDENT POLICY] (on 
file with author) (60-day statute of limitations for filing a formal sexual harassment grievance); UNIVERSITY OF 
MARYLAND AT COLLEGE PARK, HUMAN RELATIONS CODE art. III. E., at 7 (1998) [hereinafter MARYLAND CODE] 
(on file with author) (90-day statute oflimitations for filing discrimination grievances). 
228. Title IX exempts from some or all of its provisions certain organizations, e.g., sororities and 
educational institutions of religious organizations with contrary religious beliefs. See 20 U.S.C. § 168l(a)(l)-
(9) (1990). 
229. An educational institution is "any public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or 
any institution of vocational, professional, or higher education .... " 20 U.S.C. § 168l(c) (1990). 
230. For a definition of federal financial assistance, see 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(g) (1997). 
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financial assistance .... 231 
As a form of sex discrimination, sexual harassment is proscribed by Title 
IX. 232 In evaluating sexual harassment claims by students, the DOE has 
applied "many of the legal principles applicable to sexual harassment in the 
workplace developed under Title VII."233 Thus, Title IX applies to both quid 
pro quo and hostile environment cases of sexual harassment. 234 As in Title 
VII cases, the severity and pervasiveness of the harassing conduct are 
relevant in determining whether sexual harassment based on a hostile 
environment occurred.235 And, until Gebser, the DOE's Sexual Harassment 
Guidance informed educational institutions that the same liability standards 
applied to sexual harassment cases, whether the case involved a Title VII or a 
Title IX claim. 236 But in Gebser, the Supreme Court created a standard of 
institutional liability that, in practice, will make it extraordinarily difficult for 
a student victim of sexual harassment to recover monetary damages against 
an educational institution. 
Gebser involved a lawsuit by Alida Star Gebser and her mother against 
the Lago Independent School District for sexual harassment by Frank 
Waldrop, one of Gebser's high school teachers.237 Waldrop engaged in an 
intimate sexual relationship with Gebser, who was then a freshman in high 
school.238 Gebser did not report Waldrop.239 Even though she considered his 
behavior "improper", she was "uncertain how to react and she wanted to 
continue having him as a teacher."240 In addition, the school district had 
neither a formal sexual harassment policy nor a grievance procedure for 
sexual harassment complaints.241 Gebser's mother and the school district 
learned of the sexual relationship when a police officer found Waldrop and 
Gebser engaging in sexual intercourse.242 
Gebser and her mother brought suit against the school district,243 
claiming violations of Title IX,§ 1983, and state negligence law. The federal 
district court granted summary judgment to the school district on all of 
231. 20 U.S.C. § 168l(a). 
232. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 9, at 12,038. 
233. !d. at 12038, n.2 (citations omitted). 
234. See id. at 12038. 
235. See id. at 12041-42. 
236. The Fifth Circuit was the notable exception. In two decisions involving sexual harassment by 
school employees, the Fifth Circuit held that liability did not attach to the school unless a school official "with 
supervisory power over the offending employee actually knew of the abuse, had the power to end the abuse, 
and failed to do so." Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 650 {5th Cir. 1997). The DOE 
expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit's approach to liability for academic institutions. See Sexual Harassment 
Guidance, supra note 9, at 12,036-37. In Gebser, however, the Court endorsed the Fifth Circuit's approach; 
thus the DOE's comments on the liability of educational institutions are no longer good law. 
237. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993. 
238. See id. 
239. Seeid. 
240. !d. 
241. See id. 
242. See id. 
243. Gebser also filed suit against Waldrop, claiming primarily violations of Texas state law. 
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Gebser's claims.244 She appealed only the Title IX ruling to the Fifth 
Circuit.245 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling, limiting a 
school's liability for sexual harassment of students to cases in which an 
employee "with supervisory power over the offending employee actually 
[knows] of the abuse, ha[s] the power to end the abuse, and fail[s] to do 
so."246 
In a five-to-four decision/47 the Supreme Court affirmed, focusing on 
the language of Title IX, which provides no express right to sue for money 
damages. Prior to Gebser, the Court had held in Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
Public Schools248 that a Title IX plaintiff may recover monetary damages 
pursuant to the implied right of action recognized in Cannon v. University of 
Chicago. 249 Yet Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Gebser, said 
that Franklin did not establish the circumstances under which liability for 
monetary damages would attach?50 Justice O'Connor also noted that with a 
judicially implied cause of action, the Court has "a measure of latitude to 
shape a sensible remedial scheme that best comports with the statute."251 The 
Court's task, then, was to determine the conditions under which liability for 
monetary damages under Title IX would attach to educational institutions. 
The Court concluded that liability for money damages based on either 
respondeat superior or constructive notice "would 'frustrate the purposes' of 
Title IX. "252 First, Title IX contains no reference to "agents" as does Title 
VII's definition of employer.253 The Court reasoned that the absence of such 
language in Title IX, coupled with its presence in Title VII, revealed 
Congressional intent to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior only to Title 
VII cases. 254 
244. Gebser originally filed in state court. The case was removed to the federal district court for the 
Western District of Texas. See Doe v. Waldrop, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21946 (W.O. Tex. 1995), affd sub 
nom. Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997), affd sub nom. Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998). 
245. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1994. 
246. Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1997), affd sub nom. Gebser v. 
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998). 
247. Justice O'Connor authored the majority opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas joined. Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Stevens in dissent. 
See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2000 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also penned a short dissent, joined by 
Justices Souter and Breyer. See id. at 2007 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
248. 503 u.s. 60 (1992). 
249. 441 u.s. 677 (1979). 
250. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1995. 
251. /d. at 1996 (citations omitted). 
252. /d. at 1997. 
253. In his dissent, Justice Stevens explained that Title IX does not use the term "agent" because its 
focus is on the victim of discrimination, not on the person discriminating as in Title VII. 
Unlike Title VII ... , which focuses on the discriminator, making it unlawful for an employer to engage 
in certain prohibited practices (see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)), Title IX is drafted from the perspective of 
the person discriminated against. . . . And because Title IX as drafted includes no actor at all, it 
necessarily follows that the statute also would not reference "agents" of that non-existent actor. 
!d. at 2002 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F.3d 1014, 
I 047 (7th Cir. 1997) (Rovner, J., dissenting)). 
254. See id. at 1996. 
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Second, the Court believed the contractual nature of Title IX mitigated 
against the conclusion that Title IX plaintiffs could hold educational 
institutions liable in money damages based only on constructive notice. 
[Title IX] condition[s] an offer of federal funding on a promise by the 
recipient not to discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a contract 
between the Government and the recipient of funds. 
Title IX's contractual nature has implications for our construction of the 
scope of available remedies. When Congress attaches conditions to the 
award of federal funds under its spending power, U.S. Canst., Art. I, § 8, 
cl. 1, as it has in Title IX and Title VI, we examine closely the propriety 
of private actions holding the recipient liable in monetary damages for 
noncompliance with the condition.255 
The Court's examination of the statute and accompanying regulations 
provided it with "important clues" about Congress' intent with regard to 
awards of money damages in Title IX actions.256 Title IX provides that no 
action to terminate funding be taken against an educational institution "until 
the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or 
persons of the failure to comply with the requirement [of nondiscrimination] 
and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary 
means. "257 The regulations also require notice to an educational institution "of 
its failure to comply" with Title IX prior to taking action to bring the 
institution into compliance.258 Thus, the Court concluded that Congress, in 
enacting Title IX, did not intend to create liability against educational 
institutions for sexual harassment based only on constructive notice. 259 
Instead, the Court determined that the right to recover monetary damages 
pursuant to Cannon 's implied right of action should parallel the enforcement 
scheme created by Congress in Title IX.260 
In practice, this means that a Title IX plaintiff must satisfy three 
requirements prior to recovering money damages under Title IX for sexual 
harassment. First, she must provide actual notice of the harassing behavior. 
Second, a school official with the authority to "institute corrective measures" 
must receive the notice. 261 Finally, even if a Title IX plaintiff provides actual 
255. /d. at 1997-98 (citations omitted). 
256. See id. at 1998. 
257. 20 u.s.c. § 1682 ( 1990). 
258. 34 C.F.R § 100.8(d) (1998). 
259. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999. 
260. Seeid. 
261. /d. at 1993. The Court does not elaborate on which school officials have such authority; however, it 
is possible that a school may escape Title IX liability if a teacher learns of harassing behavior by a fellow 
teacher, but fails to inform other school officials, e.g., the principal. See Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 
101 F.3d 393, 400-02 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 2434 (1997) (school district not liable for sexual 
molestation of second-grade student because the student and her mother only complained to the student's 
homeroom teacher, who did not report the incident to "someone in a management-level position."). 
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notice to an appropriate school official, she will lose her claim for money 
damages so long as the school official was not deliberately indifferent to her 
complaint of sexual harassment. 262 
4. Liability of Educational Institutions for Harassment of Students After 
Gebser 
The majority in Gebser is technically correct that Franklin 's holding that 
a Title IX plaintiff has the right to recover money damages does not 
determine the circumstances under which an educational institution must 
answer for such damages. Nonetheless, the practical effect of the majority's 
decision in Gebser is to eviscerate the Court's unanimous holding in 
Franklin. 
Presumably, few Title IX plaintiffs who have been victims of intentional 
discrimination will be able to recover damages under this exceedingly 
high standard. The Court fails to recognize that its holding will virtually 
"render inutile causes of action authorized by Congress through a 
decision that no remedy is available."263 
Theoretically, Title IX plaintiffs still have the right to recover money 
damages after Gebser. As a practical matter few, if any, Title IX plaintiffs 
will actually recover such damages under the burdensome standard created by 
the majority in Gebser. In effect, the Court in Gebser reversed its earlier 
decision in Franklin, although it did so sub silentio. 264 
Moreover, as Justice Stevens notes in his dissent, the majority's opinion 
in Gebser creates the wrong incentives for educational institutions in 
handling sexual harassment complaints. 
The reason why the common law imposes liability on the principal in 
such circumstances is the same as the reason why Congress included the 
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex in Title IX: to 
induce school boards to adopt and enforce practices that will minimize 
the danger that vulnerable students will be exposed to such odious 
behavior. The rule that the Court has crafted creates the opposite 
incentive. As long as school boards can insulate themselves from 
knowledge about this sort of conduct, they can claim immunity from 
damages liability. Indeed, the rule that the Court adopts would preclude a 
262. The Court noted that a "deliberate indifference" standard "rough[ly] parallel[ed]" Title IX's 
enforcement scheme. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999. "The administrative enforcement scheme presupposes that an 
official who is advised of a Title IX violation refuses to take action to bring the recipient into compliance. The 
premise, in other words, is an official decision by the recipient not to remedy the violation." !d. 
263. !d. at 2006 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60,74 (1992)). 
264. Justice Stevens recognized this point in his dissent. "To the extent that the Court's reasons for its 
policy choice have any merit, they suggest that no damages should ever be awarded in a Title IX case--in other 
words, that our unanimous holding in Franklin should be repudiated." !d. at 2005 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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damages remedy even if every teacher at the school knew about the 
harassment but did not have "authority to institute corrective measures on 
the district's behalf."265 
Justice Stevens' comments are instructive in light of the facts of the 
Gebser case. The Lago Vista Independent School District had neither a 
formal sexual harassment policy nor a grievance procedure. While the facts of 
the case are unclear/66 it appears from the majority's opinion that the school 
district was in violation of the DOE's requirement to adopt and disseminate a 
grievance procedure for sex discrimination complaints, including sexual 
harassment claims.267 The majority in Gebser, however, tells schools that 
such policies and procedures are not necessary to protect the institution from 
financialliability. 268 Instead, the onus rests on the students, even grade school 
students, to correctly identify sexual harassment as a form of sex 
discrimination and to notify the "appropriate" school official about the 
harassing conduct. Apparently, having no mechanism for bringing a sexual 
harassment complaint amounts only to an administrative violation269 that only 
the overburdened DOE can redress. 
Gebser also has quashed any hope that educational institutions will 
freely create and adopt specific policies and procedures to govern sexual 
harassment, even though the DOE recognizes the value of such procedures. 
[P]olicies and procedures specifically designed to address sexual 
harassment, if age appropriate, are a very effective means of making 
students and employees aware of what constitutes sexual harassment, that 
that conduct is prohibited sex discrimination, and that it will not be 
tolerated by the school. That awareness, in turn, can be a key element in 
preventing sexual harassment. 270 
But schools have no incentive to develop such sexual harassment policies or 
procedures in the wake of Gebser. After all, a school may escape liability for 
265. !d. at 2004 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote and citation omitted). 
266. See id. at 2000. Justice O'Connor acknowledges that the school district had no formal harassment 
policy or grievance procedure for complaints of sexual harassment. Yet the DOE has never required 
educational institutions to adopt separate policies and procedures specific to complaints of sexual harassment. 
See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 9, at 12,038. If the school had a sex discrimination policy and 
grievance procedure, but not a procedure tailored specifically for complaints of sexual harassment, it would not 
be in violation of the DOE regulations. Because Justice O'Connor as much as admits that the Lago Independent 
School District had violated the DOE's administrative regulations, it appears that the school either had no sex 
discrimination policy, or the policy and procedure did not adequately address sexual harassment complaints. 
267. See 34 C.F.R § 106.8 (1997). 
268. See Coyle, supra note 220 (citing Charles Carver, George Washington University National Law 
Center) ("What this does is reward school districts who refuse to have meaningful anti-harassment policies for 
students .... In fact, if I were a lawyer, I'd be hard-pressed to tell the district to have a policy.") (internal 
quotations omitted). 
269. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 2000 ("We have never held, however, that the implied private right of 
action under Title IX allows recovery in damages for violation of those sorts of administrative requirements."). 
270. Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 9, at 12,038. 
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sexual harassment of a student even if the school has no sexual harassment 
policy or procedure, all of a victim's teachers know of the harassing behavior, 
and the school is grossly negligent in its handling of the sexual harassment 
complaint. 
The end result is a decision that gives school officials no incentive to 
adopt effective mechanisms for tackling the persistent problem of sexual 
harassment. "[T]he decision creates a disincentive for school districts to take 
steps to discover harassment, since they can avoid liability through an 
'ostrich defense. "'271 Gebser protects educational institutions from liability 
even if their Title IX administrator is incompetent and even if their grievance 
procedure is complicated, onerous, and burdensome to student victims. The 
DOE, with thousands of grade schools, high schools, colleges, and 
universities to monitor, is unlikely to catch a school without a sex 
discrimination policy and procedure in place. It is even more unlikely that the 
DOE will take any action against schools with ineffective policies and 
procedures. In effect then, student victims of sexual harassment have the right 
to be protected from sexually harassing behavior but no remedy to effectively 
enforce that right. 
B. Sexual Harassment in Colleges and Universities: Institutional Context 
Without concrete requirements for preventing and correcting sexual 
harassment, universities are left to their own devices in developing preventive 
strategies and remedial procedures. This is problematic. Research, not 
institutional norms and biases, should guide the development of sexual 
harassment procedures. 
Several characteristics peculiar to colleges and universities make it more 
likely that academic institutions will adopt sexual harassment grievance 
procedures that protect the accused but offer little protection to the victim. The 
tradition of self-governance within academic institutions, the institution of 
tenure, and the distribution of power in the academic population combine to 
limit the accountability of academic institutions to the most vulnerable members 
of their community-staff, untenured faculty, and students. 
1. Self-Governance 
Many academic institutions have a strong tradition of faculty governance. 
This can include the drafting of grievance procedures and policies on sexual 
harassment. Thus, faculty members participate in drafting and/or voting on the 
policies and grievance procedures that govern their behavior.272 In corporations, 
271. Martha F. Davis, Court Clarifies Sexual Harassment Tests, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10, 1998, at 810 
(footnote omitted). 
272. See, e.g., MUPIM, supra note I 09 (University Senate approved changes to sexual harassment policy 
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the employees do not draft the procedures that govern their potential 
misconduct. Faculty members have an incentive to create procedures that protect 
them from grievances, not ones that make them more susceptible to grievances. 
This is particularly a problem if a university's sexual harassment procedure is 
tied to the regular grievance process, as it is in many universities.273 At these 
universities, even those faculty members sympathetic to concerns of sexual 
harassment may have incentives to protect themselves from other types of 
grievances by creating a more complex grievance procedure. 
The gender composition of academic faculties also plays a role in the 
shaping of procedure. As mentioned, faculty members at many universities 
participate in the drafting and/or adoption of sexual harassment policies and 
procedures. But men and women do not participate equally in the governance 
process for two reasons. First, women comprise less than one-third (thirty 
percent) of all tenured or tenure-track positions at American colleges and 
universities.274 At several of the public records schools the percentage is even 
lower, with women comprising as little as twenty-four percent of tenured or 
tenure-track faculty members. 275 Thus even based on random selection, fewer 
on Dec. 2, 1996); UNIVERSITY OF ARizONA, GUIDELINES FOR SHARED GOVERNANCE§ II.E. (on file with author) 
(faculty and administration work together to develop faculty personnel policy); UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, 
UMCP POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING FACULTY GRIEVANCES (1990) [hereinafter MARYLAND 
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE] (on file with author) (faculty grievance procedure passed by Campus Senate on April 
23, 1990); University of Minnesota, Sexual Harassment Policy (visited Aug. 3, 1998) 
<http://www.umn.edu/usenatelscfa/sexualharassment.html> (policy approved by University Senate on Apr. 16, 
1998; amendments approved by Senate on Nov. 5, 1998); Iowa Letter, supra note 110, ~ 6 (in drafting current 
sexual harassment policy and procedures "faculty constituency groups and individual faculty members were 
consulted and permitted to provide input in the process"); SUNY Letter, supra note 99, 2 ~ 7, ("[T]he 
University's faculty senate did adopt the University's statement on sexual harassment and consensual 
relationships in May 1990."). 
273. See, e.g., MINNESOTA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § VI.D.3.b, at 16 (right to grieve discipline 
imposed for sexual harassment); UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES FOR 
THE BERKELEY CAMPUS, Title I, at !(a) [hereinafter BERKELEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES} (on file with 
author) (can only impose discipline pursuant to these procedures, which are distinct from the sexual harassment 
complaint procedures); MUPIM, supra note 109, § 3.6.P (if discipline recommended, the university must 
follow separate grievance procedures for imposing discipline); Colorado Policy, supra note 109, § III.F (sexual 
harassment determination separate from disciplinary proceeding; disciplinary procedure varies depending on 
status of accused, e.g., faculty member vs. student); Cornell Policy, supra note 109 (separate grievance 
procedures for faculty who contest disciplinary recommendations); OSU Policy, supra note 2, § VIII.9(a)(l) (in 
cases involving violations of sexual harassment policy by faculty, separate procedure for imposing "corrective 
measures" when no negotiated settlement occurs). 
At both the University of Arizona and the University of Texas at Austin, a faculty member may contest 
disciplinary recommendations made during the sexual harassment procedure. See E-mail message from Sandy 
Fagan, Assistant Director, Affirmative Action Office, University of Arizona, to Anne Lawton, Assistant 
Professor, Miami University I (Sept. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Arizona Letter II] (on file with author) ("If ... the 
person wishes to challenge proposed disciplinary action arising from the finding of [sexual harassment], the 
person may access the appropriate 'grievance' procedure to do so."); Phone conversation with Linda H. 
Millstone, EEO Officer, University of Texas at Austin (Sept. 8, 1998) [hereinafter Texas Conversation] (notes 
of phone conversation on file with author). 
274. See ALMANAC, supra note 80, at 30. There were a total of 414,097 tenured and tenure-track 
professors at U.S. colleges and universities in the fall of 1995, of whom 124,703 were women. 
275. At Iowa, Maryland, and Texas, women comprise only 24% of the total tenured faculty. See Iowa 
Letter, supra note 110, at 2; Maryland Letter, supra note 103, ~ 6; Letter from Joe A. Powell, Associate Vice 
President for Business Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, to Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami 
University I (June 30, 1998) (on file with author). 
At Miami, women make up 29% of all tenured and tenure-track faculty. See Miami University, Oxford, 
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women will be represented on college and university governance or policy-
drafting committees. 
Second, men are disproportionately represented in the ranks of tenured full 
and associate professors. While forty-four percent of all untenured assistant 
professors are women, less than a quarter (twenty-four percent) of all tenured 
full and associate professors are women. 276 In academia, all opinions are not 
created equal. 
[T]here is a "hierarchy of credibility" in organizations and that credibility 
and the right to be heard are differentially distrlbuted: "In any system of 
ranked groups, participants take it as given that members of the highest 
group have the right to define the way things really are."277 
The sex ratio disparity in academia, especially among the highest ranked 
members of the academy, gives men greater opportunity for shaping university 
governance documents, policies, and procedures. 
Of course, not all women are sympathetic to sexual harassment nor do all 
men turn a deaf ear to harassment complaints within the university. Nonetheless, 
the profile of the typical victim and perpetrator of sexual harassment runs 
strongly along sex lines: most victims are women and most harassers are men.278 
Because women are more vulnerable to harassment in the workplace, they are 
more likely to place themselves in the position of the victim ofharassment. Most 
men, on the other hand, will never encounter sexual harassment during their 
working lives; thus they are more likely to worry that they will be falsely 
accused of harassing behavior. These differences in perspective influence the 
procedures that faculty members draft and adopt for dealing with sexual 
harassment in the academy. The procedures are not neutral; they reflect the 
Ohio, Detail Faculty Profile as of October 16, 1997 (on file with author). 
Colorado refused my request to provide the number of tenured and tenure-track female faculty compared 
to total tenured and tenure-track faculty on the grounds that my question was not a record and, hence, not 
available under Colorado's Open Records Act. See Letter from L. Louise Romero, Senior Associate University 
Counsel, University of Colorado (June 30, 1998) to Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami University. 
SUNY tracks faculty by gender, but not by tenured versus tenure-track status. See SUNY Letter, supra note 99, 
~ 8, at 2. Minnesota did not have the 1997-1998 figures available as of August 3, 1998. See Letter from Susan 
McKinney, CRM, Records & Information Management, University of Minnesota, to Anne Lawton, Assistant 
Professor, Miami University I, ~ 6 [hereinafter Minnesota Letter] (on file with author). 
276. See ALMANAC, supra note 80, at 30. Of 159,333 full professors, 28,393 are women; 39,769 
associate professors are women out of a total of 125,082. 
277. Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies and Procedures, 46 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 497,499 (1991) (citing H.S. Becker, Whose Side Are We On?, 14 Soc. PROBS. 239,241 (1967)). 
278. With few exceptions, women report experiencing harassing behaviors at significantly higher rates 
than do men. "The strongest predictor [of sexual harassment] is sex. Most victims of harassment are women ... 
. " Lach & Gwartney-Gibbs, supra note 108, at 107. See also ANNE C. LEVY & MICHELE A. PALUDI, 
WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 55-56 (1997) (women unlikely to harass men); MSPB UPDATE II, supra 
note 21, at 16-18, app.2 at 69 (women experience all harassing behaviors at two to three times the rate of their 
male colleagues; 93% of all female victims are harassed by men); NIH REPORT, supra note 33, at 7 ("Women 
reported being harassed more often than men (37.7 percent compared to 23.8 percent) ... "); Dey et al., supra 
note 18, at !57 ("[T)here are large gender differences in the reported incidence of harassment."); Fitzgerald et 
al., supra note 18, at 172-73 (men are unlikely to be harassed). 
1999] The Emperor's New Clothes 119 
interests, concerns, and biases of the most powerful and influential members of 
the academic community, who are overwhelmingly male. 
2. Tenure 
It is difficult to fire a tenured professor. In the corporate world, where most 
employees work "at will", the employer may terminate a supervisor who 
harasses his subordinates. Of course, the corporation faces the possibility that a 
terminated employee will sue for wrongful discharge. But in academia, tenure 
adds another layer of complexity. Tenure gives the academic employee 
protection from termination, absent a showing of"cause".279 Requiring a college 
or university to demonstrate "cause" erects a much higher burden of proof than 
corporate employers must demonstrate in order to terminate an employee-at-
will. 
The problem is exacerbated in public institutions. "Tenure has the status of 
a property right."280 In a public college or university, that means that 
constitutional guarantees of due process apply by virtue of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, which protect against deprivations of property 
"without due process of law."281 The Supreme Court has not required, as a 
constitutional matter, extensive pre-termination process for deprivations of 
property, so long as a full post-termination hearing is available.282 Nonetheless, 
the tenured faculty member at a public institution of higher learning has a 
constitutionally protected right to some degree of process prior to termination. 
And some tenured professors found liable for sexual harassment do not hesitate 
to use procedure as grounds for challenging a university's sexual harassment 
findings and sanctions. 283 This provides tenured faculty with greater leverage in 
279. See, e.g., Chan v. Miami Univ., 652 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ohio 1995) ("There is no dispute that the 
granting of tenure creates an expectation of continued employment subject to discharge for cause."); UNIVERSllY 
OF TExAs, HANDBOOK OF OPERATING PROCEDURES §§ 3.18.1.C, III-20 (1973) [hereinafter TExAs GRIEVANCE 
PROCEDURES] (on file with author) ("The administration through appropriate officials reserves the right to 
discipline and to terminate the employment of a faculty member for stated good cause shown."); see also STATE 
UNIVERSllY OF NEW YORK AT BINGHAMTON, STATE UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONAL SERVICES NEGOTIATING UNIT 
TENTATIVE AGREEMENT§ 19.1 [hereinafter UUP AGREEMENT] (on file with author) (discipline imposed for "just 
cause"). The UUP Agreement "is no longer tentative, but [is now] in effect." E-mail message from Katharine 
Ellis, Director of Media Relations, Binghamton University, to Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami 
University (Apr. 26, 1999) (on file with author). 
280. Chan, 652 N.E.2d at 649 (citations omitted); see Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972) 
(absence of contract or tenure is "highly relevant" to teacher's procedural due process claim); Board of Regents 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972) ("[I]n the area of public employment, the Court has held that a public 
college professor dismissed from an office held under tenure provisions ... [has] [an] interest [] in continued 
employment that [is] safeguarded by due process."). 
281. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV,§ I. 
282. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (citations omitted) ("The 
tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the 
employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. To require more than this prior to 
termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in quickly removing an 
unsatisfactory employee."). 
283. See, e.g., Chan, 652 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio Supreme Court ruled in favor of F. Gilbert Chan, a Miami 
University professor dismissed for sexual harassment based on procedural grounds); Julianne Basinger, State 
Supreme Court Orders N.H. Institute to Reinstate Professor, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 20, 1998, at A 15 
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sexual harassment proceedings than untenured faculty or students, who have no 
comparable constitutional right to a minimum level of process in such 
proceedings. Tenured faculty members may challenge both the substantive 
finding of harassment and the procedures used to make that finding. By 
comparison, the courts have not recognized the right of untenured faculty or 
students to minimum fair procedures in the context of internal sexual harassment 
investigations. 
Some faculty members have also argued that the First Amendment protects 
their right to academic freedom, thus insulating their behavior in the classroom 
from outside scrutiny?84 They argue that universities have no business 
investigating sexual harassment complaints stemming from discourse conducted 
within the classroom. Unlike professors, students have no constitutional claim to 
learn in an environment free from sexist discourse and improper sexualizing of 
the classroom experience. 
At public universities then, the most powerful-those with life 
employment-are constitutionally guaranteed certain minimum levels of 
process. This complicates the decision of a public university to terminate a 
professor for sexual harassment. Administrators may shy away from terminating 
a tenured professor (or imposing other harsh sanctions), fearing litigation.285 
Students and untenured faculty members do not possess this bargaining chip. 
First, the Constitution does not accord any procedural protections to the victims 
of sexual harassment. Second, there is almost no case law, under either Title VII 
or Title IX, imposing liability on institutions for adopting sexual harassment 
procedures that favor harassers over victims. 
Practical considerations stemming from the nature of tenure also create 
power imbalances within academic institutions. Tenure provides faculty 
members with a life-long connection to their academic institutions. Students, on 
the other hand, pass through the institution in two to four years, depending on 
the nature of the college or university. Students also are significantly younger 
than tenured faculty members and less established in the community. Filing a 
claim of sexual harassment takes time, energy, and sometimes money. A faculty 
(New Hampshire Supreme Court ordered New Hampshire Technical Institute to reinstate Edward A. Boulay, 
who argued that the school had not followed proper procedures in terminating him for sexual harassment); 
Karla Haworth, Psychology Professor Loses Another Round in Battle Against Cornell U., CHRON. OF HIGHER 
Eouc., Apr. 10, 1998, at A20 (James B. Maas sued Cornell University, which had found him liable for sexual 
harassment and denied him a pay raise; Maas argued that the University's proceedings denied him due 
process). 
284. See, e.g., Courtney Leatherman, Court Finds That College Violated Professor's First Amendment 
Rights, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 6, 1996, at A16 (Ninth Circuit held that San Bernardino Valley 
College violated the First Amendment rights of Dean Cohen, whom the university found liable for sexual 
harassment based on sexually explicit classroom discussions and assignments); Alison Schneider, Appeals 
Court Upholds U. of Hawaii's Handling of a Sexual-Harassment Complaint, CHRON. OF HIGHER Eouc., June 
19, 1998, at A12 (Rarndas Lamb lost lawsuit against University of Hawaii, in which he claimed that the 
University's investigation of a sexual harassment complaint infringed on his right to academic freedom under 
the First Amendment.). 
285. This fear is not unjustified. A number of professors recently have sued universities that have 
terminated, suspended, or disciplined them based on charges of sexual harassment. See, e.g., Chan, 652 N.E.2d 
644; Basinger, supra note 283; Haworth, supra note 283; Schneider, supra note 284. 
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member faced with harassment may hire an attorney to defend himself. The 
stakes are high for the faculty member, and he is much more likely to have the 
sophistication, connections, and resources necessary to locate competent legal 
counsel. Many students cannot afford to hire attorneys to use internal grievance 
procedures, and even if they could do so, would not understand the importance 
of having a lawyer present during a formal or informal grievance procedure. 
Instead, students may decide that it is simply not worth the time and effort to 
pursue a grievance, especially if the professor is not sanctioned for his behavior. 
Failure to complain does not mean that the professor's behavior did not have 
detrimental effects. Some students drop classes, avoid taking certain courses, 
and change majors simply to avoid particular professors.286 
3. Distribution of Power in the Academic Population 
Several characteristics about women's experience with sexual 
harassment emerge from the literature. These common themes pose a special 
challenge for academic institutions, whose mission is to provide equal 
educational opportunities for men and women. 
First, harassment is an issue of power. The more vulnerable the woman, 
the more likely she is to experience harassment. Harassers disproportionately 
select younger, unmarried women as victims,287 which describes the majority 
of college-aged women.288 
Individual differences in age and status need to be addressed [by 
universities]. In academia, the majority of persons with occupational 
prestige are males who are older than their students. The differential 
power and status between educators and students is a central component 
in sexual harassment and must be addressed by educators and 
policymakers. Institutions need to be alert to the possible misuse of this 
status and power. 289 
Although untenured women may not necessarily be younger than their 
tenured counterparts, the potential for tenured faculty, who are 
disproportionately male, to misuse their status and power still exists. 
Untenured faculty are especially vulnerable given the role of discretion in the 
tenure review process. As an abuse of power, then, sexual harassment also 
poses a threat to untenured female faculty members. 
286. See Fitzgerald et al., supra note 18, at 159, 162. 
287. See Gruber, supra note 17, at 311; Hesson-Mcinnis & Fitzgerald, supra note 108, at 887, 890. 
288. Almost 40% of female college and university students are 21 years of age or younger, and 54% are 
24 years of age or younger. See ALMANAC, supra note 80, at 18 (based on Fall 1995 enrollment figures). For 
women, the average age for first marriage is 24. See Hank Ezell, Do You Take This ... Prenuptial: More Are 
Signing the Agreements Before Taking Vows, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 3, 1998, at 3H. The average age is 
based on the most recent United States Census, obtained in 1990. 
289. Rubin & Borgers, supra note 18, at 410. 
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Second, between 1985 and 1995, enrollment in institutions of higher 
education increased by sixteen percent, due in large part to increases in 
enrollment of part-time and female students.290 Beginning in 1984 and 
continuing to the present, female graduate students have outnumbered male 
graduate students.291 With increased enrollment of female students, especially 
in graduate programs in which faculty and students work more closely, 
universities should expect sexual harassment to continue to be a problem on 
campus. 
Third, peer harassment, both in the workplace and on campus, appears 
more common than does sexual harassment by supervisors. 292 Unlike the 
typical workplace, however, a female faculty member's peers vote on her 
tenure. The academic co-worker, in effect, acts in a supervisory role. As a 
result, the distinction between co-worker and supervisor blurs for female 
faculty in academic settings, creating a problem unique to academic 
institutions. 
Finally, two different workplace studies published subsequent to the 
MSPB surveys on sexual harassment have confirmed the MSPB's findings 
that women who work in nontraditional jobs or who have a high degree of 
contact with men at work are at greater risk of experiencing sexual 
harassment on the job. Hesson-Mcinnis and Fitzgerald found that three 
factors operate jointly to predict those women who experience harassing 
behavior on the job. Job gender context, which the researchers defined as a 
"[ c ]omposite indicator based on gender traditionality, gender ratio in the 
work group, and gender of supervisor,"293 is one of the three predictors of 
sexual harassment. 
[T]he victims' overall experience of sexual harassment over the past 24 
months was jointly predicted by the gender context of their jobs, their 
own relative vulnerability, and the tolerance of their organizational unit 
for harassing behavior. In other words, female employees who were 
considered a priori to be most vulnerable (i.e., younger, unmarried, and 
with less education), who worked in a male-dominated job context, and 
whose organizations were more tolerant of sexual harassment were more 
likely to have experienced some form of sexual harassment during the 
previous 24 months.294 
In his survey of 1990 Canadian women, Gruber made similar findings. 
His research showed that age and workplace contact with men are the two 
strongest predictors of whether a woman had experienced a sexually 
290. See Education Statistics, supra note 80, 1j4. 
291. See id. 1j6. 
292. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
293. Hesson-Mcinnis & Fitzgerald, supra note 108, tbl.l. 
294. !d. at 887, 890. 
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harassing event at work during the previous year. 295 He also found a 
significant, though weaker, relationship between "occupation sex 
composition," which measured the ratio of men and women in particular 
occupations, and the likelihood of sexual harassment. Gruber concluded that 
three groups of women are most likely to experience sexual harassment on 
the job: (1) women whose work brings them into contact with men on a 
regular basis (workplace contact);296 (2) women who work in nontraditional 
fields (occupation sex composition);297 and (3) women who hold 
nontraditional jobs in which there is high workplace contact with men 
(gender predominance). 298 
These findings are significant for educational institutions. Unlike some 
workplaces (e.g., day care centers), all large universities have colleges (e.g., 
engineering, medicine, and business) in which there is gender predominance. 
Women in such fields are more likely to be viewed as threats to the 
predominant male culture, and hence are more likely to be harassed on the 
job. 
Gender predominance is an important predictor of both physical threat 
and sexual materials. . . . First, predominantly male environments are 
more physically hostile and intimidating than other work environments. 
Women are more apt to be touched, grabbed, or stalked. Second, men are 
more apt to physically mark their work environments with sexually 
objectifying material.299 
The gender imbalance within certain professions and occupations within the 
university exacerbates the problem of sexual harassment. This, in tum, may 
affect the retention of women professors in certain fields and the willingness 
of female students to undertake particular fields of study. 
Moreover, despite the increasing numbers of female professors, men still 
comprise more than half of all professors at American four-year colleges and 
295. SeeGruber,supranote 17,at311. 
296. Women may hold traditional jobs, such as secretarial positions, but work primarily for men, thus 
having a high degree of daily contact with men at work. 
297. Gruber separated workplace contact from occupation sex composition in his study because not all 
women in nontraditional jobs necessarily have high workplace contact with men. For example, a female 
obstetrician has a nontraditional job, but also has little contact with men at work. 
298. Gruber used the term gender predominance for job categories in which women hold nontraditional 
jobs and have high workplace contact with men. See Gruber, supra note 17, at 310. An example is a female 
police officer, who holds a nontraditional job and has high daily contact with men in the workplace. 
Gruber also found that women experience different types of harassment depending on whether they hold 
nontraditional jobs (occupation sex composition), have high workplace contact with men (workplace contact), 
or hold nontraditional jobs in which there is high workplace contact with men (gender predominance). See id. 
at 314. For example, for women whose work regularly brings them into contact with men, harassment more 
likely takes the form of sexual materials at work or sexual categorical remarks (comments about women in 
general). See id. at 313. Women in nontraditional jobs tend to experience harassment as sexual comments and 
sexual categorical remarks. See id. at 314. Finally, women who hold nontraditional jobs in male-dominated 
environments, such as female professors of engineering, are more likely to experience harassment in the form 
of physical threats or sexual materials in the workplace. See id. 
299. Gruber, supra note 17,at314. 
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universities. 300 Men also comprise approximately half of all students at 
American colleges and universities. Thus, women on most campuses haye 
regular contact with male students and professors during their academic careers. 
Undergraduate institutions serve as the gatekeepers for graduate and 
professional degree programs, which in turn provide entree to the academy and 
the professions. If a hostile educational environment discourages women from 
pursuing certain· academic degrees, then an academic institution has failed in its 
mission to provide a safe environment for both women and men. 
C. Sexual Harassment in Colleges and Universities: What Really Happens? 
An evaluation of university policies and procedures on sexual harassment 
reveals a number of procedural hurdles that effectively deter reporting. Some 
provisions clearly advantage the accused at the expense of the victim. Others 
merely make it more difficult for victims to file complaints of sexual harassment. 
These procedural barriers effectively chill the reporting of sexual harassment on 
campus. 
1. False Claims Provisions 
Language providing penalties for bringing false claims of sexual 
harassment is a common feature in many university sexual harassment policies 
and procedures.301 Six of the ten public records schools-Arizona, Colorado, 
Florida, Iowa, Miami, and SUNY -have policies that provide penalties for 
faculty, students, or staff who bring forward false claims of harassment. 
Colorado's sexual harassment policy even includes "false complaints" as one of 
the three outcomes of its formal complaint process.302 False claims language in 
sexual harassment policies, however, is problematic for several reasons. 
First and foremost, such language contributes to the perception that false 
complaints of sexual harassment are common. Yet one reason given by women 
for not reporting harassment is fear of not being believed.303 False claims 
provisions reinforce this fear. There is little research on false claims of 
harassment. Therefore, no evidence exists that false claims of sexual harassment 
outnumber false grievances of any other sort within the academy.304 Many 
300. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text. 
301. See. e.g., ARIZONA CoMPLAINT PROCEDURES, supra note 109, at 5; Iowa Policy, supra note 2, § 
4.3f{3); MUPIM, supra note 109, § 3.6.F; STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BINGHAMTON, SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT: DEFINmON, POLICY, REsPONSE, AND PREVENTION-A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS, FACUL1Y AND 
STAFF OF BINGHAMTON UNIVERSITY (on file with author); Colorado Policy, supra note 109, § 11.0; Cornell 
Policy, supra note 109; OSU Policy, supra note 2, § II.D; University of Florida, Who is Responsible for 
Reporting Sexual Harassment? (visited July 16, 1998) <http://www.aa.ufl.edu/aa!affactlharass/who.htm>. 
302. Colorado Policy, supra note 109, § m.D.5. The formal complaint procedure has three possible 
outcomes: (l) cases in which the complaint is substantiated; (2) cases in which the complaint is not 
substantiated; and (3) cases in which the allegations are found to be "intentionally false and malicious." !d. 
303. See Hulin et al., supra note 97, at 140; Lach & Gwartney-Gibbs, supra note 108, at 110. 
304. According to the American Psychological Association, "(r]esearch shows that less than one percent 
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universities do not provide sanctions for filing other kinds of false grievances. 305 
Providing punishment for only one kind of false complaint sends a strong 
message: false complaints of sexual harassment are a problem within academia. 
Second, most universities that penalize complainants for filing false 
allegations of harassment do not impose similar penalties against harassers who 
lie during university proceedings.306 This creates the false impression that only 
complainants lie during sexual harassment proceedings and creates a definite 
procedural bias in favor of the accused. 
Third, false claims language has a chilling effect on victims of harassment. 
Such language may weed out false complaints, but at the expense of deterring 
many legitimate complainants from corning forward. 
Because of this need to encourage victims to come forward, it is not a 
good idea to specifically include in any sexual harassment policy a 
statement about false claims. Although no organization will want to 
encourage false claims, such a statement has been shown to have what the 
law calls a "chilling" effect. This means that such a statement's 
discouraging effect on the reporting of true claims far outweighs its value 
in eliminating untrue claims. It is often very difficult for an employee to 
come forward, and studies show that women in particular often do not 
expect to be believed when they report harassing behavior. Statements 
about retribution for false claims may reinforce feelings by some harassed 
employees that the harasser will accuse them oflying, the higher-ups will 
believe the perpetrator, and severe consequences will follow. 307 
The possibility of chilling legitimate claims is heightened when universities fail 
to adequately define what constitutes a false complaint of sexual harassment. 
Most universities fail to explain that a fmding against the complainant is not the 
equivalent of a false complaint of sexual harassment. Students, in particular, may 
prove reluctant to bring charges of harassment if they believe that the university 
will sanction them in the event that the university finds in favor of the accused. 
This is particularly important in hostile environment cases, where the law 
emphasizes the severity and pervasiveness of the conduct. A woman may 
complain about several incidents of improper behavior on the part of a professor, 
that the university determines do not rise to the level of a hostile environment. A 
finding of no cause in such a case does not mean that the complainant lied; it 
simply means that the facts of her case do not currently fit the legal definition of 
sexual harassment. 
of [sexual harassment] complaints are false." The American Psychological Association, Sexual Harassment: 
Myths and Realities (visited Jan. II, 1998) <http://www.apa.org/pubinfo!harass.html>. 
305. My thanks to Dr. Mary McDonald for bringing this point to my attention. 
306. Arizona is an exception. Arizona provides penalties both for false complaints and false statements 
made during a university investigation or inquiry. See ARIZONA COMPLAINT PROCEDURES, supra note 109, at 5. 
307. LEVY & PALUDI, supra note 278, at 76 (emphasis in original). 
126 Yale Journal ofLaw and Feminism [Vol. 11: 75 
2. Fear of Retaliation 
Most sexual harassment grievance procedures contain language offering 
complainants protection against retaliation. 308 Whether an institution protects 
against retaliation in practice is another story. Many women view official 
reporting as a dangerous strategy. In its report on sexual harassment in the 
military service academies, the GAO found that more than one-third of all 
women who had experienced harassment at one of the three military 
academies did not report the incident for fear of reprisal. 309 "[T]here was ... 
general consensus that there would be negative consequences to reporting the 
harassment, such as being viewed as a 'crybaby', being viewed less favorably 
by the student and officer chains of command, or receiving lower military 
performance grades. "310 As a result, most women at the academies handled 
harassment informally due to the "negative consequences" associated with 
formal reporting. 311 
The research suggests that women's fears of retaliation for formal 
reporting of sexual harassment are justified. Hesson-Mcinnis and Fitzgerald, 
who designed and tested a model of the predictors and outcomes of sexual 
harassment using MSPB data, found that women who used more "assertive 
and formal responses" to harassment experienced "more negative outcomes 
of every sort."312 In addition to experiencing negative medical and 
psychological effects, formal reporters of harassment were "more likely to 
quit, be fired, or be transferred."313 
Organizational justice research supports the findings of Hesson-Mcinnis 
and Fitzgerald. In a study of grievance procedures in three large non-union 
companies, Lewin found that firms punished workers who used their firm's 
internal grievance procedures. Each of the firms had multi-step procedures 
("appeals") initiated by an employee appeal to either the immediate 
supervisor or the firm's personnel officer.314 Lewin made several interesting 
308. See, e.g., ARizONA POLICY, supra note 2, at 2 ~ 5 (prohibiting retaliation against complainants and 
witnesses); BERKELEY POLICY, supra note 2, § V ("No person shall be subject to reprisal for using or 
participating in the mediation or complaint resolution processes, or for using or participating in the formal 
complaint policies."); MINNESOTA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § IV.C ("[T]he policy and state law forbid 
retaliation of any kind."); MUPIM, supra note 109, § 3.6.E ("It is a violation of University policy to retaliate 
against any member of the University community who reports or files a complaint of sexual harassment or 
anyone else who participates in the complaint process."); Colorado Policy, supra note 109, § II.C ("Retaliation 
of any kind ... is prohibited."); OSU Policy, supra note 2, § II.B ("Retaliation is a serious violation that can 
subject the offender to sanctions independent of the merits of the sexual harassment allegation."). 
309. The percentage of women fearing reprisal varied by academy. At the Naval Academy, 37% of 
women feared retaliation, while 53% of women at the Air Force Academy reported fear of reprisal for 
reporting harassment. See DOD REPORT, supra note 39, at 25; DOD REPORT II, supra note 39, at 17-23. 
310. DOD REPORT, supra note 39, at 28. 
311. !d. 
312. Hesson-Mcinnis & Fitzgerald, supra note I 08, at 896 (emphasis added). 
313. !d. 
314. Two firms had four-step procedures. The third had a five-step grievance procedure. See David 
Lewin, Dispute Resolution in the Nonunion Firm: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 31 J. CONFLICT 
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findings that are relevant to retaliation in the context of sexual harassment 
cases. 
First, while men filed more appeals than did women, women filed more 
cases alleging discrimination than did men. 315 Appeals alleging 
discrimination, however, were much more likely to be settled only at the 
higher stages of the firms' appeals process.316 The problem is that employees 
who used the higher stages of the appeals process were more likely after the 
appeal to have lower rates of promotion and higher rates of involuntary 
turnover, e.g., layoffs, than employees whose appeals settled at the first stage 
of the appeals process.317 As a result, because women are more likely than 
men to file discrimination claims, women are more likely to experience 
negative consequences for using their firms' internal grievance procedures. 
Second, Lewin discovered that employees who won their appeals, at any 
level of their firm's multi-step procedure, had significantly lower rates of 
promotion and significantly higher rates of termination and lay-offs than 
similarly situated employees who had lost their appeals.318 Lewin's findings 
suggest that employers penalize employees who use their firm's internal 
grievance procedure and win, creating a Hobson's choice for the employee. 
She can use the firm's grievance procedure, but if she "wins" her case she 
will suffer longer-term negative consequences at work. Or, she can ignore 
discriminatory treatment in the workplace. Neither result is satisfactory. 
Subsequent research involving unionized firms confirms that employers 
penalize employees who use internal grievance procedures. Lewin and 
Peterson, in a study of four unionized companies, found that "grievance filers 
were more likely than nonfilers to experience lower promotion rates, lower 
performance ratings, and higher turnover."319 Klass and DeNisi made similar 
findings in research involving a "unionized public agency."320 Their research 
also indicates that the nature of the grievance has a significant impact on 
whether the employee experiences negative job consequences. "[G]rievants 
who filed grievances against their own supervisors received significantly 
lower performance ratings from these same supervisors in the years following 
their filing of a grievance, compared not only to nongrievants but also to 
employees who filed grievances against organizational policies (rather than 
against specific supervisors)."321 Because sexual harassment may involve 
claims against a supervisor, women who use internal procedures to resolve 
such complaints against their superiors run the risk of subsequent retaliation. 
RESOL. 465,472 tbl.l (1987). 
315. Seeid.at474-76,478. 
316. Seeid. at484. 
317. See id. at 491, 493. 
318. See id. at 493. 
319. Peter Feuille & John T. Delaney, The Individual Pursuit of Organizational Justice: Grievance 
Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces, 10 PERSONNEL & HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. 187, 221 (1992) (citing 
DAVID LEWIN & R.B. PETERSON, THE MODERN GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED STATES ( 1988)). 
320. !d. at 221-22 (citing B.S. Klass & A.S. DeNisi, Managerial Reactions to Employee Dissent: The 
Impact of Grievance Activity on Peiformance Ratings, 32 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 705 (1989)). 
321. !d. 
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Employees apparently can "read" the signals that a firm communicates 
regarding use of internal grievance procedures. Confidential surveys of 
employees at major U.S. corporations found that more than half of the 
employees who had experienced harassment cited fear of reprisal as a reason 
for not reporting harassment.322 The three non-union firms studied by Lewin 
conducted an internal workplace survey, asking employees why they would 
not use their firm's internal appeals procedures. The most frequent response 
among managers and administrators was "'fear of management reprisal."'323 
A different survey by a school district of its unionized teachers' attitudes 
about the district's internal grievance procedure revealed that fear of 
retaliation figured prominently in decisions not to use the district's 
procedures. 324 
In conclusion, the research strongly suggests that women who use 
internal grievance procedures run a significant risk of retaliation for invoking 
those procedures. Complaints about supervisors, which include some sexual 
harassment grievances, are more likely to result in negative consequences for 
complainants. In addition, if a woman wins her sexual harassment grievance, 
it is more likely that the organization will punish her later for filing and 
prevailing on her complaint. 
3. Mediation 
More than halfofthe public schools-Arizona,325 Berkeley,326 Colorado,327 
Iowa,328 Maryland,329 and Miami330-include mediation or conciliation either in 
the investigation or disciplinary phases of their sexual harassment procedures.331 
322. See Daniel Niven, The Case of the Hidden Harassment. HARv. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 12, 
23. 
323. Lewin, supra note 314, at 500 (explaining that 27% of those who responded to the survey cited this 
reason). 
324. See Feuille & Delaney, supra note 319, at 221 (citing DAVID LEWIN & R.B. PETERsON, THE 
MODERN GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE IN 1lfE UNITED STATES (1988)). 
325. See ARIZONA COMPLAINT PRocEDURES, supra note 109, at 3 (explaining that mediation and 
negotiation are preferred methods for resolving formal complaints of harassment). 
326. See BERKELEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES, supra note 273, § ill. 5-6, at 83E (providing for informal 
mediation during early stages of disciplinary procedure); BERKELEY STUDENT POLICY, supra note 227, § IV.C, 
at 6 (explaining that complaint resolution officer may "mediate a resolution or negotiate an administrative 
settlement" of a student's formal grievance at any time during the investigation). 
327. See Colorado Policy, supra note 109, § III (explaining that informal complaints are "resolved 
through means (e.g., mediation) other than formal investigation"). 
328. See University of Iowa, Faculty Dispute Procedures, § 29.7.d (last modified Dec. 1998) 
<http://www.uiowa.edu/-{lur/opmanual!iii/29b.htm> [hereinafter Iowa Faculty Procedures] {mediation in 
disciplinary proceedings). 
329. See MARYLAND GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE, supra note 272, § II.B.2 (providing for mediation in 
grievance procedure for faculty complaints of sexual harassment); MARYLAND CODE, supra note 227, § III.K 
(directs that upon a finding of probable cause that discrimination has occurred, attempt to resolve by 
conciliation, persuasion, and conference). At Maryland, faculty, students, and staff may make formal 
complaints of sexual harassment under the Human Relations Code. Only faculty members may invoke the 
Faculty Grievances Procedure. See MARYLAND POLICY, supra note 2, §§ B.2.a, e. 
330. See MUPIM, supra note 109, §§ 3.6.I, 8.3.E (providing for mediation as informal method for 
resolving sexual harassment complaints and mediation during disciplinary procedure). 
331. See infra note 357. Many universities have a two-part sexual harassment procedure: (I) 
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Some universities, such as Berkelef32 and Miami,333 include mediation in both 
the investigation and disciplinary phases. Mediation, in the context of either an 
investigation of sexual harassment or the imposition of discipline for such 
harassment, is inappropriate in most sexual harassment cases within the 
academy. 
First, even those commentators who recommend mediation for sexual 
harassment disputes334 recognize that it cannot work where "an extreme power 
imbalance exists that cannot be addressed adequately in mediation. "335 Yet 
sexual harassment often involves serious power imbalances, especially in an 
academic setting. Faculty members have great power over student grades and 
recommendations. While co-worker harassment is more common than 
supervisory harassment, the co-workers of untenured female faculty often are 
tenured male faculty, who vote on her tenure decision. Short of removing faculty 
members from tenure committees, for example, it is difficult to determine how 
the university can adequately address this power imbalance in a mediation 
setting. 
Second, some cases of sexual harassment involve sexual coercion or other 
forms of forced physical attention, such as kissing or touching of intimate parts 
of the body. Mediation requires both parties to participate.336 This means that the 
victim must sit down with the harasser in an effort to mediate the dispute. Such a 
meeting could be traumatic or even threatening to the victim. 
In recent years, some institutions have built into their grievance 
procedures a mediation technique, whereby grievances can be resolved 
informally between the individuals involved .... However, such sessions 
very often become volatile. Individuals have very powerful emotions 
associated with the situation. Furthermore, such a procedure assumes 
both individuals are of equal bargaining power in the organization. 
Research has suggested, however, that most victims of sexual harassment 
hold less organizational power than the harassers. Perhaps most 
importantly, most individuals who have experienced sexual harassment 
want to flee the harasser, not sit with this person face-to-face. They fear 
the mediation session will become an extension of the sexual 
harassment. 337 
investigation; and (2) discipline. 
332. See supra note 326. 
333. See supra note 330. 
334. See, e.g., Barbara J. Gazeley, Venus, Mars, and the Law: On Mediation of Sexual Harassment 
Cases, 33 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 605, 608 n.22 (1997). 
335. /d. at 634 (footnote omitted). 
336. The victim does not have to participate in mediation during some disciplinary proceedings. Instead, 
the university acts as the plaintiff in the disciplinary case against the harasser. See, e.g., Iowa Faculty 
Procedures, supra note 328, § 29.7d (stipulating that complainant need not participate in mediation; mediation 
occurs between faculty member and a high-ranking university official). 
337. LEVY & PALUDI, supra note 278, at 110-11. 
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Yet several university sexual harassment policies encourage victims either to 
first attempt to resolve the dispute informally with the harasse238 or to try 
mediation.339 "The decision to enter mediation, however, may not be truly 
voluntary if dictated by an unequal power balance in the relationship as it existed 
prior to the mediation. Thus even voluntary mediation can be coercive."340 At a 
minimum, a university policy should be neutral as to how victims ought to 
proceed. University officials can set forth the options. The victim should then 
proceed as she sees fit, free of subtle pressures that currently reside in university 
policies. 
Third, the prevalence of mediation and other informal mechanisms for 
resolving sexual harassment complaints suggests a gender stereotype about 
women's preferences for resolving conflict. 
[I]t has been suggested that affirmative action offices concentrate on 
informal mediational procedures rather than conducting formal hearings. 
However, such a shift in focus is problematic because it typically results 
in unpunished and undeterred offenders. It may also portray women as 
reluctant consumers of adversarial justice systems and infer that women 
neither deserve nor demand restitution for infractions of their civil 
rights.341 
The argument that women prefer informal resolution mechanisms is flawed. 
Women do use informal resolution methods much more often than formal ones. 
The research, however, suggests that they do so not out of personal preference, 
but out of :frustration with formal complaint mechanisms.342 
Fourth, none of the universities that use mediation as a means to resolve 
sexual harassment complaints allows the complainant to select the mediator. 
"One of the obvious advantages of mediation is that the parties may choose the 
mediator."343 In a university sexual harassment case, however, the victim must 
make do with the university official selected to mediate the case. This creates a 
conflict. The university mediator works for and is paid by the university. The 
university has an interest in addressing sexual harassment complaints, but the 
university's interest is not necessarily co-extensive with that of the victim's. In 
338. Berkeley's student policy on sexual harassment advises students to "attempt to resolve the matter 
informally with the person alleged to have committed the violation" or with the department or unit head prior 
to filing a grievance. BERKELEY STUDENT POLICY, supra note 227, §liLA. 
339. Arizona prefers to mediate or negotiate a resolution of even formal complaints of sexual 
harassment. In fact, in most cases, the university will not conduct a full investigation "until other methods of 
resolution have been attempted." ARIZONA COMPLAINT PROCEDURES, supra note 109, at 3. Miami's sexual 
harassment policy "encourages informal means of mediation and resolution where practical and appropriate." 
MUPIM, supra note 109, § 3.6.1. 
340. Trino Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1550 
n.12 (1991). 
341. Rudman et al., supra note 65, at 521 (citations omitted). 
342. See infra Part III.C.5. 
343. Gaze1ey, supra note 334, at 637. 
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fact, the victim's and the university's interests may diverge, especially if the 
harasser is a repeat offender whom the university previously has failed to 
sanction. 
Finally, what is most interesting about mediation in university sexual 
harassment cases is how it is used in the disciplinary phase of the case. At two of 
the three universities that allow mediation during the disciplinary phase (Iowa 
and Miami), the faculty member participates in the selection of the mediator or 
mediation committee. At Iowa, the faculty member states his preference of 
mediators from a list provided to him. 344 At Miami, the faculty member selects 
one of the three mediators to serve on the faculty member's mediation 
committee. 345 And, at both Iowa and Miami, the university affords the faculty 
member the right to participate in mediation concerning the discipline to be 
imposed upon him, even though the university already has determined that the 
faculty member has engaged in sexual harassment. For example, at Iowa, the 
mediation proceeding occurs after the university has found that a reasonable 
basis exists for believing that sexual harassment has occurred.346 At Miami, a 
faculty member may invoke mediation even though the Office of Affirmative 
Action has found reasonable cause to believe that sexual harassment has 
occurred and the faculty member either has failed to appeal to or lost an appeal 
before the university's Sexual Harassment Panel.347 
To begin with, it is unclear why mediation is part of the disciplinary phase 
of any sexual harassment proceeding. Once a faculty member is found liable for 
sexual harassment, why does he have a right, sanctioned by university 
procedure, to participate in his discipline? Moreover, why does a faculty 
member who has violated university policy have the right to select his mediator, 
while victims of sexual harassment have no control over the person who 
mediates their case? The answer lies in the power relationships within 
universities. Faculty members devise the grievance and disciplinary proceedings 
available to them. Thus, they insert procedural protections, such as the right to 
mediation, that operate to benefit them at the expense of less powerful members 
of the university community. 
4. Length and Clarity of Procedures 
344. See Iowa Faculty Procedures, supra note 328, § 29.7.d(2). 
345. See MUPIM, supra note 109, § 8.3.E.l. 
346. See Iowa Faculty Procedures, supra note 328, at § 29.7.d; see also University of Iowa, Sexual 
Harassment Complaint Procedures § 5.9b(9) (visited Apr. 21, 1999) 
<http://www.uiowa.edu/-our/oprnanuaVii/OS.htrn> [hereinafter Iowa Complaint Procedures]; Letter from 
Grainne Martin, Associate Director and Compliance Officer, University of Iowa, to Anne Lawton, Assistant 
Professor, Miami University (Jan. 26, 1999) (copy on file with author) ("If [the Provost] agrees [that a 
reasonable basis exists for believing the policy has been violated], he then attempts to obtain a negotiated 
settlement. . . . If this effort fails, the Provost then imposes formal sanctions and the faculty member may 
appeal that action pursuant to the Faculty Dispute Procedures .... "). 
347. See generally MUPIM, supra note 109, § 8.3 (mediation is part of disciplinary proceedings, which 
are invoked only after a finding that a faculty member has engaged in sexual harassment). 
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No one can use a procedure that she does not understand. A review of 
university sexual harassment procedures, however, reveals several consistent 
problems that make understanding the formal procedures difficult and using 
them burdensome. Many formal procedures involve multiple stages; following 
the process often requires diagramming it. The length of the written procedure, 
as well as the time it takes to complete it, operates as a barrier to entry. In 
addition, many procedures leave key terms or critical time periods undefined. 
This makes the procedures ambiguous. 
a. Lengthy Procedures 
First, the sheer length of a written document setting forth a procedure is a 
deterrent to reporting, especially if the writing is "legalistic" or the document 
requires multiple references to other sections of university policy. Several 
universities have very long sexual harassment policies and procedures. Cornell's 
policy is twenty-seven pages long. The documents that describe the formal 
sexual harassment investigation and disciplinary procedures at Berkeley, Iowa, 
and Miami range from sixteen to twenty-five pages in length.348 It is misleading 
to look only at the documents that govern the sexual harassment investigation 
procedure because, at many universities, a faculty member may attack the 
factual finding of harassment in a separate disciplinary or faculty grievance 
phase. 349 As a result, there can be no relief until the entire formal process, 
including the disciplinary or grievance proceedings, is completed. 
Second, the longer it takes to complete an investigation of sexual 
harassment, the less likely victims are to invoke the procedure. This is especially 
348. At Berlceley, the procedures describing the steps involved in a formal investigation of sexual 
harassment by a student are 21 pages long. The formal complaint procedures for students consist of nine pages of 
text. See BERKELEY SruoENT Poucv, supra note 227. Prior to filing a formal complaint, however, "[s]tudents are 
encouraged to consult ... the [BERKELEY Poucv]", which is 12 pages long. BERKELEY STIIDENT Poucv, supra 
note 227, § I. C. See also Letter from Carmen McKines, Title IX Compliance Officer, University of California at 
Berlceley, to Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami University 2 (Aug. 27, 1998) [hereinafter Berlceley Letter 
II] (on file with author) (stating that the Berlceley Policy is "the first step of the 'formal process' which encourages 
informal resolution"). 
In order to understand Iowa's formal complaint procedure, three different documents must be examined. The 
first is the sexual harassment policy, which is six pages long. See Iowa Policy, supra note 2. The complaint 
procedures are nine pages long, four of which govern formal complaints. See Iowa Complaint Procedures, supra 
note 346, §§ 5.9-5.13. Finally, discipline against a faculty member for violating the sexual harassment policy is 
imposed pursuant to the Faculty Dispute Procedures, which are 50 pages long. Of course, not all 50 pages are 
relevant; only seven pages of definitions and other general provisions, and § 29.7, which is eight pages long, apply 
to discipline against a faculty member in sexual harassment cases. See Iowa Faculty Procedures, supra note 328, 
§§ 29.1-29.4, 29.7. But because the complaint procedures do not specifically cross-reference the subsection of the 
disciplinary procedures that apply in sexual harassment cases, a student or faculty member must wade through 50 
pages of faculty dispute procedures in order to determine which procedures govern their case. Even if a student or 
faculty member immediately determines which procedures are relevant for discipline, she must read 25 pages in 
order to understand the complete formal complaint procedure: a six-page policy, four pages on formal complaints, 
and 15 pages of disciplinary procedures. 
Miami's formal complaint procedure is shorter, but still is 16 pages long. The sexual harassment policy 
and formal complaint procedures are six pages long. See MUPIM, supra note 109, § 3.6. The disciplinary 
procedures are 10 pages long. See MUPIM, supra note 109, § 8.3. 
349. See infra note 425 and accompanying text. 
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true for students who typically spend only nine months of each year on campus. 
For graduating seniors, lengthy procedures mean they may not obtain a 
resolution of their complaint prior to graduation. Few would wish to return to 
campus in order to pursue a sexual harassment complaint. 
At a number of the public records schools, e.g., Arizona,350 Berkeley/51 
Iowa,352 Miami/53 SUNY/54 and Texas,355 it can take from six months to one 
350. The formal complaint procedure will take at least 180 days or six months at Arizona. The 
Affirmative Action Office ("AAO") has 120 days from the filing of a formal complaint to "provide both the 
complainant and the respondent a written summary of findings, determination of CAUSE or NO CAUSE, and 
if appropriate any necessary correction action." ARizONA COMPLAINT PROCEDURES, supra note 109, at 4. Either 
party may then appeal to the president within 30 calendar days from receiving the AAO's report. See id. 
Finally, the president appoints an "ad hoc discrimination appeal officer," who must provide "the president with 
written findings and recommendations within 30 calendar days of appointment." /d. The president's decision is 
final. See id. The procedures do not set time limits for the president; thus, he does not have to appoint the ad 
hoc discrimination officer or reach a final decision after receiving that officer's findings within any particular 
time frame. As a result, the formal complaint procedure at Arizona may take more than 180 days. 
The faculty member also has access to a grievance procedure, in which he can challenge the disciplinary 
action imposed. "He/she may assert, for example, that the facts and finding [of sexual harassment] do not 
warrant any disciplinary action or may argue that the proposed disciplinary action is disproportionate to the 
behavior giving rise to it." Arizona Letter II, supra note 273, at I. If the faculty member appeals, using the 
formal complaint procedure, it is not clear whether he may later access the university's grievance procedure in 
order to challenge the discipline imposed. The complaint procedures suggest that he may not do so; the 
president's decision, which is based on a review of both the facts and the discipline, is final. See ARizONA 
COMPLAINT PROCEDURES, supra note 109, at 4. It seems that the faculty member, at a minimum, has a choice of 
appeal procedures: the one provided in the sexual harassment complaint procedures, or the one provided to 
faculty in their handbook. See Arizona Letter II, supra note 273, at I; University of Arizona, University 
Handbook for Appointed Personnel ch.6 (visited Sept. 19, 1998) <http://www.arizona.edu/-uhap/chap6.html> 
[hereinafter Arizona Faculty Handbook]. The version of the handbook on the Web is current. See Arizona 
Letter II, supra note 273, at 1. 
351. A complaint of sexual harassment by one faculty member against another, in which discipline is 
imposed, can take more than nine months to complete at Berkeley. (A copy of the timeline is on file with the 
author.) The procedure may take longer for students because the student grievance procedure does not operate 
during "summer term and inter-semester recesses." BERKELEY STUDENT POLICY, supra note 227, § !I.E. 
The Complaint Resolution Process ("CRO") at Berkeley-an investigation that can result in discipline--
can take 105 working days or just over five months to complete: (!) up to 90 working days to complete the 
sexual harassment investigation; and (2) up to 15 working days for a decision by the "appropriate campus 
official or Senate Committee." BERKELEY POLICY, supra note 2, § V.B.4.b, c, at 8. 
Discipline against faculty members is imposed pursuant to separate procedures contained in the Manual of 
the Academic Senate. See generally BERKELEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES, supra note 273. If the faculty 
member avails himself of all rights offered under the disciplinary procedures, it will take a minimum of 119 
days or almost four months to complete the proceedings. See id. at 83D-831; see also Berkeley Letter II, supra 
note 348, at 2 ( clarif'ying which disciplinary procedure applied and how the disciplinary and CRO procedures 
intersect). 
Therefore, if a faculty member files a sexual harassment complaint against another faculty member, who 
invokes all of his procedural rights, it could take more than nine months to complete the investigation of the 
complaint and impose discipline. (In order to determine the total time needed to complete the disciplinary 
procedure, I had to assume time periods for a number of stages that were not specified in the procedure. I used 
either seven or 14 days, times that were comparable to time periods provided for in other portions of the 
disciplinary procedure.). 
352. It may take seven months to impose discipline against an Iowa faculty member who violates the 
university's sexual harassment policy. (A copy of the timeline is on file with the author.) The investigation 
stage takes no more than 45 days. See Iowa Complaint Procedures, supra note 346, § 5.9b(6). The length of 
time to complete the disciplinary phase varies, depending on whether mediation is successful. Assuming 
mediation is not successful, it can take another !58 days to impose discipline. See Iowa Faculty Procedures, 
supra note 328, § 29.7. At Iowa, then, it can take 203 days or almost seven months to complete a formal sexual 
harassment investigation and subsequently impose discipline against a faculty member. (Because certain times 
were not specified, I assumed time periods, ranging from I 0 to 20 calendar days, which are comparable to other 
periods stated in the procedures.) 
353. See infra notes 361-81 and accompanying text. 
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year to formally investigate a sexual harassment complaint and impose 
discipline against a faculty member.356 One reason for the lengthy process is that 
354. Depending on which procedure governs the investigation of a sexual harassment complaint, it can 
take nine months at SUNY to complete the formal complaint procedure. SUNY's sexual harassment procedure 
has two stages: (I) investigation of the sexual harassment complaint; and (2) hearing a faculty member's 
grievance over recommended discipline. The disciplinary grievance procedure is provided at Article 19 of the 
Agreement between the State of New York and the United University Professions. See UUP AGREEMENT, supra 
note 279, art.19. SUNY may impose discipline only pursuant to Article 19 of the UUP Agreement. See id. § 
19.3. If the faculty member takes advantage of all rights provided to him pursuant to the disciplinary grievance 
procedures at SUNY, it can take 105 working days or 5.25 months to complete the proceedings. The UUP 
Agreement defines "days" as working days. !d. § 19.2b. (This assumes that it takes no more than 10 working 
days to issue a notice of discipline, as provided by§ 19.4c, and another 10 working days to select a disciplinary 
arbitrator, as provided by§ 19.4c of the UUP Agreement The UUP Agreement does not specify time periods 
for these two elements of the disciplinary grievance procedure. See id. §§ 19.4a, 19.4e. Because the disciplinary 
arbitrator makes "determinations of guilt or innocence," the sexual harassment fact-finding is not complete 
until the end of the disciplinary grievance proceeding at SUNY. !d. § 19.4h.) The disciplinary phase alone, 
then, takes more than five months. 
It is unclear whether the procedures for the investigation stage are contained in the Administrative 
Guidelines in§ IV of The Faculty Handbook, or in Article 7, Grievance Procedure, of the UUP Agreement. 
Compare State University ofNew York at Binghamton, Policies and Procedures for Faculty, Administrative 
Guidelines (visited June 22, 1998) <http://www.binghamton.edu/publications/facstaff-
handbook/facstaff_body_ 4.html> (for faculty cases potentially subject to discipline under Article 19 of the 
UUP Agreement) with State University of New York at Binghamton, Policies and Procedures for Faculty, 
Policy on Sexual Harassment and Consensual Relationships (visited June 22, 1998) 
<http://www.binghamton.edu/publications/facstaff-handbook/facstaff_body_ 4.html> (four-step grievance 
procedure available under UUP Agreement). SUNY did not respond to a request to clarify which grievance 
procedure applies to sexual harassment complaints and did not provide a copy of Article 7 of the UUP 
Agreement. See Facsimile from Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami University, to Katharine F. Ellis, 
Director of Media Relations, State University of New York at Binghamton I, ~ 4 (July 26, 1998) (on file with 
author). Therefore, it is difficult to determine the minimum time necessary to complete the formal sexual 
harassment complaint procedure. 
Unlike the UUP Agreement, the Administrative Guidelines are available on the Internet. Assuming the 
Administrative Guidelines govern the investigation phase of a sexual harassment complaint, the investigation 
will take a minimum of three months. The president appoints a fact-finder; who must report back to the 
president with findings, "no later than 120 days after initiation of the complaint." State University ofNew York 
at Binghamton, Policies and Procedures for Faculty, Administrative Guidelines§ IV (visited June 22, 1998) 
<http://www.binghamton.edu/publicationslfacstaff-handbook/facstaff_body _ 4.html>. The president then may 
consult with other persons about the "alleged misconduct" and determine whether to impose discipline. See id. 
§ V. No time period is provided for the president's deliberations; hence, the investigation normally will take 
more than 120 days. See id. §§ V, VI. 
Using the Administrative Guidelines and assuming the faculty member takes advantage of all rights 
provided to him, it can take 120 calendar days (investigation) and 105 working days (disciplinary grievance) to 
complete the entire formal complaint process. This is the equivalent of9.25 months. 
355. Imposition of discipline against a faculty member at Texas can take between five and seven months, 
depending on how the grievance procedure is interpreted in appeals of discipline in sexual harassment cases. (A 
copy of the timeline is on file with the author.) Texas currently has no written procedure for investigating 
sexual harassment complaints involving two faculty members. See Texas Conversation, supra note 273. I 
assumed it would take a minimum of20 working days to complete an investigation. If it actually takes longer, 
then the entire process for resolving complaints in which discipline is imposed will take longer. 
If discipline is imposed in a sexual harassment case, the faculty member may invoke the university's 
grievance procedure. See TEXAS GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, supra note 279, § 3.18. That procedure, when 
coupled with the sexual harassment investigation itself, can take I 05 working days or a little more than five 
months to complete if the Faculty Grievance Committee determines that the faculty member can bypass §§ 
3.18.IV.C.2 & 3, which consume an additional 30 working days. See id. §§ 3.18.IV.C.l-3. If the faculty 
member does not bypass §§ IV.C.2-3, then the sexual harassment investigation and disciplinary determination 
can take as long as 135 working days, or almost seven months to complete. (The disciplinary procedures did 
not specify all relevant time periods; hence, I assumed time periods, ranging from 10 to 20 working days, 
which are comparable to those given for other stages of the procedure.) 
356. The universities named are not necessarily the only schools with lengthy procedures. It was difficult 
to determine time periods for some universities, e.g., Florida, because the sexual harassment complaint 
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a majority of the public records schools have a two-step formal complaint 
procedure: (1) the sexual harassment investigation; and (2) the imposition of 
discipline.357 At some universities, e.g., Arizona358 and Berkeley/59 the sexual 
harassment investigation itself is lengthy, ranging from five to six months. But at 
many universities, it is the disciplinary phase that adds months to the sexual 
harassment complaint process. At a number of the public records schools, e.g., 
Berkeley, Iowa, Miami, SUNY, and Texas, the factual finding of sexual 
harassment made against a faculty member during the investigation phase can be 
overturned during the disciplinary procedure.360 As a result, the procedure really 
is not finished until the university makes a final factual determination that sexual 
harassment occurred. An example, using one of the lengthier sexual harassment 
procedures (Miami), shows how complicated and difficult a process it is for 
students to get the university to discipline a professor found liable for sexual 
harassment. 
Mary is a senior at Miami University. She plans to attend graduate school 
beginning in the fall of 1999 and currently is asking professors for letters of 
reference. Mary has earned two semesters of independent study credit for 
working in the lab with Professor Z. Nonetheless, Mary is hesitant to ask 
Professor Z for a recommendation. She decided not to work in the lab her senior 
year because Professor Z had repeatedly propositioned her during her junior 
year. Professor Z is a well-known researcher, so Mary finally relents and asks 
him for a letter of reference, which he agrees to write. In late October of 1998, 
Mary discovers that Professor Z has written her a very negative letter of 
recommendation. On Friday, November 6, 1998, Mary initiates Miami's formal 
sexual harassment procedure by filing a written complaint against Professor Z.361 
reporting procedure is so decentralized. At Florida, investigations generally occur within departments, which 
makes uniformity more difficult to maintain. See Florida Conversation 2, supra note I 00. 
357. See, e.g., ARIZONA COMPLAINT PROCEDURES, supra note 109, at 3-4 (formal resolution of 
complaints) and Arizona Faculty Handbook, supra note 350, ch. 6 (grievance procedure for discipline); 
BERKELEY POLICY, supra note 2, § IV.B.3, at 4 ("disciplinary action against the alleged harasser may be 
initiated only through established disciplinary procedures"), BERKELEY STIJDENT POLICY, supra note 227, § l.C. 
("used for complaints of sexual harassment"), and BERKELEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES, supra note 273 (for 
imposition of discipline); Colorado Policy, supra note 109, § Ill.F ("If the investigation report concludes that a 
violation of [the sexual harassment policy] has occurred, it must be determined whether disciplinary action is 
warranted .... Disciplinary actions will be implemented using the procedures applicable to the respondent."); 
Iowa Complaint Procedures, supra note 346, § 5.9 (formal complaints) and Iowa Faculty Procedures, supra 
note 328, § 29.7 (procedure for imposing discipline); MUPIM, supra note 109, §§ 3.6J-P, 8.3 (formal complaint 
investigation and procedure for disciplinary action); and UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF 
STIIDENTS (on file with author) (formal complaint investigation) and TEXAS GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, supra 
note 279, § 3.18.II.A.3 (discipline subject to faculty grievance procedure). 
SUNY has a two-step procedure. See supra note 354. Minnesota also has separate procedures by which 
employees can grieve the discipline imposed. The procedures vary depending on the status of the person 
disciplined, e.g., student, faculty, staff. See Letter from Julie A. Sweitzer, Acting Director, Office of Equal 
Opportunity and Affirmative Action, University of Minnesota, to Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami 
University 1-2, '1]4 (Sept. 14, 1998) (hereinafter Minnesota Letter II] (on file with author). 
358. See supra note 350. 
359. See supra note 351. 
360. See infra note 425. 
361. See MUPJM,supra note 109, § 3.6K. 
136 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 11: 75 
Miami's Affirmative Action Office ("AAO") now has fourteen days362 to 
complete its investigation of Mary's complaint. 363 Suppose the AAO finds in 
Mary's favor. Professor Z then has fourteen days to appeal the AAO's findings 
to the Sexual Harassment Panel ("SHP").364 He decides to do so. Miami's policy 
gives the SHP fourteen days to complete its review of Professor Z's appeal and 
to issue its written report.365 The SHP's review is de novo.366 On Friday, 
December 18, 1998, the SHP affirms the AAO's findings in Mary's favor. The 
investigation phase is complete forty-two days after Mary filed her formal 
complaint, which is a fairly quick process compared to some institutions. 367 
At Miami, the disciplinary procedure does not operate at certain times, the 
two longest periods being the fifteen weeks of summer and the month-long 
winter recess.368 Because the SHP reached its decision on December 18, 1998, 
the last day of classes before Miami's winter recess, disciplinary proceedings 
may not begin until classes resume on Monday, January 11, 1999.369 At this 
juncture, the University takes over the case. The SHP sends its report to the 
Provost, who decides to initiate discipline against the harassing faculty 
member.370 Miami's procedure fails to provide a time frame within which the 
Provost must act. For the sake of this example, however, suppose the Provost 
moves to impose discipline within fourteen days of the start of the new semester 
Monday, January 25, 1999. 
The faculty member then has seven days to request either mediation or a 
hearing before the Committee on Faculty Rights and Responsibilities 
("R&R"). 371 Most faculty members will likely choose mediation at this juncture. 
Mediation offers them an opportunity to participate in discussions about the 
discipline to be imposed. Miami's policy provides for mediation by a committee 
of three tenured faculty members or administrators, one of whom the faculty 
member gets to select. 372 Moreover, even if mediation fails, the faculty member 
can request a hearing before R&R later in the procedure. Thus, the faculty 
member loses nothing by invoking his right to mediate. 
Mediation conceivably can take sixty-five days to complete under Miami's 
362. The time periods are calendar, not working, days. See id. at§ 3.6M-P. 
363. See id. § 3.6M 
364. See id. § 3.6N. 
365. See id. § 3.60. 
366. The Sexual Harassment Panel may take any of the following actions: (I) affirm the AAO's 
decision; (2) reverse the AAO's decision; (3) remand to the AAO for additional investigation; or (4) modify the 
AAO's recommendations. See id. § 3.60. 
367. See supra notes 358-59 and accompanying text. 
368. See MUPIM, supra note 109, § 8.3.L.2. Miami's disciplinary procedure does not operate during 
summer, Thanksgiving break, and the winter and spring recesses. Berkeley also suspends the operation of a 
portion of its sexual harassment procedure. The student sexual harassment complaint procedure does not 
operate during the "summer term and inter-semester recesses." BERKELEY STUDENT POLICY, supra note 227, § 
II.E, at 3. 
369. See MIAMI UNIVERSITY, FIRST SEMESTER 1998-99 COURSE SCHEDULE 2-3 [hereinafter MIAMI 
COURSE SCHEDULE] (on file with author). 
370. See MUPIM, supra note 109, § 8.3.0.4. 
371. See id. 
372. See id. § 8.3.E.l. 
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policy.373 It is now April 16, 1999,374 less than one month before the swnmer 
recess begins. If the faculty member and the Mediation Committee fail to reach 
an agreement, the Mediation Committee notifies the Provost, who then has 
fourteen days within which to act.375 Miami's procedure provides the Provost 
with a pocket veto. Should she fail to act within those fourteen days, the entire 
case ends, even if there has been a prior finding of sexual harassment by the 
SHP.376 
If the Provost does proceed with discipline in those fourteen days, the 
faculty member still has the right to request a hearing before R&R. 377 The 
faculty member has seven days to make this request. It is now May 7, 1999, the 
end of the spring semester, when the disciplinary procedure once again is 
suspended, this time for the entire swnmer.378 
As a result, Mary will graduate without learning if Miami intends to 
discipline Professor Z for his behavior. Even more unfortunate, she has lost six 
months to a procedure that has provided her with no relief. Moreover, it is not 
clear whether the procedure can go forward unless Mary returns to campus for 
the hearing before R&R. Miami is the "complainant" during the disciplinary 
phase. But the hearing before R&R is de novo: the hearing procedures 
specifically provide that the faculty member may present evidence in response to 
the university's "claim that misconduct has occurred."379 The procedure provides 
both parties, the university and the faculty member, with the right to "submit 
evidence and cross-examine all adverse witnesses who testify in the matter. "380 
R&R may "accept a witness' written statement in lieu of live testimony,"381 but 
this lies within R&R's discretion. In addition, Professor Z could argue that not 
being able to cross-examine Mary, the key witness against him, renders the 
hearing fundamentally unfair. 
No matter what happens, however, Mary clearly is the loser. Because the 
university cannot take action against Professor Z until there is a final 
determination of sexual harassment against him, any remedy that Mary sought 
373. See id. § 8.3.E.2-3. It actually may take longer than 65 days because MUPIM is not clear in 
defining its time limits. MUPIM provides that "(t]he Mediation Committee will convene within a time period 
specified by the Provost, not to exceed thirty (30) calendar days." /d. § 8.3.E.2. But the procedure does not 
specify whether the 30 days runs from the selection of the mediators, see id. § 8.3.E.l, or from the original 
request for mediation, see id. § 8.3.D.4. This calculation uses the shorter periodll30 days from the request for 
mediation. 
A second mediation meeting may be held 14 days after the first, and the faculty member has 21 days to 
consider offers made during mediation. See id. § 8.3.E.3. If the Committee holds a second meeting, at which an 
offer is made, then the mediation procedure will take 65 days. 
374. April 16, 1999 is more than 65 days from February 2, 1999, when the faculty member chose 
mediation. However, Miami's policy does not operate during the spring recessllMarch 7 through March 14, 
1999. See MIAMI COURSE SCHEDULE, supra note 369, at 3. 
375. See MUPIM, supra note 109, § 8.3.F. 
376. See id. § 8.3.F. 
377. See id. § 8.3.0. 
378. See MIAMI COURSE SCHEDULE, supra note 369, at 3. 
379. MUPIM, supra note 109, § 8.3.H.4 (11). In addition, R&R operates as a fact-finder. Its final report 
includes "findings of fact, conclusions drawn from these facts and recommendations." /d. § 8.3.H.4 (13). 
380. /d. § 8.3.H.4 (5). 
381. /d. § 8.3.H.4 (5). 
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when filing her formal complaint must wait until the end of the disciplinary 
phase. For example, Mary might have requested that the university intervene to 
undo the damage caused by Professor Z's adverse letter of recommendation. If 
Mary must wait until some time in the fall of 1999, when she originally intended 
to attend graduate school, to receive this relief, the university certainly cannot 
claim that such relief is timely. Some universities already may have rejected her, 
in part based on Professor Z's negative recommendation. Professor Z's actions 
and the university's untimely and burdensome procedures have caused 
irreparable harm to Mary's reputation and her chances for graduate school. 
b. Lack of Clarity 
Not only are many university sexual harassment procedures needlessly 
long, they also are very unclear. Many procedures leave critical terms and time 
periods undefined and unspecified, creating ambiguity. Others are so complicated 
that understanding how the procedure operates is difficult. The combination of 
long and unclear procedures creates confusion for women who wish to invoke 
them. 
Many universities fail to define critical terms in their sexual harassment 
policies and procedures. Two examples are "sexual harassment" and 
"retaliation". Three of the public records schools-Arizona, Berkeley, and 
Texas-use the EEOC's definition of sexual harassment, but provide no 
examples of harassing behavior.382 While the EEOC's definition is a good 
starting point, it uses fact-dependent terms, such as "hostile" and "offensive." 
Providing examples of prohibited behaviors gives men and women alike a better 
idea of what conduct falls within the definition of sexual harassment. 
The need to define sexual harassment in the policy in non-legalese is 
paramount. Examples should be given of various behaviors that have 
been identified by the courts as sexual harassment, particularly in the area 
of hostile environment harassment. This conveys a clearer picture to male 
employees of what constitutes harassment, and identifies for female 
employees what activities they do not have to tolerate in the workplace.383 
Likewise, few universities provide examples of retaliatory behavior. 
Most sexual harassment policies contain a short statement prohibiting 
retaliatory conduct. Yet retaliatory behavior, like sexual harassment itself, is a 
fact-specific inquiry. Providing concrete examples, as does Florida in its 
382. See ARizONA POLICY, supra note 2, at I; BERKELEY POLICY, supra note 2, § II; TEXAS STIJDENT 
POLICY, supra note 109. But see UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, SEXUAL HARASSMENT 3-5 (1994) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter MINNESOTA HARASSMENT]. 
383. Ellen Peirce et al., Why Sexual Harassment Complaints Fall on Deaf Ears, ACAD. MGMT. 
EXECUTIVES 41, 52 (Aug. 1998). 
1999] The Emperor's New Clothes 139 
policy,384 helps students, faculty, and staff alike to identify the more subtle 
forms of retaliation. 
Another problem with sexual harassment policies and procedures is the 
use of legal jargon.385 Some universities use terms such as "respondent",386 
"jurisdiction",387 "preponderance of the evidence",388 "probable cause",389 
"evidence of probative value"/90 "hearsay"/91 "summary disposition",392 and 
"rebuttal evidence",393 in both their sexual harassment policies and 
disciplinary procedures. Unlike Colorado and Cornell, most universities do 
not provide definitional sections in their policies and procedures. Most non-
lawyers, however, do not know the meanings of these terms. The purpose of 
an internal sexual harassment grievance proceeding is to provide an expedited 
resolution of a complaint; using terminology that makes it difficult to 
understand the procedures without consulting an attorney erodes that purpose. 
Finally, there are significant time "gaps" in many university sexual 
harassment procedures. For example, Florida's procedure provides no time 
periods for completing the sexual harassment investigation. 394 A number of 
other universities, e.g., Arizona, Berkeley, Iowa, Miami, SUNY, and Texas, 
leave unclear or unspecified the time within which critical phases of either the 
investigation or disciplinary phase must be completed.395 As a result, the 
complainant has no leverage to force the process forward to completion. 
Because a complainant cannot obtain relief until there is a final determination 
made in her case, these "gaps" in the procedure operate to her detriment by 
potentially delaying a final resolution in the case even longer. 
5. Conclusion 
384. See University of Florida, Sexual Harassment: What You Can Do About Sexual Harassment (visited 
July 16, 1998) <http://www.aa.ufl.edu/aa/affactlharass/do.htm>. 
385. Much of the legal jargon appears in the disciplinary procedures. However, as noted before, the facts 
are not final in most sexual harassment procedures until the disciplinary proceeding is completed. Thus, women 
who are contemplating use of the formal sexual harassment grievance procedures need to understand the 
workings of their institution's disciplinary procedure. 
386. See, e.g., MUPIM, supra note 109, §§ 3.6.H, I, P; Minnesota Harassment, supra note 382, at 16-17. 
387. See BERKELEY STUDENT POLICY, supra note 227, § IV.B. ("If the [Complaint Resolution Officer] 
determines that the grievance is [ ) outside the jurisdiction [of the procedure) . . . the grievance will be 
dismissed."). 
388. See MARYLAND CODE, supra note 227, § III.L. ("All findings, recommendations and conclusions .. 
. shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence having probative effect."); TEXAS GRIEVANCE 
PROCEDURES, supra note 279, § V.A.l ("In all other cases, the burden of proof shall rest with the grievant to 
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence .... "). 
389. See BERKELEY POLICY, supra note 2, § V.B.2.d ("[c]onclusion as to whether there is probable cause 
to believe that the conduct found to have occurred falls within the definition of sexual harassment .... "). 
390. See TEXAS GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, supra note 279, § V.A.2 ("The rules of evidence ... need not 
be strictly observed when ... evidence of probative value is being offered .... "). 
391. See BERKELEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES, supra note 273, tit.VI, ~ 14 ("Mere uncorroborated 
hearsay, however, shall not constitute substantial evidence."). 
392. See MUPIM, supra note 109, § 8.3.H.3. 
393. See BERKELEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES, supra note 273, tit. VI,~ 14 ("Every party shall have the 
right ... to submit rebuttal evidence .... "). 
394. See University of Florida, University Procedures for Handling Sexual Harassment Complaints 
(visited July 16, 1998) <http://www.aa.ufl.edu/aa/affactlharass/procedures.htm>. 
395. See supra notes 350-52, 354-55, 370, 373 and accompanying text. 
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Is it worth the time and effort, given the cost involved, to pursue a 
complaint of sexual harassment? The research suggests, that for many 
women, it is not. 
Rudman and her colleagues conducted a study of victims of sexual 
harassment at the University of Minnesota in order to determine the reasons 
why victims fail to use university grievance procedures. The researchers 
found that procedural justice, i.e., fairness of the procedure, is the "main 
deterrent to reporting,"396 not gender socialization, i.e., women dislike 
confrontation. 
[T]he results indicated that procedural justice, rather than gender 
socialization, was a superior explicator of the reliably low reporting rate 
found for sexual harassment in a large, public research university. 
Specifically, the most important attitudinal predictor of nonreporting was 
a factor-derived, futility index assessing uncertainty about the response 
efficacy of filing a grievance. Compared to reporters, nonreporters were 
more likely to agree that (a) positive results were not likely to come of 
reporting, (b) the benefits of reporting would not outweigh the 
repercussions, (c) they had no control over the procedure, (d) their 
complaint would be trivialized, and (e) reporting would exacerbate rather 
than relieve their situation. 397 
Hulin and his colleagues made similar findings.398 They found that the 
likelihood that the organization would take the victim seriously and the 
perception by students and employees that the organization would punish the 
harasser significantly affected the willingness to report harassment.399 The 
risk of reporting also affected the decision to report, but to a lesser extent.400 
Hesson-Mcinnis and Fitzgerald's fmdings also support the theory that an 
organization's response to sexual harassment shapes women's willingness to 
report harassment. Hesson-Mcinnis and Fitzgerald tested their model of the 
predictors and outcomes of sexual harassment, using the MSPB's 1987 
survey data. They found that women who used "assertive and formal 
responses" to harassment were more likely to suffer negative work outcomes, 
396. Rudman et al., supra note 65, at 537. 
397. !d. at 534. 
398. See Hulin et al., supra note 97, at 135-41. Hulin and his colleagues developed a scale entitled the 
Organizational Tolerance for Sexual Harassment Inventory ("OTSHf') in order to measure how students and 
employees perceive their institution will respond to allegations of sexual harassment The researchers 
conducted a preliminary test of the OTSHI on graduate students at a large midwestern university. Next, they 
administered the OTSHI to a large-scale sample of employees at a public utility company located on the West 
Coast. Hulin and his associates developed several scenarios, varying both the type of harassment, e.g., gender 
harassment versus sexual coercion, and the organizational status of the harasser, e.g., supervisor versus 
colleague. Part of the study asked respondents to rate three factors for each scenario: (I) the risk of reporting; 
(2) the likelihood that the organization would take the complaint seriously; and (3) the likely consequences for 
the harasser. 
399. Seeid. at 140,142. 
400. Seeid. 
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e.g., termination or transfer, and negative physical and psychological 
outcomes, e.g., need for counseling.401 Not surprisingly, the researchers also 
found that negative job outcomes result from the organization 's response to 
harassment, not from the intensity and duration of the harassment itself 
It is interesting, however, to note that the severity, frequency, and 
duration of the most significant harassment event did not exacerbate 
objective work outcomes, although it did exert a negative impact on the 
psychological and physiological consequences to the victim .... This [] 
suggests that the etiology of negative job outcomes may derive more 
from retaliation and negative organizational response (e.g., victim 
blaming) than from the sexually harassing behavior itself. This is not the 
case with psychological and physical symptoms; the intensity of 
harassment directly as well as indirectly affected the perceived emotional 
and physical stress these victims experienced. 402 
But by penalizing women who come forward with complaints or making 
the sexual harassment process burdensome, an organization effectively 
"chills" other women from complaining. Hulin and his colleagues found that 
women's perceptions of their organization's tolerance for sexual harassment 
proved a stronger predictor of job withdrawal, as well as women's physical 
and psychological well-being, than having personally experienced sexual 
harassment. 403 
These fmdings were unexpected; although we had thought that a tolerant 
climate might affect women negatively, we had assumed that sexual 
harassment would be by far the more powerful variable. Our results may 
reflect apprehension and fear on the part of women who perceived they 
are working in a hostile and threatening work environment, feelings that 
may be triggered by a perception that the organization tolerates 
harassment and the inference of managerial values consistent with this 
kind of climate, without the necessity of being personally harassed. . . . 
[The fmdings] may also reflect reactions to beliefs that female employees 
who complain about harassment are treated as "whistle-blowers" whereas 
little is done to their harassers.404 
The findings of Hulin and his colleagues provide the link between an 
organization's response to sexual harassment and the likelihood that women 
will use internal grievance mechanisms to register complaints of harassment. 
An organization communicates to its members through written procedures 
401. Hesson-Mcinnis & Fitzgerald, supra note 108, at 896. 
402. !d. 
403. See Hulin et al., supra note 97, at 145-46. 
404. !d. 
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and actions whether it takes sexual harassment seriously. For example, 
procedures that provide preferential treatment for the accused send a strong 
signal to victims about who the university values. But even if a university has 
an even-handed written policy, failing to punish repeat offenders and doling 
out light sanctions for egregious behavior tells women that the organization 
will not deal appropriately with their complaints. When coupled with the 
prospect of retaliation, such ineffective procedures will deter many women 
from coming forward with legitimate complaints of sexual harassment. 
N. RECOMMENDATIONS: WHEREDOWEGoFROMHERE? 
First and foremost, Congress needs to amend Title IX in order to bring 
the standards for liability for sexual harassment of students in line with those 
for employees. The Court in Gebser created a different standard of liability 
for sexual harassment of students based on its interpretation of Congress' 
intent regarding schools' liability for Title IX violations. "Until Congress 
speaks directly on the subject, [] we will not hold a school district liable in 
damages under Title IX for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student absent 
actual notice and deliberate indifference."405 If Congress remains silent in the 
wake of the Court's decision in Gebser, then educational institutions will 
have no incentive to create any sexual harassment policies and procedures for 
students, let alone good policies and procedures. 
Second, the lower federal courts and the EEOC,406 in interpreting the 
affirmative defense created by the Court in Ellerth and Faragher, need to 
examine the literature on sexual harassment. The federal government and 
academic researchers alike have conducted numerous studies demonstrating 
the persistence of sexual harassment at work and on campus, as well as the 
problem of underreporting. Research in management and psychology 
indicates that organizational factors, such as tolerance for harassment and 
procedural barriers to reporting, strongly influence the level of reporting.407 
Yet universities modify their sexual harassment procedures based on the 
interests of those drafting the procedures, not on the basis of the existing 
research. 408 
[P]rocedural justice (rather than gender socialization issues) are [sic] the 
main deterrent to reporting (and, we hope, alleviating) sexual harassment 
problems on campus. Consequently, promoting informal grievance 
405. 118 S. Ct. 1989,2000. 
406. The ensuing discussion mentions only the EEOC, not the DOE, because of the Court's recent 
decision in Gebser. Nonetheless, if Congress acts to bring the standards of liability for harassment of students 
in line with those for harassment of employees, the suggestions provided apply with equal measure to the DOE. 
407. See supra Part ill.C.5; see also notes 293-300 and accompanying text. 
408. See generally DOD REPORT, supra note 39, at 52 (noting a failure by the service academies to 
systematically evaluate their sexual harassment programs); Connell, supra note 12; Phillips, supra note 169, at 
126 n.202 (citing Champagne & McAfee, Auditing Sexual Harassment, PERSONNEL J. 124, 132 (June 1989)) 
(Few employers "have systematically evaluated the effectiveness of their [sexual harassment] programs"). 
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procedures or providing victim advocates to bolster confrontation 
likelihood may not be the most efficient way to increase reporting rates 
(such persons may, however, provide social support). People who have 
been sexually harassed may be rightfully angry, and they may require no 
encouragement to seek redress and pursue their rights-provided the 
formal grievance system is trustworthy, neutral, and committed to 
preserving their dignity. Therefore, modifications to the grievance 
procedure itself may be the most worthwhile approach to consider.409 
For more than a decade the lower federal courts and the EEOC have left 
universities to their own devices in developing sexual harassment policies 
and procedures. If the procedures available at the public records schools are 
any indication, many universities have failed in their responsibility to draft 
clear, timely, and accessible procedures for reporting sexual harassment. It is 
time for the EEOC to step in and develop very specific guidelines for 
universities to follow in drafting their policies. Based on the existing 
research, the following are suggestions to improve existing university policies 
and procedures on sexual harassment. 
A. Documentation and Reporting of Harassment 
First, federal law should require universities to keep internal records of 
all sexual harassment complaints brought to the universities' attention, 
whether through formal or informal complaint channels. If a university does 
not keep internal records of the number of sexual harassment complaints filed 
over time, how can it determine whether harassment complaints are 
increasing or decreasing over time?410 Internal trend data furnishes 
information about the level of reporting within the institution, which, in turn, 
provides a base of comparison with the incidence of harassment on campus. 
Internal records should include both formal and informal complaints. 
Women use informal mechanisms more often than formal-keeping records 
of only the latter understates the actual reporting rate. In addition, the law 
should not create incentives for universities to funnel complainants into 
procedures in which no paper trail exists. If a woman reports harassment to 
university officials, whether "formally" or "informally", the university should 
keep a record of that report. This is particularly important in cases of repeat 
offenders. Without records, the university can disclaim knowledge of prior 
incidents ofharassment. 
Second, the records maintained should include the corresponding 
disposition of the complaint. If a university investigates harassment 
409. Rudman et al., supra note 65, at 537-38 (citation omitted). 
410. See DOD REPORT, supra note 39, at 52 ("Without trend data, the academies have no way of 
knowing whether the level of sexual harassment is decreasing."); but see Colorado Policy, supra note 109, at§ 
III.I (requiring sexual harassment co-chairs to "establish and maintain a centralized system for gathering 
statistics and tracking information on sexual harassment and related retaliation claims"). 
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complaints, but never imposes sanctions for harassing behavior, then women 
may prove reluctant to invoke the university's procedures. Raw numbers of 
complaints alone do not provide sufficient information by which to judge the 
efficacy of a university's procedures. 
Third, in measuring the effectiveness of university grievance procedures, 
the courts need to look beyond the four corners of the grievance document. As 
the Supreme Court noted in Faragher, Title Vll's primary goal is harm 
avoidance.411 If women rarely file internal sexual harassment grievances, then 
sexual harassment becomes a low-risk activity. Procedures that are rarely used 
have little, if any, deterrent effect on harassment. 
Moreover, the research indicates that procedural barriers create a potent 
deterrent to reporting.412 Burdensome procedures can deter reporting and create a 
perception that the university tolerates harassing behavior.413 As a result, a 
university involved in sexual harassment litigation should not benefit from a 
presumption that the majority of women on campus voluntarily choose not to 
file sexual harassment complaints. Rather, the lower federal courts should 
require the university to provide empirical data demonstrating that the majority 
of women on its campus who fail to invoke internal procedures do so because 
they believe the incident is minor and does not merit reporting. In Faragher, the 
Court noted that a victim who unreasonably failed to invoke "a proven, effective 
mechanism for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual harassment, 
available to the employee without undue risk or expense'>414 should not recover 
damages under Title Vll. It makes sense, then, for the lower federal courts to 
require a university employer to demonstrate more than the mere existence of a 
sexual harassment policy and procedure. To do otherwise renders the Court's 
use of the words "proven" and "effective" superfluous. Consequently, the courts 
should require proof that the university has periodically surveyed its own 
faculty, staff, and students about the incidence of harassment on campus and the 
efficacy of its internal sexual harassment grievance procedures,415 and revised its 
internal procedures in light of these climate survey results, as well as the 
growing body of research on effective procedures. 
B. Eliminate False Claims Language 
False claims language may deter legitimate reporting. There is no 
evidence to suggest that false claims of harassment are rampant on college 
campuses.416 Rather, false claims language is an example of drafter bias: 
university procedures provide penalties for false claims, but not for men who 
411. See Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275,2292 (1998). 
412. See supra Part III.C.5. 
413. See Gruber, supra note 17, at 316; Hulin et al., supra note 97, at 145-46. 
414. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292. 
415. See, e.g., NIH REPORT, supra note 33, at 16 (recommending periodic "employee attitude survey[s]" 
to identifY "sexual harassment and sex discrimination trends and problems"). 
416. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text. 
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lie during university proceedings on sexual harassment. Universities should 
eliminate such language from their policies and procedures. 
C. Protection from Retaliation 
If universities wish to reduce and eliminate sexual harassment, they need to 
develop procedures that significantly reduce the risk of retaliation against 
victims. There are two possibilities. University procedures can require periodic 
follow-up with both victims and harassers, especially in cases involving 
supervisory harassment. This removes the burden from the complainant of 
initiating contact with university officials about retaliation. If periodic review by 
the equal employment opportunity office reveals questionable reviews, grades, 
or pay raises, the university, not the complainant, should initiate retaliation 
proceedings in the name of the victim. University-initiated proceedings send a 
stronger message to the community about the seriousness of retaliation. 
An alternative is to create a rebuttable presumption for cases in which the 
complainant prevails on her sexual harassment complaint. A complainant would 
satisfy her prima facie case by demonstrating two things: ( 1) she won her sexual 
harassment case; and (2) she alleges a behavior that falls within a category of 
behaviors defined by the policy as retaliatory; e.g., negative grade or 
performance review. The harasser would have the burden of proving that his 
actions were not retaliatory. In making his case, however, the harasser should 
have to demonstrate that he would have made the same decision even if the 
complainant had not brought and won a sexual harassment complaint against 
him. The advantage of adopting this presumption is that it gives women an 
incentive to file formal grievances. Most informal procedures do not involve 
fact-finding,417 so women could not satisfy the prima facie case for retaliation if 
they previously had used an informal resolution mechanism. 
Some might argue that a rebuttable presumption of retaliation turns on its 
head the notion of "innocent until proven guilty." Sexual harassment cases, 
however, are not criminal, but rather civil proceedings. In addition, internal 
grievance procedures are not even civil court proceedings-they are 
mechanisms intended for the quick resolution of sexual harassment problems. 
The procedure can protect the harasser's rights by providing him with an 
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence rebutting the presumption. 
Given the research on the likelihood of retaliation,418 a rebuttable presumption 
better protects victims and more accurately reflects the real-world consequences 
of filing sexual harassment complaints. 
D. Minimize the Use of Mediation 
417. See supra Part Il.B. 
418. See supra Part III.C.2. 
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A number of universities include mediation as part of their internal 
grievance procedures. Yet two important conditions for the success of 
mediation-power parity and party selection of the mediator-are not 
obtainable in university settings. As a result, the inclusion of mediation in 
university sexual harassment procedures is questionable. 
At a minimum, universities should not include preferences for mediation 
in their policies and procedures.419 Such language suggests to victims that 
they must exhaust informal mechanisms of resolution prior to using formal 
complaint procedures. This decision should be left to the complainant. 
In addition, mediation simply does not belong in the disciplinary phase 
of a sexual harassment proceeding. Once a faculty member has been found 
liable for sexual harassment, it is unclear why he has the right to engage in 
discussions about what is appropriate discipline for his behavior. Mediation 
offers the faculty member leverage to negotiate his discipline, especially 
when he has the opportunity to reject any suggested discipline and continue 
to challenge disciplinary findings through other university channels.420 
Moreover, universities should not offer faculty members found liable for 
harassment the right to select their mediators, while denying that right to 
victims ofharassment.421 Such differential treatment suggests drafter bias. 
Finally, universities should exercise caution in recommending 
mediation, particularly for certain types of sexual harassment. Forced 
touching, grabbing, and fondling constitute not only harassing behavior, but 
also assault. It is unrealistic to expect a woman who has been assaulted to sit 
down with the harasser in order to mediate the dispute. While mediation may 
work in cases involving true misunderstandings, it may deter many women 
from reporting harassment out of fear of confronting the harasser. 
E. Reduce the Length and Complexity of Procedures 
First, with the exception of dismissal, there is no reason it should take a 
university six months to one year to discipline a professor for sexual 
harassment. Most students are on campus each academic year for no more 
than nine months. Formal procedures that take most of an academic year, or 
even longer, to complete serve as a deterrent to reporting. Students who do 
complain will use informal channels, which often do not involve the 
imposition of discipline and, hence, take less time to complete. As a result, 
any conclusions drawn about women's preference for informal methods of 
resolution are suspect, given the incentives created within institutions to 
select informal over formal complaint mechanisms.422 
419. See supra notes 338-39 and accompanying text. 
420. See, e.g., MUPIM, supra note 109, §§ 8.3.F, G. 
421. See supra notes 326-30 and accompanying text. 
422. See supra notes 341-42 and accompanying text; see also Part III.C.5. 
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At universities where the formal procedures are lengthy because of the 
disciplinary phase,423 there is a simple solution: make the factual 
determination of sexual harassment final at the end of the investigation phase. 
A number of universities bifurcate their sexual harassment procedures into 
separate investigation and disciplinary phases, 424 but then allow the factual 
determination of sexual harassment to be reopened and potentially overturned 
during the disciplinary proceedings.425 If universities must bifurcate their 
sexual harassment procedures, then the bifurcation should be clean-faculty 
should not have the opportunity to appeal facts in both the investigation and 
disciplinary phases. Otherwise, the disciplinary phase becomes a second 
investigation phase. 
Finalizing the facts at the end of the investigation phase also protects the 
victim. A final factual determination of harassment allows the university to 
redress any harm done to the victim as a result of the harassment. The 
university then can proceed, on its own initiative, with discipline against the 
harasser. If the determination of harassment is not at issue in the disciplinary 
phase, then the victim's need to participate in the proceedings necessarily 
ends. 
Second, there is no reason why a university must afford a professor 
multiple opportunities to appeal either a finding that he engaged in sexual 
harassment or the discipline imposed.426 Multiple appeals delay the 
imposition of discipline. They also provide the professor with leverage to 
negotiate-the university or the victim of harassment may agree to lighter 
sanctions in exchange for the harasser foregoing his right to further appeals. 
Because no sanctions apply for frivolous internal appeals, pursuing such 
appeals is a low-cost endeavor for the harasser. 
Finally, universities need to make their policies more user-friendly. 
Many colleges and universities have put their policies and procedures on the 
Internet.427 But accessibility means more than obtaining a copy of the 
423. See supra notes 350-57 and accompanying text. 
424. See supra note 357 and accompanying text. 
425. See, e.g., BERKELEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES, supra note 273, tit.Vl, '1!14, tit.VII, '11'1!16-17, at 
830-H (after investigation has determined faculty member engaged in sexual harassment, disciplinary 
committee hears evidence, determines the facts, and decides whether cause exists for discipline); Iowa Faculty 
Procedures, supra note 328, §§ 29.7g-b (university has burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence 
during disciplinary proceeding that faculty member already found liable for sexual harassment has violated 
university policy); MUPIM, supra note 109, § 8.3.H.4 & 8.3.1 (after determination of sexual harassment made 
and one appeal exhausted, disciplinary hearing committee hears evidence to determine whether misconduct 
occurred; president subsequently may overturn factual finding of sexual harassment if "against the greater 
weight of the evidence"); TEXAS GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, supra note 279, §§ IV.C.5, V (faculty member 
grieving discipline has right to formal hearing, at which the facts are heard; hearing panel sends report of 
"findings, determinations, and recommendations" to president); UUP AGREEMENT, supra note 279, § 19.4h 
(disciplinary arbitrator at SUNY makes "determinations of guilt or innocence," as well as the "appropriateness 
of proposed penalties."). 
426. See, e.g., MUPIM, supra note 109 (complainant who loses at the Office of Affirmative Action 
("OAA") and subsequently before the Sexual Harassment Panel ("SHP") has no further recourse within the 
university; faculty member who loses before OAA and subsequently before the SHP may appeal the 
determination of sexual harassment during the disciplinary phase). 
427. See supra note 2 for the Internet addresses for Florida's, Iowa's and Ohio State's sexual harassment 
policies and procedures. See supra note 109 for the addresses for Colorado's and Cornell's procedures. 
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procedure; it also means being able to understand the language of the 
procedure, and the steps involved in bringing a sexual harassment complaint. 
To that end, universities need to eliminate legal jargon from, or define terms 
used in, their policies.428 In addition, universities should provide complaint 
forms rather than requiring women to draft their own complaints.429 Diagrams 
or flowcharts showing the steps of the procedure also help make the 
procedure easier to follow and understand.430 But most important, universities 
need to revisit their procedures and simplify them. Women should not have to 
hire attorneys in order to understand how a university's internal procedures 
operate. 
V. CONCLUSION 
If colleges and universities wish to curtail the incidence of sexual 
harassment on campus, then they must develop policies and procedures that 
are "better calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come 
forward."431 Despite the strongly worded condemnations of harassment found 
in many university sexual harassment policies,432 most universities have 
placed substantial procedural hurdles in the path of women who wish to file 
sexual harassment complaints, especially complaints that result in discipline 
against faculty members. 
Unfortunately, the law has created few incentives for institutions of 
higher education to develop balanced procedures that encourage . internal 
reporting. An examination of the policies and procedures at ten large public 
universities reveals that these institutions, for the most part, are responding 
only to the requirements imposed by law. Because most victims of sexual 
harassment, e.g., students or untenured faculty members, have no protected 
legal right to a fair or balanced harassment procedure, few institutions 
provide processes that are fair to both the victim and the accused. Instead, the 
procedures favor tenured faculty members, who are disproportionately male, 
because they draft or vote on their institution's sexual harassment disciplinary 
procedures, and at public universities, they have a constitutional right to due 
process. 
The law's experiment with a laissez-faire approach to internal sexual 
harassment procedures has failed. The courts must hold academic institutions 
MUPIM, which includes Miami's sexual harassment policy and its disciplinary procedures, is available at 
<http://www.muohio.edu:80/mupirnl3_6.html> (sexual harassment policy) and 
<http://www.muohio.edu:80/mupirn18_3.html> (disciplinary procedures). See supra note 272 for the Internet 
address for Minnesota's sexual harassment policy. 
428. See supra Part III.C.4.b. 
429. See, e.g., ARIZONA COMPLAINT PROCEDURES, supra note 109, at 3 (complaint form available at 
Affirmative Action Office); BERKELEY STUDENT POLICY, supra note 227, at 10 (student grievance form 
attached to policy). 
430. See BERKELEY STUDENT POLICY, supra note 227 (flowchart attached to end of policy); Cornell 
Policy, supra note 109, app.C (flowchart of complaint process). 
431. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,73 (1986). 
432. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. 
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accountable for drafting burdensome, complex, and lengthy procedures that 
deter women from reporting incidents of sexual harassment. The EEOC and 
the DOE must develop specific procedural guidelines for academic 
institutions to follow in drafting internal grievance procedures. Until the law 
makes educational institutions liable for bad procedures, colleges and 
universities will continue to develop policies and procedures that protect 
them from liability, while doing little to increase the reporting and decrease 
the incidence of sexual harassment on campus. Only time will tell if the 
promise of "proven, effective mechanism[s] for reporting and resolving 
complaints of sexual harassment"433 is fulfilled, or simply becomes another 
hollow phrase in the history of sexual harassment law. 
433. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275,2292 (1998). 
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TABLE 1: RESULTS OF PUBUC RECORDS REQUESTS 
UNNERSITY DISCLOSED PROVIDED REASONS FOR 
COMPLAINTS INFORMATION DENYING PUBLIC 
RE: RECORDS' REQUEST 
#OF 
COMPLAINTS 
ARIZONA No Yes Personnel records 
exemption 
BERKELEY No No FORMAL: No way to 
retrieve or identify 
INFORMAL: "Strictly 
confidential"; too hard 
to redact names; no 
"statistical breakdown 
of complaints" based 
on nature and 
resolution434 
COLORADO No Yest Personnel records 
exemption 
FLORIDA No No Records not kept in 
centralized location 
IOWA No Yest Confidential 
MARYLAND No No No record of numbers 
of complaints, either 
formal or informal; 
Maryland does not 
keep records by 
subject matter so no 
way to retrieve sexual 
harassment 
complaints435 
MIAMI Yes, only No Maintain neither 
formal informal records nor 
numbers of informal 
complaints filed436 
MINNESOTA No Yestt FORMAL: Most 
involve no written 
complaint437 
434. Berkeley Letter, supra note 10 I, at 2. 
435. See Maryland Letter, supra note 103, 'IJ2, 3. 
436. See Miami Letter II, supra note 98. 
437. See Minnesota Letter, supra note 275, 'IJ3. 
438. See id. at '1!4; see also Minnesota Letter II, supra note 357, 'IJI, at I. 
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INFORMAL: Most 
involve no written 
complaint438 
SUNY No No FORMAL: 
Unwarranted invasion 
of personal privacy 
exemption 
INFORMAL: Neither 
records nor numbers 
of complaints 
maintained 
TEXAS Yes Yes Not applicable 
tColorado only provtded fihng numbers for the penod December 1, 1995 
through May 31, 1997. 
tiowa provided reporting statistics back to the 1990-91 academic year. 
HMinnesota only provided filing numbers dating back to the 1996 calendar 
year. 
152 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 11: 75 
TABLE IT: REPORTING STATISTICS 
UNNERSITY FuLL-TIME NO. OF NO. OF AVERAGE OFFICIAL 
FEMALE INFORMAL FOR- NO. OF REPORT-
STUDENTSt COM- MAL COM- INGRATE 
439 PLAINTS COM- PLAINTS 
PLAINTS PER 
YEAR44o 
ARI- 14, 911 Total= Total= 93 .6% 
ZONA 222441 57442 
Average Ave-
per year= rage per 
74 year= 
19 
COLO- 11,057 Total= 39 Total= 34 .3%445 
RADO Average 12 
per year= Averag 
26443 eper 
year= 
8444 
CORNELLt 8445 41446 ttt .5%447 
439. Enrollment figures are for the fall of 1997. See BARRON'S PROFILES OF AMERICAN COLLEGES 273 
(Arizona), 372 (Colorado), 594 (Iowa), 812 (Minnesota), 969 (Cornell), 1127 (Miami), 1411 (fexas) (1998). 
440. Unless otherwise indicated, the averages are based on academic year reporting statistics. 
441. See Arizona Letter, supra note 87. 
442. See id. The data provided was for the period from August I, 1995, to the date of the follow-up 
public records request, which was August 18, 1998. See id. 
443. The Colorado figures are based on an 18 month, not an academic-year, reporting period. For the 
period December I, 1995 through May 31, 1997, there were 51 complaints of sexual harassment filed on the 
Boulder campus. See COLORADO REPORT I, supra note 117, §I. Of those 51 complaints, 12 were formal and 39 
were informal. See id. I arrived at the annual number of informal complaints by dividing 39 complaints by 18 
months (the length of the reporting period), which provides the average number of monthly complaints. I took 
that figure (2.17 per month) and multiplied it by 12 months to arrive at the annual average number of informal 
complaints. 
444. I arrived at the annual average number of formal complaints of sexual harassment by dividing the 
total number of formal complaints (12) by 18 (the number of months in the reporting period). I multiplied that 
number (.67 per month) by 12 months to arrive at the annual average. See supra note 443. 
445. I arrived at this figure by dividing the average number of complaints per year (34) by the number of 
female full-time students (11,057). See supra note 443. 
446. See Cornell Report, supra note 108. The actual number of complaints per academic year is as 
follows: (I) 57 for 1992-1993; (2) 51 for 1993-1994; (3) 44 for 1994-1995; (4) 17 for 1995-1996; and (5) 34 for 
1996-1997. See id. at§ II. The University acknowledges that the 17 complaints for the 1995-1996 academic 
year were "an anomaly due to campus-wide debates surrounding the sexual harassment procedures." /d. 
44 7. I arrived at this figure by dividing the average number of complaints per academic year ( 41) by the 
number of female students (8445 women students). 
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IOWA 13,245 No break- No 4544su .34%449 
down by break-
type of down 
complaint by type 
of com-
plaint 
MIAMI 8689 Not main- 2450 <1 .05%451 
tained 
MINNESOTA 16,300 No break- No 56452 .34%453 
down by break-
type of down 
complaint by type 
of com-
plaint 
TEXAS 21,903 Total = Total = Total=20 .03%455 
15454 5 Average 
Average Ave- per year= 
per year= rage per 6.67 
5 year = 
448. The actual numbers of complaints of sexual harassment per year is as follows: (I) 25 for 1990-
1991; (2) 32 for 1991-1992; (3) 66 for 1992-1993; (4) 54 for 1993-1994; (5) 56 for 1994-1995; (6) 38 for 1995-
1996; and (7) 42 for 1996-1997, for a total of313 complaints over a seven-year period. See IOWA DATA, supra 
note 111. 
449. Dividing the average number of annual complaints (45) by the number of full-time female students 
(13,245) produces a reporting rate of .34%. 
450. Miami produced formal records involving faculty, students, and staff. Over the past three academic 
years, there have been five formal complaints of sexual harassment; only two involved students. The 
complainants in both cases were women. To maintain uniformity across universities, the figures in Table II 
reflect only complaints by female students. 
451. One of the formal complaints involved three graduate students. As a result, I calculated the 
reporting rate based on four students, not two complaints. The reporting rate using two complaints is even 
lower (.02%). 
452. Minnesota provided data on the basis of calendar, not academic, years. The information provided 
dates back only to the 1996 calendar year because "Minnesota does not currently have the data on contacts 
available earlier than 1996." Minnesota Letter, supra note 275. But Minnesota offered to compile the data for 
the 1995 academic year for approximately $40-the cost of two hours of time at $20 per hour. See id. 
The following are the total number of contacts made with Minnesota's Office of Equal Opportunity and 
Affirmative Action since the beginning of 1996: (I) 75 for 1996; (2) 88 for 1997; and (3) 32 through June of 
1998. These figures, however, reflect complaints by employees and students, as well as complaints handled by 
administrators and supervisors. In order to maintain some uniformity across universities, I subtracted the 
number of employee complaints from the total for each year. This still produces an exaggerated reporting rate 
because it is impossible to tell from the cumulative statistics whether complaints handled by units, e.g., by 
administrators or supervisors, involved students or employees. After subtracting employee complaints, the 
number of complaints per year at Minnesota since 1996 is as follows: (I) 49 for 1996; (2) 64 for 1997; and (3) 
28 through June of 1998. With these assumptions in mind, Minnesota had 141 complaints in the past 2.5 
calendar years, for an average of 56 complaints per year. 
453. Dividing the average number of contacts made during the 1996, 1997, and 1998 calendar years (56) 
by the number of full-time female graduate and undergraduate women (16,300) produces the reporting rate. 
454. I assumed that female students made all of the informal complaints. Informal records were 
handwritten; coupled with redaction, it was hard to accurately identify who had made each complaint. 
455. Dividing the average number of contacts per year (6.67) by the total number of female students 
(21 ,903) gives a reporting rate of approximately .03%. 
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l1.67 
t Includes both undergraduate and graduate students. 
t Cornell University ("Cornell") was not one of the institutions from which I 
sought public records; however, it publishes an annual sexual harassment 
report, which is available on the Internet.456 
tBased on reporting statistics from the 1992-93 to the 1996-97 academic 
years. 
HtBased on reporting statistics from the 1990-91 to the 1996-97 academic 
years. 
456. See Cornell Report, supra note 108. 
